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JPRS-JAR-85-013

9 May 1985

JAPAN REPORT

CONTENTS

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

AID POLICY TO BE COORDINATED WITH U.S.

OW231111 Tokyo KYODO in English 1102 GMT 23 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 23 March (KYODO)--The United States and Japan have agreed to coordinate their overseas aid policies in future, government officials said Saturday.

The officials said the agreement was reached on Saturday at a meeting between U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost and Deputy Foreign Minister Shinichiro Asao.

Asao and Armacost, who arrived Friday, discussed a wide range of topics, including U.S.-Japanese relations, foreign aid, east-west relations and the situation on the Korean peninsula, they said.

Armacost said the U.S. appreciated Japan's increasing assistance to Latin American and Carribbean countries and expressed the hope that Japan will make further efforts to improve both the quantity of its aid.

Armacost also said the U.S. hoped Japan would work out a third medium-term program for official development aid (ODA), the officials said.

Armaco and Asao agreed that the two countries would maintain close contact on the question of aid in the future, they said.

The U.S. official urged Japan to step up efforts to ease bilateral trade friction without damaging friendly relations between the two countries.

At a meeting held by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe and Secretary of State George Shultz in January, Armacost had explained what the U.S. calls "strategic assistance."

He said U.S. aid to the Middle East was increasing because Washington wants to play a greater role in the region. He added that aid to Africa is aimed at promoting self-reliance by recipient nations.

At Saturday's meeting, Asao told Armacost that Japan bases its foreign aid on considerations of both self-reliance and humanitarianism, the officials said.

He made it clear that Japan intends to increase its aid to Latin American and Caribbean nations.

Armacost urged Japan to use aid to reduce its vast foreign trade surplus.

Asao said Japan would continue assistance to the Philippines, in which the United States is strongly interested.

As for East-West relations, Armacost said it is still uncertain whether a U.S.-Soviet summit will materialize and that the United States will keep close contact with Japan on disarmament negotiations under way in Geneva.

Both sides agreed to study means to help promote dialogue between North and South Korea to ease tension on the Korean peninsula, the officials said.

In an earlier meeting with Foreign Minister Abe, Armacost said the U.S. Congress and industry expect Japan to take swift and effective measures to solve trade friction.

Armacost and Abe agreed on the need to prevent the economic problem from developing into a political issue.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

NAKASONE NOW PLANS FOR JULY EUROPEAN VISIT

OW221011 Tokyo KYODO in English 1001 GMT 22 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 22 March (KYODO)--Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is considering an official visit to France and other European countries in July, it was reported Friday.

Nakasone has so far been forced to change his European trip plans twice because of diet (parliament) sessions.

The Prime Minister was orginally scheduled to visit France and other countries in Europe last year following the London summit of industrially advanced nations.

He was earlier reported making plans to make such a visit after the Bonn summit in May.

But, like last year, the diet is expected to extend its session beyond April, forcing Nakasone to return to Tokyo immediately after the Bonn meeting.

He is also said to be interested in personally attending the United Nations General Assembly in October on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of its founding.

French President Francois Mitterrand met with Nakasone in Moscow at the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko and renewed an invitation to the Prime Minister to visit France at an early date.

Nakasone reportedly promised Mitterrand that he would visit France by September at the latest.

Government sources said France wanted to invite Nakasone in July, a month before French citizens take a summer vacation.

If Nakasone decides to make the visit to France, he would take advantage of that occasion to visit Italy, the Vatican and European community headquarters in Belgium.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

NAKASONE SEEKS SUPPORT FROM ELDER STATESMEN

Tokyo KYODO in English 0919 GMT 6 Apr 85

[Text] Tokyo, 6 Apr (KYODO)--Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone met former ministers Saturday and sought their cooperation in administering both domestic and foreign affairs.

The meeting, the third this year, was attended by "executive advisers" of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), including Nakasone's predecessors Zenko Suzuki and Takeo Fukuda.

Former speakers of the lower house and upper house presidents also took part.

Saturday's meeting focused on the current trade friction between Japan and the United States, and the senior party leaders at the meeting expressed their grave concern about the matter, according to officials.

Nakasone explained a market-opening package the government is to announce next Tuesday in a bid to resolve the trade crisis with the United States, which largely results from Japan's huge trade surplus.

Despite the imminent market-opening measures, Nakasone reportedly told the meeting, the prospects for correcting the trade imbalance are not necessarily good because interest rates in the United States remain high.

"We can't be overly optimistic," Nakasone was quoted as saying.

The United States has demanded that Japan further open up its markets to foreign products in four key areas--telecommunications, forest products, medical supplies and electronics equipment.

Nakasone also described his meeting with new Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow last month, according to the officials.

Gorbachev appeared to have a somewhat flexible attitude toward the long-standing territorial issue involving the Soviet-held Northern Islands, east of Hokkaido, Nakasone reportedly said.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

TURKISH STATE MINISTER ARRIVES FOR CELEBRATION

OW090657 Tokyo KYODO in English 0641 GMT 9 Apr 85

[Text] Tokyo, 9 Apr (KYODO)--Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe expressed Japan's appreciation Tuesday for Turkey's action in airlifting 215 Japanese nationals from war-torn Iran on March 19.

Abe conveyed Japan's appreciation to Turkish State Minister Mesut Yilmaz who is now on a five-day visit here, a foreign ministry official said.

The official said Yilmaz was responsible for overseeing the airlifting the 215 Japanese and other foreign nationals from Tehran by two Turkish aircraft on March 19 shortly after Iraq issued a warning to civilian airliners against flying over Iranian airspace.

The visiting Turkish minister emphasized the need for closer trade and economic relations with Japan, including bilateral cooperation primarily in construction projects in third countries, the official told reporters.

Yilmaz also briefly explained his country's plans to create a free trade zone along the Mediterranean Sea coast to promote external trade.

On Wednesday, the state minister will attend Turkey's National Day celebrations at the Tsukuba Science Exposition, whose organizers invited him to Japan.

Yilmaz told Abe that Turkey's Prime Minister Turgut Ozal will visit Japan, possibly in May, to help strengthen relations between the two countries.

The foreign ministry official said Abe and Yilmaz also discussed the Iran-Iraq war and their independent efforts so far to help ease the hostilities. Both Japan and Turkey maintain relatively friendly relations with the two warring states.

Abe visited Ankara in August, 1983 as the first Japanese foreign minister to visit Turkey.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JAPAN CONSIDERING WAYS TO HELP JAPANESE IN IRAN

OW190405 Tokyo KYODO in English 0351 GMT 19 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 19 March (KYODO)--The Tokyo government is considering measures to help Japanese in Iran leave the country safely as the five-year-old gulf war escalated with missile attacks on major Iranian and Iraq cities, a senior Japanese government official said Tuesday.

"We are ready to make our maximum efforts to help Japanese nationals in Iran get out of the country," Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami said. "We are now having talks with the Japanese Embassy in Tehran (on what can be done for them)."

About 400 Japanese are now living in the Iranian capital, according to foreign ministry officials.

Fujinami said the government will try to help Japanese in the city get aboard Soviet aeroflot and Iran air flights from Tehran scheduled for Tuesday.

The government will also ask Iran Air to increase its regular flights between Tehran and Tokyo, or use larger airplanes, Fujinami said, adding that sending a Japan Air Lines charter flight to the country is another possibility now under consideration.

Most Western Air Lines have stopped their service to Iran.

Iraq has warned that all commercial airplanes stay clear of Iranian air space, declaring the area will be a war zone beginning 8:30pm Tuesday (local time).

In the meantime, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe, speaking at an Upper House Committee meeting, described the state of war as "serious."

"The situation will become grave if (Tehran is exposed to) indiscriminate bombing," Abe said.

He said what is urgently needed at present is to move women and children to safety, suggesting it is difficult to get all Japanese nationals out of the country all at once.

As Abe urged both Iran and Iraq to exercise restraint, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said the U.N. Security Council may need to strengthen its peace keeping function.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

ASAO, ARMACOST TO DISCUSS FOREIGN AID POLICIES

OW201213 Tokyo KYODO in English 1158 GMT 20 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 20 March (KYODO)--"Strategic assistance" will be a dominant topic at weekend talks between Michael Armacost, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and Japanese officials, Foreign Ministry officials said Wednesday.

Armacost is to arrive in Tokyo Friday after visiting Pakistan, India, China and South Korea.

His talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Shinichiro Asao and other officials will focus on how to adjust the foreign aid policies of Tokyo and Washington, a Ministry source said.

Japan's aid policy was previously characterized by its emphasis on "humanitarian" economic assistance to poor countries in general. The U.S. is more "selective" in giving aid for strategic considerations.

The administration of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has been pursuing a line similar to that of the U.S. in the past few years, Tokyo increased assistance to Turkey, Jamaica and Pakistan, which are located very close to warring coutnries.

Those countries belong to regions to which Washington extends what it calls "strategic assistance."

In a joint communique with the U.S. in 1981, Japan declared that it will step up assistance toward regions vital for maintaining peace and security of the world.

The coming high-level consultations on foreign aid policy follow an agreement reached between Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe and Secretary of State George Shultz during the New Year's Summit in Los Angeles.

According to the Ministry source, the Armacost-Asao talks are expected to center on the two countries' aid policy toward Southeast Asia, specifically the Philippines, and South Korea.

The meeting, to be held on Saturday, will also cover the prospect of the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks in Geneva, Asian situation and the recent change of the Soviet leadership, the source said.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

FOREIGN MINISTRY DECLASSIFIES MORE DOCUMENTS

OW240839 Tokyo KYODO in English 0806 GMT 24 Mar 85

[Excerpts] Tokyo, 24 Mar (KYODO)--The United States endorsed Japan to reopen whaling just after World War II but is now trying to put an end to Japan's centuries long business, showed diplomatic documents declassified on Sunday.

The 20,810-page documents dated mainly from 1951 and 1953 depicted chiefly processes of Japan's return to the international community after its defeat in the war.

Major themes contained in the volume of 18 reels of microfilm covered Japanese efforts to win membership in the United Nations, conclude a peace pact with India, join the International Whaling Treaty and to sign trade agreements with many countries.

However, the foreign ministry said it would keep some documents still confidential to "protect significant national interests."

Those documents were the eighth volume in a series. The foreign ministry first declassified diplomatic records over 30 years old in 1976.

The ministry last declassified diplomatic documents in September 1982 which dealt mainly with diplomatic maneuvers toward the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty both signed in 1951.

The United States-led supreme command allied powers permitted Japan in November 1945 to resume whaling because of severe food shortages which hit postwar Japan.

It also allowed Japanese fishermen in August 1946 to go whaling in the Antarctic Ocean, according to the documents.

Japan joined the International Whaling Treaty in April 1951 and was host to the sixth meeting in Tokyo of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in July 1954, said the documents.

The IWC adopted a resolution in 1982 to call for a 10-year moratorium on whale hunting amid surging voices for protection of the mammals' resources.

After a lapse of over three decades, the United States has turned to be a prime mover to put Japan's whalers on the verge of death.

The United States has threatened to sharply cut fish catch quotas for Japan in the U.S. 200-mile zone unless Japan withdraws an objection to the anti-whaling resolution.

Japan now appears certain to cease commercial whaling by 1988 as Japanese fishermen earn 10 times more in America's 200-mile zone than whalers in the antarctic and in northern pacific waters who bring in 14 billion yen.

Much of the documents focused on Japanese diplomatic efforts to join the United Nations.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

JAPAN VIEWS OECD SESSION WITH 'GUARDED OPTIMISM'

OW251221 Tokyo KYODO in English 1204 GMT 25 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 25 Mar (KYODO)--Marcroeconomics and a new round of multilateral trade talks will dominate a two-day ministerial meeting of the organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) next month, foreign ministry officials said Monday.

The two topics are also certain to be discussed at full length by leaders of seven industrialized democracies during their annual economic talks in Bonn, West Germany May 2-4, the ministry officials predicted.

Outlining Japan's basic stance on macroeconomic factors like America's current account and budgetary deficits, high interest rates and strong dollar, a ministry official said Japan is looking forward to the OECD meeting in Paris April 11-12 with guarded optimism.

High jobless rates and cumbersome industrial structural adjustments in western european countries are also high on the agenda, along with Japan's chronic current account surplus that reached a record 35 billion dollars in 1984, according to the ministry official.

Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe and Economic Planning Agency Chief Ippei Kaneko are scheduled to attend the OECD gathering.

In addition to macroeconomics, ministry officials said, trade matters--notably a new round of multilateral trade consultations--will be another main feature of the meeting, which follows the european community's recent announcement of an official commitment to such a new round.

Both Japan and the United States strongly favor a new trade round under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Japan's successful performance at the OECD meeting hinges on specifically "how Japan can cite its own specific contributions to the world economy," a foreign ministry official explained.

The source said he does not expect the meeting to become a forum for name-calling, but rather to focus on a new round and the extent of commitment, particularly by the EC.

The EC foreign ministers failed last week to fix a date for the start of such a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Other trade issues to be discussed include means to roll back protectionism such as an acceleration of tariff cuts and sector study on autos, steel, textiles, light electricals, machine tools and shoes, and mixed loans.

Fund flows into developing countries, investment in less developed countries and utilization of science and technology as a way to revitalize economies will be also covered in the OECD conference, foreign ministry officials said.

They said 20th Anniversary projects concerning information and telecommunications will be another issue of debate. Japan proposed the projects during last year's OECD ministerial meeting to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of its entry into the Paris-based organization, which is marking its 25th birthday this year.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

LOCAL ASSEMBLIES OPPOSE ALIEN FINGERPRINTING

OW261113 Tokyo KYODO in English 0955 GMT 26 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 26 Mar (KYODO)--With an estimated 200,000 foreign residents of Japan due to renew their alien registrations between July and September, opposition to fingerprinting, a registration procedure, is mounting.

According to reports by the general association of Korean residents in Japan, the Korean residents union in Japan and other private groups, as of Tuesday a total of 702 local assemblies had voiced opposition to certain requirements in the registration of foreign nationals.

Opposition by the assemblies, representing 339 cities, 13 metropolitan governments (including Tokyo), 299 towns and 40 villages, had taken the form of a statement calling for the elimination of fingerprinting and compulsory carrying of the alien registration certificate by all foreign residents.

The justice ministry specifies that alien registration certificates must be carried at all times by foreign residents 16 years of age and over, and be renewed every five years. As a result, a new set of fingerprints are required whenever registration, initial or otherwise, takes place.

According to justice ministry records, a total of 176 foreign nationals residing in 21 urban and rural prefectures have refused to undergo fingerprinting to date.

Government officials maintain that while there are no plans to introduce a bill amending the current alien registration law to the diet, problems in the procedure are under study.

The justice ministry, in charge of regulating the activities of foreign residents, has announced that certain alterations will be introduced this year to facilitate smoother registration.

One example is a plan to introduce inkless fingerprinting.

However, anti-fingerprinting groups point out that such cosmetic changes will not cover up the basic flaw in the procedure, which they claim violates human dignity.

With a large number of fingerprinting refusals scheduled to take place in the peak summer period, the anti-fingerprinting groups are aiming for the support of 1,000 local assemblies as a means of turning public opinion to their side.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

FURTHER ON DSP CHAIRMAN SASAKI'S PLAN TO RESIGN

OW271233 Tokyo KYODO in English 1222 GMT 27 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 27 Mar (KYODO)--Ryosaku Sasaki, Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party, said Wednesday he would resign his post at a regular party convention to be held in late April.

Sasaki, 79, expressed his intention to resign at an extraordinary central executive committee meeting after heading the third largest opposition party for over seven years, the longest in the party.

Sasaki told reporters that he wished to make a fresh start for the party which will mark its 25th Founding Anniversary at the coming convention.

Vice Chairman Tadashi Kodaira and Masao Nakamura also intend to resign their posts.

Sasaki's resignation is expected to have subtle effects on a coalition scheme pursued at his initiative with the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party.

It is also likely to speed up a shift of power to a younger generation of leaders in the political world.

Sasaki said he wants to select his successor by early next month if possible.

Secretary General Saburo Tsukamoto, 57, is considered the likeliest successor.

However, Eiichi Nagasue, 67, Chairman of the party's Diet Policy Committee, is also regarded as a strong potential candidate.

Sasaki plans to select his successor in consultation with party elders, including adviser Ikko Kasuga and Vice Chairmen Kodaira and Nakamura.

Sasaki came under fire within the party for involvement in an abortive scheme to support LDP Vice President Susumu Nikaido in last October's LDP presidential election.

Complaints about Sasaki's long chairmanship were also mounting in the party and Japanese confederation of labor (DOMEI) affiliated with the party.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

TSUKAMOTO LIKELY DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY HEAD

OW281135 Tokyo KYODO in English 1114 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 28 Mar (KYODO)--Saburo Tsukamoto is most likely to be named new Chairman of the Moderate Opposition Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) to succeed Ryosaku Sasaki who expressed his intention to step down Wednesday to "rejuvenate" the party, political sources said Thursday.

Tsukamoto, 57, is currently secretary general the No. 2 Officer of the party.

Keigo Ouchi, 55-year-old chairman of the policy board (chief policymaker) is eyed as the strongest candidate for the position of secretary general, the sources said.

Outgoing Chairman Sasaki, 70, is prevailing on party executives and senior parliamentarians as well as leaders of DSP-affiliated labor organizations and supporting groups to help pick Tsukamoto and Ouchi for the No. 1 and No. 2 posts of the third opposition party, the sources also said.

Sasaki reportedly considers that a Tsukamoto-Ouchi team would be best for the party because of their political skills and their relative youth which would help contribute to the party's youth movement.

Ouchi is still a junior parliamentarian but his ability as policymaker is highly evaluated in the party.

Ikko Kasuga, former chairman who still retains strong influence over party members, supports Sasaki's idea but some segments of the party are grooming popular senior parliamentarian Eiichi Nagasue for the chairmanship, the sources said.

Therefore, it will be some time before the new lineup is decided, the sources added.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

TANAKA SAID MAKING 'VERY SMOOTH RECOVERY'

OW281123 Tokyo KYODO in English 1115 GMT 28 Mar 85

[Text] Tokyo, 28 Mar (KYODO)--Former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, in hospital since he suffered a stroke a month ago, is making a "very smooth recovery" and is expected to be able to start working again in two or three months, his doctors said Thursday.

They added, however, Tanaka could take a little longer getting back to work, "because the effects of rehabilitation vary from person to person."

The condition of Tanaka, the focus of great political concern and speculation, was reported at a news conference by Dr Tsunehiko Watanabe, Director of Teishin Hospital, where Tanaka has been confined since February 27. Dr Masaaki Kashima, Tanaka's chief physician, was also present.

Dr Watanabe said the former prime minister "has completely regained consciousness and there is almost no danger of relapse."

"By getting back to work," the doctor said he meant a condition in which Tanaka would be able to meet and talk with people as a politician.

Dr Watanabe told the news conference, third on Tanaka's condition since he was hospitalized, a rehabilitation program was begun for the 66-year-old former prime minister two weeks ago by Prof Toshi Uyeda of Tokyo University, whom he described as the world's top authority in mobility therapy.

The treatment included training in sitting and standing positions and also using a wheelchair, Dr Watanabe said.

He said the edema in Tanaka's brain has almost subsided.

As for Tanaka's capacity for speech, the doctor said he was "good enough for daily conversation" but was still not talking as fast and loudly as he used to.

Dr Watanabe also said no visitors were allowed to see Tanaka, though he was "medically well enough" to meet them, because "it's difficult to decide who can and who can't."

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

RAILWAYS PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION CAUSES PROBLEMS

OW041301 Tokyo KYODO in English 1249 GMT 4 Apr 85

[Text] Tokyo, 4 Apr (KYODO)--Iwao Nisugi, President of Japanese National Railways, has tendered his resignation to Transport Minister Tokuo Yamashita, a top ruling Liberal-Democratic Party leader revealed Thursday.

The leader said that the reason for the offered resignation was the recent questioning in the diet on the JNR awarding of contracts to a construction firm in which Nisugi's family had interests.

The LDP leader said, however, that the transport minister only "received" the resignation offer without intention of accepting it.

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone denied the resgination offer in the diet earlier Thursday and said that he wished to have Nisugi to continue his work as president of JNR.

Informed sources said that the government was not prepared to allow Nisugi to resign at this stage while a committee on the restructuring of JNR is scheduled to complete its final recommendation in July on the division and denationalization of the deficit-ridden national railways.

Indications are clear that there will be considerable trouble if the government wanted to replace Nisugi at present, the sources said.

Nisugi's resignation offer has no doubt created a major issue which will have an impact on the current work of the committee to draft the final recommendation.

Nisugi was installed as JNR President by Nakasone with intention of pushing through the restructuring of the national railways under his administrative reform pledge for smaller and cheaper government.

Opinions have been sharply divided within the national railways on the division and denationalization plan since the plan was revealed by the committee in August last year.

The JNR has come up with its own plan to restructure itself without changing its present system. But this plan only brought strong objections from both the government and the ruling party.

The announcement of such a plan by JNR also cast doubt among government and LDP officials that Nisugi did not have sufficient power as a leader for restructuring the national railways, according to sources.

The tendering of the resignation may be an indication that Nisugi is no longer confident of leading the national railways toward denationalization, they added.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

NAKASONE ON ALIEN REGISTRATION LAW IMPROVEMENT

OW051243 Tokyo KYODO in English 1235 GMT 5 Apr 85

[Text] Tokyo, 5 Apr (KYODO)--Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, speaking at the House of Councillors meeting Friday, said he had urged the ministries concerned to improve the alien registration law which requires controversial fingerprinting of foreign residents in Japan, government officials said the same day.

Nakasone reportedly said he thinks improvement of the law is necessary as quickly as possible, and it is now under study by the justice and foreign ministries, national policy agency and other government agencies.

The government officials said possible alterations should be ready for discussion in the regular meeting between Japanese and Korean cabinet members set for this summer.

At the councillors meeting, Security Bureau Director Yoshinori Shibata expressed his support for the current fingerprinting system as "important for the maintenance of public security and order," the officials said.

Shibata said that fingerprinting is the best way to identify foreign nationals in Japan and is effective in preventing illegal entrants, the officials added.

The alien registration law requires all foreigners aged 14 and over wishing to live in Japan for more than one year to be fingerprinted within 90 days of their arrival, with the procedures to be renewed every five years.

There are an estimated 200,000 foreign residents in Japan due to renew their alien registrations between July and September. However, 339 cities and 13 metropolitan governments including Tokyo have called for the elimination of fingerprinting.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

GOVERNMENT REPORT ON WOMEN'S ROLE IN SOCIETY

OW090143 Tokyo KYODO in English 0201 GMT 9 Apr 85

[Text] Tokyo, 9 Apr (KYODO)--The status of women in Japan has improved markedly over the past decade but the people as a whole still have strong ideas about the 'fixed' social roles of men and women, according to a government report released Tuesday.

Despite the improvements, both men and women in Japan have become increasingly aware of inequalities, it said.

The report, the fourth in a series, was issued by the prime minister's office to mark the final year of the 'United Nations Decade For Women.'

The 363-page report cited a series of legislation that has sought to improve women's position in law and in jobs.

The government has enacted a new nationality law, which came into force from the start of this year, enabling Japanese women married to foreigners to pass their Japanese nationality on to their children, the report said.

The report also cited other legal reforms, such as giving a great share of inheritance to the wife upon the death of her spouse and the right to retain a married name after divorce.

On working conditions, the report singled out current legislation aimed at relaxing restrictions on job promotion and working hours for women.

Although there have been achievements, the idea that men and women should play a fixed social role is still strongly rooted in the society, the report said.

It will take a long time and great effort to improve the situation, it said.

The report, for instance, noted that women still comprise only some 5 percent of the members of the various advisory councils appointed by the government.

This is an improvement, the report said, as they made up only 2.4 percent 10 years ago.

Despite the improvements, women have increasingly become aware of their unequal position in the society.

A poll taken by the government in 1972 indicated that 62.3 percent of the women felt there were inequalities in their social status, and the figure rose to 77.5 percent in a similar poll taken in May last year, the report said. The figures cited for men were 61.6 percent in 1982 and 69.4 percent last May.

The report, which was accepted by the cabinet at its regular meeting Tuesday, urged further efforts toward equality for women.

CSO: 4100/342

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL

BRIEFS

YUGOSLAVIA'S DEBTS--Tokyo, 20 March (KYODO)--Japan and Yugoslavia exchanged documents of agreement in Belgrade Wednesday on rescheduling repayment of Yugoslavia's debts to Japan. The agreement covers governmental loans due to be repaid at the end of last year and commercial debts. The loans owed by the bank of Yugoslavia to export-import ban of Japan amount to 770 million yen. In addition, Yugoslavia's dollar-based commercial debts amounted to about 3,607,000 dollars and its yen-based debts about 1.32 billion yen. Yugoslavia will be allowed to repay all the debts in six semiannual installments starting December 31, 1988. The export-import bank loans carry an interest rate of 5.75 percent per annum. The annual interest rate for the dollar-based debts is 11 percent and that for the yen-based debts 7.9 percent. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1229 GMT 20 Mar 85 OW]

ROK FISHING BOAT SEIZED--Toyama, 22 Mar (KYODO)--The skipper of a 36-ton South Korean fishing boat was arrested off Ishikawa prefecture on the sea of Japan coast early Friday morning for violating Japanese territorial waters, according to the Regional Maritime Safety Office in Fushiki, Toyama prefecture. The Japanese patrol boat Noto found the Korean boat Dongkang fishing for conger eels about 1.5 kilometers inside territorial waters off Hakui, Ishikawa prefecture, a report reaching the Maritime Office said. The patrol arrested its skipper Pak Mun-chun and seized the boat with a crew of 12, the report said. The South Korean fishing boat will be towed to Fushiki Port Saturday morning for questioning of its crewman, Maritime Officials said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0910 GMT 22 Mar 85 OW]

AID TO MALAYSIA, MOZAMBIQUE--Tokyo, 21 Mar (KYODO)--Japan has agreed to extend 2.1 billion yen in yen credits to Malaysia, and 500 million yen in grant-in-aid to the southern African state of Mozambique, the Government announced Thrusday. Official documents were exchanged the same day in Kuala Lumpur and Harare, Zimbabwe, the Government said. The yen credits for Malaysia carry an annual interest of 4.5 percent and are repayable over a period of 25 years, including a 7-year grace period, the announcement said. Malaysia will use the loans to push its projects for the sabah gas supply network, an optical fiber communications sytem, a toll expressway and the Malaya Railway diesel locomotive purchase, it said. The grant to Mozambique is to be used to buy materials needed for a road improvement project around the nation's capital, Maputo, the announcement said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0805 GMT 21 Mar 85 OW]

WHALING BAN--Tokyo, 25 March (KYODO)--Japan might soon have to withdraw its objections to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) decision on a moratorium on commercial whaling, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe told the House of Councillors' Budget Committee Monday. Abe said that although the government has not decided officially yet, Japan will have to choose between whaling and fishing in U.S. waters. The United States has told Japan that it will invoke an American law curbing Japan's fishing quota in its waters unless Japan withdraws its objections to the IWC by April 1. Abe pointed to the strong American influence on world-wide support of a whaling ban, and added that Japan can not stop the U.S. from invoking the law. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0655 GMT 25 Mar 85 OW]

NIKAIDO VISITS CHINA--Tokyo, 25 March (KYODO)--Susumu Nikaido, Vice President of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, leaves Wednesday for a four-day visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese government. During his stay in Beijing, Nikaido is to meet Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang, Premier Zhao Ziyang and Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian. Nikaido, who conferred with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone about the trip, said he will carry a personal message from Nakasone to Hu. However, he is not expected to engage in any substantial talks with the Chinese leaders. "I've got lots of old friends there, and the trip is just to say hello," he told reporters. Nikaido is a frequent traveler to China. His last trip was in February 1983, when he went as a special emissary from Nakasone. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0837 GMT 25 Mar 85 OW]

JAPAN TO REMAIN IN UNESCO--Tokyo, 18 March (KYODO)--Japan is not thinking of leaving UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe said Monday. Abe said Japan intends to remain inside the body to work for reform. Abe's statement came in response to a socialist questioner during a meeting of the Upper House Budget Committee. His remarks marked a softening of Japan's position toward the U.N. agency. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone told the same committee last week that Japan may withdraw unless UNESCO reforms. Abe said Japan's presence in UNESCO is important for reform of the organization. He said he had instructed the Japanese representative at UNESCO to follow the government's stand. A senior Foreign Ministry official also told the diet panel that the government plans to boost its personnel at UNESCO to take a more active role in reforming the organization. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1057 GMT 18 Mar 85 OW]

UNESCO TO BE REVITALIZED--Tokyo, 11 April (KYODO)--Japan will call on UNESCO Director general Amadow-mahtar M'bow to revitalize the U.N. body during his five-day visit beginning Sunday, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Thursday. Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe intends to express Japan's strong wish to see the revitalization of UNESCO, the United Nations educational, scientific and cultural organization, during his meeting April 16 with M'bow, ministry spokesman Yoshio Hatano said. Despite Japan's previous warnings that it would "reconsider" its membership of UNESCO, the spokesman said Japan plans to strive for reforms while remaining inside the organization. M'bow, of Senegal, is expected to seek a renewed commitment to UNESCO from Japan, which provides about 10 percent of its budget. The United States, which had been contributing a quarter of the UNESCO budget, withdrew from the U.N. agency at the end of last year. M'bow, whose first visit to Japan was last July, is scheduled to attend UNESCO day celebrations at the Tsukuba Science Exposition and meet Education Minister Hikaru Matsunaga and other Japanese governemnt and business leaders during his stay. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0741 GMT 11 Apr 85 OW]

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNESCO--Japan has no intention to increase its contribution to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to make up for the fund shortage following the withdrawal of the U.S. from the organization, Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe said Tuesday. UNESCO has been asking Japan for additional contributions. The U.S. used to bear around 25 percent of the total amount of UNESCO funds. In a session of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Abe said that he would like to discuss with UNESCO Director general Amadou-mahtar M'bow the organization's problems and find out whether he has the will to carry out UNESCO reforms when he visits Tokyo next month. "Japan wants to remain in UNESCO and work for the organization's reform, Abe said. In February, Japan warned that it may consider withdrawing from UNESCO unless the U.N. agency carries out sweeping reforms by this fall. The Foreign Ministry's position is that UNESCO should reduce its activities and programs considered to be politically biased should be cut to cope with the fund shortage due to the U.S. withdrawal. [Text] [Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 27 Mar 85 p 3 OW]

SWEDISH KING AND HIROHITO MEET--Tokyo, 25 March (KYODO)--Sweden's King Carl XVI Gustaf met Japanese Emperor Hirohito at the Imperial Palace Monday morning, officials said. The Emperor gave a lunch party for the Swedish King later. The Emperor's two sons, Crown Prince Akihito and Prince Hitachi and their wives, attended the party, the officials said. Prince Akihito and Princess Michiko will invite the Swedish monarch to their palace for a dinner party Monday evening, they said. The 51-year-old heir to the Japanese throne is scheduled to visit Sweden in June. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0503 GMT 25 Mar 85 OW]

NAKASONE AND SWEDISH KING MEETING--Tokyo, 29 March (KYODO)--Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone Friday paid a call on visiting King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden at the Swedish Embassy in Tokyo. In a meeting with the King, Nakasone discussed the proposed visit of Japan's Crown Prince Akihito to Sweden in June. Carl XVI Gustaf arrived in Japan March 22, heading the royal Swedish technology mission, for his fifth Japan visit. He took part Friday morning in Sweden's National Day celebrations at his nations Tsukuba Expo 85 pavilion at the fair site in Ibaraki prefecture. During his nine-day visit, scheduled to end Saturday, the King met with Emperor Hirohito and toured high-tech industrial facilities and scientific research institutes. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1149 GMT 29 Mar 85 OW]

JAPAN THANKS TURKEY FOR AID--Tokyo, 20 March (KYODO)--The Japanese government Wednesday thanked Turkey for helping Japanese nationals flee war-stricken Iran by offering airliner seats. Tokyo's gratitude was expressed by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe to the Ankara government through the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo, ministry officials said. With Iraq threatening to attack airliners flying into Iran's airspace, the Turkish airlines offered some 200 seats of a regular and an extra flight to the Japanese desperate to get out of Iran. Most of the Japanese left Tehran Tuesday aboard the Turkish planes and an Air France plane. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1240 GMT 20 Mar 85 OW]

IRANIAN OFFICIAL MEETS WITH ABE--Tokyo, 16 Mar (KYODO)--A special Iranian envoy arrived in Tokyo Saturday to explain to Japan the Iranian stance toward the escalating war with Iraq, foreign ministry sources said. They said the envoy, an official responsible for parliamentary affairs in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, will see Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe Saturday evening before proceeding to China Sunday. Iran is understood to have dispatched a total of five senior officials on similar missions to six other countries and the United Nations. The emissaries are expected to seek international condemnation of recent Iraqi air raids on Iranian cities. Besides Japan, envoys are said to be on their way to India, Turkey, the United States, Pakistan, East Germany and China. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0642 GMT 26 Mar 85 OW]

COOPERATION DISCUSSED--Tokyo, 26 Mar (KYODO)--Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone told a visiting official of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Tuesday that Japan has been endeavoring to open its markets to ASEAN products as it is for American ones. Nakasone met Phan Wannamethee, Secretary General of ASEAN, in the prime minister's office. Touching on a concept of pacific basin cooperation, Nakasone stressed that he fully respects the initiative by the ASEAN countries in the concept and that Japan and the United States should back up the ASEAN initiative. The ASEAN leader said the ASEAN group plans to put a priority on fostering human resources at first to promote the regional cooperation in the pacific rim. He is here mainly to attend a Japan-ASEAN meeting of business employers, sponsored by the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Doyukai) in Tokyo on Monday and Tuesday. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1035 GMT 26 Mar 85 OW]

PLAN TO INCREASE ODA--Tokyo, 25 Mar (KYODO)--Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone Monday implicitly endorsed a foreign ministry plan for another program to boost Japan's official development assistance (ODA) for developing countries. Nakasone dropped the hint when he was briefed by an aide on committee work to draft a set of measures to open Japan's market more to foreign products. Nakasone told Saburo Okita, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on External Economic Affairs, that he saw the need for increasing ODA under a detailed program, official sources said. The foreign ministry is considering incorporating a new ODA program into the planned market-opening package. Japan has been trying to double ODA through two programs--first under a three-year program from fiscal 1978 and then under a five-year program from fiscal 1981. Meanwhile, the committee held its ninth meeting earlier Monday but remained wide apart on many market-opening measures, committee sources said. It was agreed to call another session April 1 in a bid to find common ground and let a subcommittee work out draft recommendation in time for adoption expected April 9, they added. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1228 GMT 25 Mar 85 OW]

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENTS--Tokyo, 29 Mar (KYODO)--The government officially appointed novelist Shumon Miura as Chief of the Cultural Affairs Agency to succeed Isao Suzuki. Miura, 59, is the first man of culture in 13 years to take the post after the late Hidemi Kon, the agency's first head. The government also officially appointed the presidents of six state-run universities including the University of Tokyo. Newly-appointed presidents were Wataru Mori, 59, of the University of Tokyo, and Toru Yokoyama, 62, of the Yokohama National University. Minoru Takeda, Ambassador to Ireland, was appointed as Chief of the Akasaka Guest House to succeed Kenjiro Rikiishi. After joining the foreign ministry in 1947, Takeda, 63, a native of Yamaguchi Prefecture, has served as Ambassador to Ireland since January 1982. The government also appointed Hisashi Kotani, 53, Deputy Chief of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, as Chief of the National Defense College to succeed Santo Ito who is retiring. All the appointments are to be officially announced next Monday. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0459 GMT 29 Mar 85 OW]

GRANT AID TO SOMALIA--Tokyo, 20 Mar (KYODO)--Japan will give the Somali Democratic Republic 600 million yen (2.3 million dolalrs) to buy food and farm equipment, the Government said Wednesday. Of the total, 400 million yen (1.6 million dollars) will go to buy wheat from the U.S., and the rest will be spent on farm equipment for the country's current 5-year agricultural program, which lasts through next year. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0231 GMT 20 Mar 85 OW]

ENVOY TO IRELAND--Tokyo, 19 Mar (KYODO)--Yoshinao Odaka will replace Minoru Takeda as ambassador to Ireland, the Foreign Ministry said Tuesday. Odaka, 62, a career diplomat, has been on the waiting list since January since leaving his post as ambassador to Laos, the Ministry said. Takada will return to Tokyo. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0030 GMT 19 Mar 85 OW]

EDUCATIONAL COOPERATION WITH USSR--Osaka, 18 Mar (KYODO)--Osaka City University Monday approved a pact to cooperate with Leningrad A.A. Zhdanov State University in the Soviet Union in teaching staff and literature exchanges. Consultations between the institutions will begin shortly, with delegations to exchange visits every few years. Osaka and Leningrad formed sister-city ties in August 1979, and the Soviet University proposed the cooperation agreement with the Japanese University in August 1981. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0918 GMT 18 Mar 85 OW]

GRANT TO INDONESIA--Tokyo, 18 Mar (KYODO)--Japan agreed Monday to give 2.2 billion yen to Indonesia to help develop the country's agricultural industry, the Foreign Ministry announced. The note of agreement was exchanged in Jakarta earlier in the day, the Ministry said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0905 GMT 18 Mar 85 OW]

IWA RESOLUTION--Tokyo, 20 March (KYODO)--The government believes that it will have to ultimately withdraw its objection to an International Whaling Commission (IWC) resolution calling for a moratorium on commercial whaling, government sources said Wednesday. The sources said the government now takes this stand in the face of a U.S. threat to cut Japan's fish catch quota in the U.S. 200-mile economic zone. The government, however, considers it absolutely necessary to win a U.S. agreement on continuation of commercial whaling for two years. In this connection, the sources said, the governments will shortly begin negotiations on the matter in Washington. The new government policy means that Japan will completely stop commercial whaling in 1988 at the latest, they added. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 1243 GMT 20 Mar 85 OW]

AFFORESTATION PROJECT IN KENYA--Tokyo, 23 March (KYODO)--Japan is to give technical and financial help to Kenya in a seven-year forestation project starting in 1986, it was announced Saturday. The project, drawn up by the Forestry Agency and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, will involve help with training and the setting up of experimental and administrative facilities in Kenya. The two agencies plan to send study teams to Kenya in May and September to draw up final details of the project, the cost of which has not yet been announced. Feasibility studies began in 1983. Kenya, one of the worst-hit countries in the drought affecting North Africa, launched a scheme several years ago to plant 200 million young trees each year. It has turned to Japan because of the expertise and technology which have helped Japan achieve a high ratio of forestation despite its small land area, officials said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0546 GMT 23 Mar 85 OW]

AID TO CAMBODIAN REFUGEES--Tokyo, 23 March (KYODO)--Vice Parliamentary Foreign Minister Mayumi Moriyama Saturday presented a list of Japan's 736 million yen (2.9 million dollars) in grant aid for Cambodian refugees through two U.N. agencies. Details of the aid were given by Moriyama to representatives of the U.N. agencies in Bangkok, where she is now visiting, a Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman said. The aid will comprise 391 million yen for Cambodians now temporarily housed at refugee centers in Thailand, and 345 million yen for Cambodian forced to move to Cambodian-Thai border areas and Thai people affected by the six-year-old fighting in the country, the spokesman said. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0958 GMT 23 Mar 85 OW]

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MILITARY

NUCLEAR WAR, SELF-DEFENSE FORCES DISCUSSED

Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Feb 1985 pp 74-139

[Article by SEKAI Editorial Division: "White Paper: Nuclear War and the Self-Defense Forces"]

[Text] Introduction

Toward Cooperation in Combat-Like Operations

Twice in the past, in the December 1982 and December 1983 issues, we made known to the world in the form of "white papers" on the actual situation regarding Japan's current military strength and the trend toward militarization which spreads across [Japanese] society as a whole.

These [white papers] analyzed and reported the transformation of the Self-Defense Forces into real combat forces and their unification with U.S. Forces. They dealt with the mounting defense expenditure, which is also connected with the line of the Ad Hoc Commission on Administrative Reform; the upgrading of equipment, and the accompanying movement for militarization of society and the economy which, with the heightening of U.S.-Soviet tension, suddenly developed after 1980--to be more precise, after agreement by the governments of Japan and the United States on "guidelines for Japan-U.S. cooperation on defense" in 1978.

Throughout 1984, even Prime Minister Nakasone, who in the past had invited public criticism by his statements on "[Japan] the unsinkable aircraft carrier" and "the destined community of Japan and the United States," maintained a low posture, and America, too, gave the impression that it had toned down somewhat the strident demands which it had been making on Japan since the beginning of the 1980's.

But, once the tracks had been laid, Japanese militarization advanced along them at top speed, so it seems likely that America toned down its strong demands on Japan because America recognized that they had borne results, and "seeing that the expansion of hardware was already on track, switched to the stage of seeking cooperation in combat-like operations" (editorial in the ASAHI SHIMBUN on 29 June 1984).

The Completion of Research on Joint Japanese-U.S. Tactics

It must be noted that Japan is running in a more dangerous direction. Proof of this is found in the rush of port calls at Yokosuka by U.S. nuclear submarines capable of carrying the Tomahawk nuclear missiles which were deployed for actual combat in June 1984, the intensification of joint Japanese-U.S. land, sea, and air exercises, and the size of U.S. Naval exercises around Japan, which are said to be the largest in history.

Among these [exercises], the participation of the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the RIMPAC 84, a 5-nation joint naval exercise in the summer of 1984, in which 50,000 troops and 80 warships were committed including 2 aircraft carriers (extending from the west coast of the United States to the vicinity of Hawaii) and FLETEX 85, in the autumn of 1984, in which 5 aircraft carriers and 60 warships took part (extending from the west coast of the United States to the North Pacific and the Indian Ocean) probably deserves special mention.

Of the "study on defense," "study on a system of emergency laws," (in principle these first two are carried out independently by Japan), "study on joint Japanese-U.S. tactics," "study on emergencies in the Far East," and "joint study on defense of sea lanes" which were pointed out as "five studies" in the December 1983 issue of SEKAI, the "study on joint Japanese-U.S. tactics," which began in 1979, was completed in November 1984 and formally signed by the government. On 16 November [1984] the second interim report was promulgated on the "study on a system of emergency laws," which had begun in 1977. The plan for "joint Japanese-U.S. tactics" is a scenario that forecasts the course of battle in Japanese airspace and Japan's peripheral waters within U.S. world strategy, including even a division of military roles between Japan and the United States. It is expected that this is directly tied to recent Japanese-U.S. joint exercises and to trends in U.S. forces in the Far East. And the "study on a system of emergency laws" is a study devoted to building a society which gives priority to military affairs so that a war can actually be prosecuted.

Japan has advanced one step further on the road to war.

"Nuclear [Weapons]" Must Be Made An Issue

Such being the case, what sort of "war" would it be? According to the government, Japan's basic policy on defense is "an exclusively defensive defense posture" which "will resort to defensive force only after suffering an armed attack by an adversary" (1959 white paper on defense). Consequently, "exercise of the right of collective self-defense (deletion) is not permitted under the Constitution" (1959 white paper on defense). Furthermore, it is arranged that "[Japan] shall rely upon its mutual security arrangement with the United States [to make up for] insufficiencies in our nation's defensive strength, such as deterrent against the threat of nuclear [weapons], and the ability to meet a large-scale invasion [by an aggressor] using conventional weapons."

And Japan's current military strength is supposed to have been fitted out "with the object of being able to deal effectively with situations up to and including limited, small-scale invasion" (National Defense Program Outline" established in October 1976 by resolution of the cabinet and the National Defense Council).

This does not hypothesize a large-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, of course, it does not hypothesize a nuclear war either.

In that case, is there really conformity between this kind of officially announced Japanese defense policy and the situation which is actually in progress?

This must be answered in the negative.

"Military Alliance and Nuclear Weapons"

There is no one, including the Japanese Government itself, and the U.S. Government, who believes that in the near future Japan will separately suffer an attack from a neighboring power, including the Soviet Union, or enter a state of war. Rather, what is currently being considered is a U.S.-Soviet clash on a world level and Japan's role as a member nation of the U.S. "military alliance."

In such a case, "nuclear [weapons]" must naturally be taken for granted.

It goes without saying that the mainstay of U.S. military might are "nuclear [weapons]" of various sizes. We, too, have repeatedly touched upon the "nuclear" question in analyzing U.S. world strategy. But in reporting on Japan's militarization we have never openly analyzed its relationship to "nuclear [weapons]."

In Japan, when formally debating the problem of security, [everyone,] including the government itself, has totally excluded nuclear war from the hypothesis.

This time we have made the problem of "nuclear [weapons]" and Japan's military might the main theme of the "white paper," because it is now impossible to make any sort of analysis of trends in Japan's current militarization if one ignores that problem.

There exists a probability that Japan itself will acquire nuclear weapons. [Japan] possesses sufficient productive capacity, and it is the sort of government "sense" which presents a problem concerning the "three nonnuclear principles" on the uniform exam [for state college admission] and gives as the correct answer: "The possession of small nuclear weapons is not a violation of the Constitution." But there is probably no objection to setting that question aside for the time being. This is because actual conditions do not permit [the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan]. The Japanese people are, of course, opposed, and America does not wish it.

The focal point of the problem is "Japanese-U.S. Security."

Whether it was the RIMPAC exercise or the FLETEX exercise, the keynote was the idea of "nuclear [weapons]." The joint army exercise in Tohoku and Hokkaido in the fall of 1984 also had secret echoes of nuclear weapons.

Let us, together with the reader, tear aside "the veil of secrecy." To what extent has there been consideration of things which "have never been considered?"

In Party I we report on America's nuclear strategy in the light of recent trends in [military] exercises on the periphery of Japan, and in Part II we report on the type of preparations the Self-Defense Forces are making for nuclear war. Then in Part III we examine the actual situation in Japan regarding the "command, control, and communications" equipment which is considered to be more important in a nuclear war than actual warheads, and the system of prepositioning [of nuclear weapons] as U.S. preparation for war. In Part IV we examine the course of recent Japanese-U.S. military cooperation, centering our attention on Japanese-U.S. cooperation on military technology and the system of emergency laws.

We should like to mention that in the creation of this white paper we have received cooperation from many journalists and military specialists, including Shin'ichi Mizuta, Shunji Takaoka, Yuji Sato, and (Yasushi) Kiino.

(1) The Self-Defense Forces and the Nuclear Strategy of U.S. Forces

The Largest Naval Exercise in History

Yokosuka Was Crowded With U.S. Warships

On 8 December 1984 [the anniversary of Pearl Harbor in Japan] the U.S. atomic powered aircraft carrier, "Carl Vinson" displayed its vast form in Tokyo Bay.

It was the first port call at Yokosuka by a U.S. atomic powered aircraft carrier. Just before, on 2 [December], the "San Francisco" and the "Swordfish," also nuclear attack submarines, entered Yokosuka; making a total of three in port. Of these, the "San Francisco," a ship of the "Los Angeles" class, deployment of which began in the 1970's and the numbers of which are still being increased at the rate of 5 or 6 per year, was scheduled to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles (loading was planned or had been completed). It and ships of the same type such as the "Indianapolis," are frequent visitors to Yokusuka, that is, they are ships that often operate in Japanese waters. As of 3 December [1984], a total of 24 U.S. nuclear submarines had called at Yokosuka [during the year], surpassing the 23 of 1983 to set a new record. Among them, ships [capable of] carrying Tomahawk missiles, such as those of the "Los Angeles" class mentioned above and the "Aspro" and "Tunny" of the "Sturgeon" class, accounted for the majority of both total port entries and individual ships.

And on 21 November the amphibious general assault landing craft "Tarawa" entered the port of Yokosuka for "minor repairs," and immediately the AV-8 Harrier vertical and short takeoff and landing attack fighters which it had been carrying to Atsugi Airbase, startling the local populace with the unique shrill sound of their jet engines. It is reported that on 26 [November] officials of the Yamato-City Base Countermeasure Section verified that six Harriers were stationed at Atsugi Airbase (the number of Harriers regularly carried by a British [carrier] of the "Invincible" class operating as a support carrier is five) and that their fuselages carried the words "U.S.S. Tarawa," indicating that the aircraft belong to that ship.

According to a plan which began at the end of last year, in July 1985 the conventional aircraft carrier "Midway," which makes Yokosuka its home port, will exchange the squadron of five SH-3 Sea King antisubmarine helicopters which it carries for a squadron of six model H [helicopters] equipped with radar for monitoring of ultra- low-altitude incoming missiles and the latest antisubmarine equipment (verified by the Public Information Section of U.S. Forces Japan). Citizen groups which keep the base under surveillance, and so on, have been upset by the introduction of this new model helicopter which is capable of carrying nuclear depth charges (however, the former model D also possessed nuclear capability).

On 15 August [1984], the U.S. Navy's large all-purpose destroyer "Oldendorf" arrived at Yokosuka, where it had been newly assigned, and a welcoming ceremony was held inside the base. The "Oldendorf" is a new, powerful warship which was completed in 1978 as the 10th ship of the "Spruance" class, and has a displacement, when fully loaded, of 7,800 tons. It is an extremely large warship, larger than the missile cruiser "Reeves" (5,600 tons), which, as direct defense for the "Midway," also makes Yokosuka its home port, and, if necessary, its helicopter deck can also operate Harriers. The U.S. Navy is also considering the equipping of this class of ship with Tomahawk [cruise missiles].

The stationing of the "Oldendorf" at Yokosuka, together with the stationing of the conventional powered attack submarine "Barbel" at Sasebo (to be carried out in 1985 or 1986), represents one link in the plan to reinforce the forward disposition of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Sylvester Foley, Jr, who visited Sasebo in May [1984], informed the base commander that submarines, frigates, and landing ships in addition to the conventional attack submarine "Darter," the cargo landing ship "St Louis," and previously mentioned submarine "Barbel" and the amphibious transport dock "Dubuque" (equipped with a full-scale large helicopter takeoff and landing deck) currently stationed at Sasebo, are scheduled to be stationed there. It is reported that in the near future the [base] establishment will be 2,500 men, approximately 4 times the current force.

FLETEX 85

The "Carl Vinson" participated in the U.S. Navy exercise FLETEX 85 which was held from mid-October to the end of November 1984, deploying approximately

500 aircraft and 60 ships, including 5 aircraft carriers, across a vast sea area extending from the U.S. West Coast to the Indian Ocean.

FLETEX was an offensive exercise which, using warships, realistically acted out a strategy of "counterattack" from the sea, based upon the maintenance and expansion of military superiority at sea by such means as the deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles and the 5-year plan for a 600-ship navy centered on a system of 15 deployable aircraft carriers. This expansion began at the beginning of the Reagan administration. According to published reports, [such activities] go back to the autumn of 1982.

On 1 September 1982 a battle group centered on the nuclear powered aircraft carrier "Enterprise" left its home-port of Alameda (San Francisco Bay), and on 14 September the "Midway" and its escort team left Yokosuka, apparently supported by the Maritime Self-Defense Force which at that time was deployed from the Izu Shichito to the Northern Marianas (on annual exercises). The two groups assembled in the area of the western Aleutians and then concentrated on the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka front, while carrying out air attacks, air defense, antisubmarine, and other battle drills. The Soviet Navy responded by dispatching Backfire bombers flying in missile-firing mode (a mock attack).

The two carrier battle groups maneuvered along the Kurile Islands, entered the Sea of Japan via the Tsugaru Kaikyo, and entered the waters off Vladivostok, following which they headed south along the Korean Peninsula. On 5 October they passed through the Tsushima Strait into the East China Sea. The "Enterprise" battle group continued on toward the Indian Ocean (U.S. Navy announcement).

In the spring of 1983 the same sort of exercise was carried out by a battle group with three aircraft carriers. This exercise was called FLETEX 83-1 (announcement by a Defense Agency source).

The Role of the Maritime Self-Defense Force

On 25 November [1984], a very limited part of FLETEX 85 was also revealed to the Japanese press corps. The scene was on the "Enterprise," approximately 540 kilometers southeast of Okinawa, where the carrier's aircraft were being dispatched. According to the commander of the carrier battle group, Rear Adm P. McCarthy who held a shipboard press conference, on that day three aircraft carriers were operating in the vicinity of Okinawa: the "Enterprise," the "Carl Vinson," and the "Midway," dividing their work by concentrating, respectively, on antisurface, antisubmarine, and antiaircraft combat as their central tasks. Rear Admiral McCarthy listed the exercise objectives as (1) command and control of the various combat units, (2) polishing of antiaircraft, antisurface, and antisubmarine [technique], and so on, and said: "The area of the exercise covers half the globe; the utilization of communications satellites, etc, and communications between carrier battle groups are important points," (every newspaper dated 26 [November]).

It is worth noting that in contrast to the fact that previous FLETEX's have been oriented toward tactical operations in waters of the Soviet front, in this year's FLETEX open ocean tactics were unfolded on a global scale. This means that "America has taken measures to counter the qualitative improvement of the Soviet Union's ocean fighting power by improving the carrier battle groups which it has pushed forward in succession and improving ocean command and control systems" ("Report on National Defense for Fiscal Year 1985" February 1984).

Though only in part, the Maritime Self-Defense Force did participate in FLETEX 85 in a practical way. Already on 6 November [1984] the Maritime Self-Defense Force announced that from 15 to 30 November the second Japanese-U.S. antisubmarine exercise of that year would be held in the seas east of Honshu and south of Japan. A total of 15 ships would take part on the Japanese side led by the helicopter escort vessel "Kurama" and the all-purpose escort vessel "Mineyuki" and including three submarines and one supply ship, and there also would be support by Air Self-Defense Force F-4's. Submarines, aircraft, and six surface vessels including a missile cruiser would take part on the U.S. side, and during the exercise intelligence support would be received from the aircraft carriers "Carl Vinson," "Enterprise," and "Midway" while the carriers were taking part in FLETEX 85.

In June of this year [as published] Maritime Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff (Manabu) Yoshida visited the United States at the invitation of James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations. After conferring with Admiral Watkins and U.S. Navy Secretary Lehman, [Chief of Staff Yoshida] announced a policy of further strengthening joint exercises with the U.S. military, saying: "(The U.S. side) has strengthened its expectations for the role of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to supplement in the Far East region the U.S. Navy which undertakes the mission of strategy on a global scale," (all papers dated 27 June). The connection between FLETEX 85 and the Japanese U.S. joint antisubmarine exercise plainly shows the way the situation is developing.

As one segment of the U.S. military's tactics which are carried out on a global scale, the Maritime Self-Defense force has undertaken the mission of controlling the northwest Pacific together with supporting units.

Why Did the "Carl Vinson" Call at Japanese Ports?

"Nuclear Conditioning"

U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Foley once made a statement on the educational effect of [events such as] the port call at Sasebo by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier "Enterprise" in March of last year after a 15 year hiatus, and the first port call at Sasebo by the "Carl Vinson." He said: "Having received a good education from the U.S. Navy, the problematic nature of port calls in the Far East by nuclear powered warships is diminishing, and opposition has weakened," (U.S. Navy-related newspaper NAVY, 7 November 1983).

This [statement] shows that the U.S. Navy considered that the "Carl Vinson's" second port call in Japan, its port call at Yokosuka, both brought this sort of "nuclear conditioning" to the area of completion, and was its finishing touch.

The "nuclear conditioning" of the Far East, in other words, of Japan, became a significant strategic imperative for the U.S. Navy, particularly after the deployment of the "Carl Vinson" to the Pacific Fleet. Roughly speaking, regardless of whether they be steam turbine, gas turbine, or diesel, the volume of fuel consumed by conventional powered ships and warships increases in proportion to the square of the speed. Military-use naval vessels cannot always cruise at an economical speed in the manner of civilian vessels. The captains of all conventional powered warships must constantly operate while calculating the remaining fuel. Atomic powered warships are completely freed from this restriction. The effect is particularly conspicuous in the case of aircraft carriers.

Atomic powered aircraft carriers can move from their homeland to the battle area and from one battle area to another, at top speed; similarly, at the battle area they can repeatedly approach their objective and distance themselves from it at top speed. Moreover, an atomic powered carrier can utilize as storage space and fuel lockers for its aircraft, armories, maintenance and repair facilities, and the like, the capacity and weight which conventional carriers allot for their own fuel.

In general, U.S. conventional aircraft carriers load aviation fuel and aerial weapons equal to 7.6 percent and 2 percent, respectively, of its fully loaded displacement, and nuclear aircraft carriers load aviation fuel and aerial weapons equal to 10.5 percent and 3.6 percent respectively. This means that carriers of the "Kitty Hawk" class, the largest conventional carriers, load approximately 6,000 tons of aviation fuel and about 1,600 tons of aerial weapons, but on the "Carl Vinson" this becomes approximately 9,600 tons and 3,100 tons.

If we replace the figure for the amount of aerial weapons carried [on the ship] by that for the total volume of aerial weapons that can be carried on attack aircraft, 247.2 tons (6.2 tons for each A-7E, times 24 aircraft, plus 8.2 tons for each A-6E, times 12 aircraft), [it comes to] enough to dispatch all the aircraft on a convention carrier 6.5 times, and enough to dispatch those on a nuclear carrier 12.5 times. This is merely calculation on paper, but it can easily be understood that the number of days which a nuclear carrier can operate without replenishing supplies could be twice that for a conventional carrier.

The Aim of Port Calls

There are figures which also [rank] the nuclear offensive capability of nuclear carriers at 25 percent higher than that of conventional carriers due to good internal conditions on the nuclear carriers. The fighter and attack aircraft units carried on the huge aircraft carriers (this, itself, is a

combat system which only America possesses) are organized into 5 squadrons with a total of 60 aircraft; this is true even of "Midway"-class carriers, the oldest and smallest. Nevertheless, because of these facts, the capability of nuclear carriers is estimated to be two or more times that of conventional carriers.

The cost of constructing the fifth nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the "Theodore Roosevelt," which was just launched on 27 November 1984, was between $2.8 and $3 billion, and though the "Abraham Lincoln" and the "George Washington," which have already been ordered, are being constructed in tandem in an effort to reduce costs, they will cost at least $3.6 billion each. This is only the cost of construction; the cost of manufacturing the aircraft which they carry will be about the same. It would be meaningless if only the nuclear carrier could continuously run around at high speed and its escort vessels could not keep up with it in the same way, so two nuclear powered cruisers must be built to go with each aircraft carrier.

Because of the above reasons, America clings to nuclear aircraft carriers despite the astronomical costs. As such nuclear carrier battle groups and nuclear submarines loaded with Tomahawk cruise missiles came to constitute the core of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and particularly of the 7th Fleet which is responsible for the front line, it became imperative to the U.S. military that obstacles to nuclear weapons, mainly the obstacle of "public opinion," be decisively removed.

Thus, the "Carl Vinson's" port call at Yokosuka, which was carried out as though slipping through the gap between the ebbing tide of antinuclear public opinion and the break up of [antinuclear] action, possessed major strategic significance. From the repeated port calls, not only by nuclear submarines, but also by nuclear aircraft carriers, it appears that the U.S. military wishes at one stroke to open the way to minor repairs and so on utilizing the excellent shipbuilding and maintenance facilities at Yokosuka and Sasebo.

Among [exercises] by land, sea, and air forces, Japanese-U.S. joint exercises at sea are most advanced, and a development in 1984 which was more worthy of attention than most was the senior commander-staff officer level command post exercise carried out for 5 days beginning on 11 June using the U.S. Forces and Maritime Self-Defense Force bases at Yokosuka. Although the antisubmarine and antimine combat capability of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, including aircraft, is flawed in regard to its capability to sustain combat over a long period, even the U.S. military fully admits that in both quality and quantity it is first class, even among that of major powers.

[The Maritime Self-Defense Force] does not have its own air-support capability, but the Air Self-Defense Force possesses the most modern fighters, so the Japanese island chain, bearing a high density of these fighters, and with its geographical characteristics, constitutes a strong air-defense barrier for naval forces, including submarines, operating in the western Pacific. The Maritime Self-Defense Force has reached a level which should be quite satisfying to U.S. Forces: it has enterd a stage in which it can be made to function as a deterrent force, in other words, a

real combat force. The contents of the Japan-U.S. joint naval command-post exercise has been kept top-secret, so not even fragmentary information is available, but it showed that realistic operations by the Maritime Self-Defense Force had entered a new stage.

In the five-nation joint naval exercise RIMPAC 84, a unit of Maritime Self-Defense Force warships formed the escort unit for the "Enterprise" along with the nuclear powered missile cruiser "Arkansas." Each of the five Japanese ships which participated was a system warship which carried equipment to process and display combat, navigation, reconnaissance, communications and other tactical information by computer, and which was equipped with a LINK 11 (sending and receiving) and 16 (receiving) for use in exchanging data. They operated while connected to the "Enterprise" and the "Arkansas" by an electronic network. The unit made up of the U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carrier, its direct escort nuclear powered cruiser, and enough Japanese warships to make up an escort group was named Mobile Carrier Unit K. It is reported that overall command was held by the U.S. Navy's Rear Admiral (Cohn) (commander of the third carrier group) and that the commander of the Japanese unit, Rear Admiral Konishi (commander of the first escort group), was second in command and was coordinating officer for surface and antisubmarine combat.

The Threat of Nuclear War at Sea

Reagan's Naval Strategy

The activities of the Maritime Self-Defense Force appear to have begun to be fully coordinated and merged with those of the U.S. Navy in 1982.

That was the year in which the Reagan administration submitted its first report on national defense and appealed [to the public] on behalf of its own military policy; it was also the year in which the strategy of counterattack against the Soviet Union from the sea became manifest in a clear naval presence.

The "Report on America's National Defense for Fiscal Year 1983," which was published in February 1984, warned that should the Soviet Union launch an attack on rapid deployment forces of the United States at a time when such forces had been committed in the Middle East of southwest Asia in defense of the vital interests of the United States, the Soviet Union must not expect the [U.S.] counterattack to be carried out in that battle zone, and the United States must not encourage the Soviet Union to entertain such an expectation. The Institute for Research on International Strategy in London criticized the report, calling it "a strategy of escalation on a global level" which sought to deter warfare by expanding it to other regions (SURVEY OF STRATEGY 1981-82).

The core of the strategy of "level escalation" is the navy (SURVEY OF STRATEGY 1983-84). The [U.S.] aircraft carrier presence and exercises in frontline waters off important Soviet areas which began in 1982 clearly demonstrated the U.S. policy mentioned above. America calls this sort of activity by aircraft carrier units "flexible operations" (flex ops).

The 1984 Report on National Defense explains that flexible operations are extremely effective because they increase [U.S.] aircraft carrier presence in the northern Pacific, the Sea of Japan, the Caribbean Sea, etc, where, previously, there was hardly any such presence, and at the same time they probably make it more difficult for the Soviet Union to predict the actions of U.S. carrier units.

Nuclear War At Sea

It is generally thought that a U.S. carrier attack against Petropavlovsk, Vladivostok, the sealane which connects them, and the Kurilie Island line which guards it, would be carried out as an ultimate tactic by the U.S. Navy in the Far East-Northwest Pacific Theater. Common opinion among persons connected with the navies of the world holds that in such a case, if three or four carrier battle groups were committed, the carrier's air power, aided by the mobility of the mother ships, having a great operational radius, carrying a great volume of weapons, and having superior precision attack capability, would probably be able to annihilate the Soviet air and sea power located there just by attacking with conventional weapons. That is because the striking power [of the two sides] would be completely different.

Should a situation develop in which America and the Soviet Union clash and U.S. carrier battle groups and units assigned to carry out a landing invade areas facing Soviet strategic points, the Soviet Navy would probably recall its main forces to a (land-based air-support sphere), to which it would add coastal defense vessels, submarines, and aircraft dispatched from land bases, and try to repulse the U.S. fleet by means of a short, continuous, saturation missile attacks launched from many platforms, that includes the use of nuclear weapons.

In a saturation missile attack one seeks to destroy an opponent by firing enough missiles to overwhelm the opponent's defensive measures; the Soviet Navy has frequently rehearsed it [for the world to see] as in its global naval exercises in 1970 and 1975 (NATO code name (Ocean). This is a great threat to U.S. aircraft carriers, and it is the reason why flexible operations are often carried out using more than one carrier (multicarrier operation). And what makes multicarrier operation possible is support operations by the modern naval power of allies such as Japan.

Even the U.S. Navy, however, cannot always commit a large number of aircraft carriers to a given area of the ocean as it would like. From whatever aspect one views it--the cost of U.S. aircraft carriers, their strategic value, the treat they must face--it is indispensible that aircraft carriers carry nuclear weapons under normal conditions, and they would probably rely upon them greatly in an emergency. At the very least, it is probably almost 100 percent certain that a battle between the U.S. and Soviet Navies in the waters of the Far East-Northwest Pacific would have to develop into a nuclear war.

The merging of the Maritime Self-Defense Force with the U.S. Navy as seen in FLETEX 85, which is used as a politica and military requisite for the

policy of "level escalation," is leading Japan into the nuclear dilemma from which Europe is vainly trying to extricate itself.

(2) The Self-Defense Forces Which Are Being Incorporated In U.S. Strategy

Joint Air and Land Exercises

Michinoku 84

In 1984 efforts were made to develop combined Japanese-U.S. exercises and preparedness for joint operations not only at sea, but also on land and in the air.

The Ground Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Army carried out the sixth (actually the seventh) joint command post exercise Yamasakura 6 from 27 to 31 May at Fort Ford in Washington State on the U.S. mainland.

Following that, the joint maneuver "Michinoku 84" was carried out from 18 September to 1 October by 1,600 men centered on the Ground Self-Defense Force's 5th Regular Regiment (of the Aomori 9th Division) and 1,400 troops of infantry and artillery battalions of the U.S. Army's 7th Division (California) using both the (Ogijihara) exercise ground in Miyagi Prefecture and the Iwate-san exercise ground in Iwate Prefecture. This was the third [joint ground exercise in Japan], following "Yamato 82" (at the Higashi Fugi Exercise Ground in Shizuoka Prefecture) and "Kokuto 83" (at the (Oji) Exercise Ground in Hokkaido), and was connected to the joint command post exercise Yamasakura 5 which was held at Sendai in the autumn of 1983. The U.S. forces brought in mortars and 155 mm howitzers from the U.S. mainland, the Self-Defense Force also rolled out similar artillery, and both sides held target practice using live ammunition. It is reported that the highlight of the exercise was the use of helicopter mobility to mount an attack behind enemy lines and recapture and enemy occupied area.

In addition to the F-1 ground attack fighters of the Air Self-Defense Force, four F-4 fighter bombers belonging to U.S. Air Force units stationed in the Philippines participated in the exercise. The latter are thought to have been the aircraft, nicknames "Wild Weasels," which attack with precision by tracing sources of radio wave [emission].

Furthermore, from 21 October to 3 November, one battalion of the 12th Regiment (an artillery regiment), 3rd Marine Division, which is stationed in Okinawa, and one battalion of the 5th Artillery Regiment of the Ground Self-Defense Force (stationed at Obihiro [in Hokkaido], it is the artillery regiment of the 5th Division) held a joint firing exercise at the (Yausu) exercise ground in Hokkaido (see the pictorial section).

This was the first joint exercise of U.S. Marines and the Ground Self-Defense Force since a communications drill in the autumn of 1981, and was the first real joint firing exercise with either the [U.S.] Army or Marines. The exercise was not merely a matter of technology, it was a tactical exercise in which Japanese and U.S. artillery units cooperated in supporting a

friendly infantry regiment in its efforts to repulse an enemy mechanized infantry battalion which was bolstered by an artillery battery and two companies of tanks. Prior to the main exercise, there was a command post exercise and firing with live ammunition. The Self-Defense Force used 10 Japanese-made Model 75, 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, and U.S. Forces used 10 M-198, 155 mm towed howitzers, deployment of which began in April 1984. During the 3 days of the main exercise approximately 1,300 rounds of live ammunition were fired by the combined Japanese-U.S. forces.

The joint exercise with the U.S. Marines, the only [U.S.] ground force stationed in Japan, was something which the Self-Defense Force had been enthusiastically hoping for since 1983. At a press conference just prior to his transfer from Commandant of Marines stationed in Okinawa to [a position with] Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan, Major General Phillips stressed this point, saying: "Soon joint exercises will be held by the U.S. Marines in Okinawa and the Ground Self-Defense Force, and it is planned to expand them in stages in the future. This policy of expansion is the wish of the Japanese side."

The second joint exercise by the [U.S.] Marines and the Ground Self-Defense Force is scheduled to be a snow combat drill held at the Kami Furano exercise ground in Hokkaido in February 1985. A.M. Weyand, commandant of U.S. Army Japan (also commander of the 9th Army Corps), who attended "Michinoku 84," said: "It is the most helpful exercise so far," and Joint Staff Council Chairman Keitaro Watanabe said: "One could get a feeling from the exercise that the level of training had improved." The joint shelling exercise at (Yausubetsu) drew the interest of concerned Japanese and American parties, and high-level military leaders from both sides attended. Major General Phillips, Chief of Staff U.S. Forces Japan, who was mentioned above, observed the exercise along with Commandant Wyand of U.S. Army Japan and Commandant (Glasgow) of U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa, and it appears that he was enthusiastic enough to personally pull the lanyard to fire the first shell on the U.S. side.

A New 155 mm Cannon

The 155 mm howitzers introduced by the U.S. Army and Marines are all capable of firing nuclear warheads. This is the most common type of field artillery, the main artillery piece of the U.S. Army and Marines, and of [U.S.] allies such as NATO. The nuclear warhead in current use is the W-48 which has explosive power of just under 1 kiloton. The 1985 U.S. Defense Report says that it is impossible to fulfill the nuclear mission of artillery with 8-inch (203 mm) cannons alone, and that the existence of the 155 mm howitzers which have been deployed in large numbers and have become a constituent element of short-range nuclear firepower, have increased the survivability and flexibility of U.S. close-range nuclear force.

The M-198 is a new towed 155 mm howitzer which was developed in the 1970's as a replacement for the existing M-114A1. It is light in weight, has a long barrel, and a long range (30 kilometers with rocket-assiated shells, 24 kilometers with conventional shells; the W-82 is a rocket-assisted shell),

and the cannon and its ammunition and crew can be carried by large transport helicopters. The U.S. Marines are also replacing their 105 mm howitzers (for which nuclear warheads have not been developed) with M-198's.

Joint Air Exercises

Japan-U.S. joint air exercises began immediately after the adoption of the "guidelines for Japan-U.S. cooperation on defense" in November 1978, and [occurring] at a pace of just under 1 each month, attained a total of approximately 50 by the end of 1984.

During this time many practice dogfights were held with aircraft of the [U.S.] Air Force, Navy, and Marines. Exercises under the direction of the U.S. military's E-3A airborne warning and control system [literally warning, command and control] aircraft (Japanese controllers ride in the E-3A, and U.S. controllers enter the radar site on the ground) began in the spring of 1981, and starting in the summer of 1982 they received the services of a B-52 strategic bomber acting as a target, and electronic warfare exercises began with that aircraft as the target. Both exercises have continued. In the autumn of 1983 a command post exercise was carried out by all Air [Self-Defense Force] units and staff officers of the [U.S.] 5th Air Force. Separately from the above, in September 1983, small-scale practice-dogfights began to be held in Okinawa at a rate of about one per week. It was observed at just about that time that in Okinawa the movement of Self-Defense Force Nike and Hawk antiaircraft missile units had become active, and it was surmised that they were ordinary exercises in order to respond to possible combat. Japanese U.S. joint air exercises have come to be held more randomly, both in time and planning, than [are joint] naval exercises.

The conspicuous development since the beginning of 1984 was the antiship attack exercise which was carried out in early February in waters stretching from the southeast of Kyushu to south of the Kii Peninsula. And in the fiscal year 1984 All-Air-Unit Comprehensive-Exercise (an annual exercise involving the entire strength of the Air Self-Defense Force), U.S. military ground controllers entered the radar sites, participating in a practical way, being involved for the first time in the entire cycle of detection, identification, guidance and control, so indications have emerged that, following the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Air Self-Defense Force, too, is going to be increasingly unified with U.S. Forces.

Japanese-U.S. Joint Exercises Combining Air, Ground, and Sea Forces

The next goal of Japanese-U.S. joint exercises is joint combined exercises of Japanese and U.S. air, ground, and sea forces (including marines in the case of America). In regard to this, speaking at a press conference on 1 September 1983, Chairman Murai of the Joint Staff Council set forth the direction that combined maneuvers of the Air, Ground, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, which have been held for 3 years in succession beginning in 1981, would not be held in fiscal year 1984 (but staff-level command post exercises would be perfected), but would be progressively dissolved in favor of more realistic Japanese-U.S. alliance-type joint combined exercises.

As we pointed out in the 1983 "White Paper on Military Affairs," command posts exercises will probably be carried out in fiscal year 1985. The importance of command post exercises should be more emphasized and better understood. It is more regular to fully carry out well-prepared command post exercises, and move troop units after that, than to hastily carry out very expensive actual maneuvers. It may be that many Japan-U.S. joint command post exercises will be carried out based upon the assumption of all sorts of situations encompassing air, ground, and sea forces.

Japan Which Is Being Incorporated Into U.S. Strategy

Interoperability

From 1984 onward, the word "interoperability" (the quality of operating mutually) came to be used frequently in Japan-U.S. joint exercises and discussions on defense.

At the 15th Japan-U.S. Business-Level Security Conference (the so-called Hawaii Conference) in the latter part of June, the problems in regard to Japan's defense efforts on which the U.S. side "indicated concern," that is, the ones which they pressed in a roundabout way, were interoperability and capability to sustain combat for an extended period.

In the latter part of September, (then) Defense Agency Director-General Kurihara, who was on his way to Washington for a Japanese-U.S. defense leaders conference, paid a visit to the Headquarters U.S. Forces Pacific in Hawaii as is the custom, met with the commandant, Admiral William Crowe and exchanged views.

It is said that the perceptions and opinions of the two men agreed on points such as: (1) strengthening of the interoperability of Japanese and American equipment and tactical plans, (2) the enhancement of the Self-Defense Forces' capability to sustain extended combat, and (3) the early compilation of the results of Japanese-U.S. joint research on the defense of sealanes.

On this occasion Admiral Crowe said in regard to interoperability: "The point is to build beforehand conditions which enable efficient cooperation; this is an extremely important matter among all the allied nations." In response to this the argument became common among persons connected with military affairs at home and abroad that the building of interoperability was a quick measure to build up Japanese-U.S. trust and trust in the Japanese-U.S. security arrangement including [the provision that] the U.S. military would come to [Japan's] aid in time of emergency, in order to strengthen the deterrent function of that arrangement.

Rear Admiral Konishi, commander of the Japanese unit in RIMPAC 84, gave (1) enhancement of interoperability, (2) acquisition of new tactics, and (3) enhancement of the level of training in firing as the objectives of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's participation, and placed special emphasis on the enhancement of interoperability.

Admiral Long, former commander of U.S. Forces Pacific, published an article in the February 1984 issue of SIGNAL, journal of the U.S. Association of Military Communications and Electronics, which emphasized that interoperability is the key to enhancement of C (command, control, and communications) in order to assist the mission of [U.S.] Pacific Forces to [act as a] wide-ranging deterrent. And Lieutenant General Donnelly, commander of U.S. Forces Japan, published an article which says that plans are in progress to escape the current situation in which the C systems of U.S. Forces Japan and the Self-Defense Forces have the lowest possible level of interface (connection), and to build interoperability of the two systems, and that the path is opening for Japan's participation in the information system, (WIS [world information system]) which is united with America's World-wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

Losing the [Protective] Hedge Around the Nation

The words "interoperability" appears to contain problems from those on the technical or hardware level, such as unity of standards and interchangeability of arms and ammunition and interface of command, control, communications and intelligence (C I) systems, to strategic and tactical level problems which are highly political, such as the gathering and common use of intelligence and its evaluation and countermeasures centered on interoperability of C I.

An actual example of interoperability on the tactical level was the closely coordinated maneuvers by warships of the U.S. Navy and the Self-Defense Force during RIMPAC 84. The U.S. aircraft carrier was the central seaborne command, control, communications and intelligence center for the WWMCCS and the Naval Tactical Data System (NDTS) upon which it is based. The central C I ship for the Self-Defense Force was the "Kurama," and a U.S. cruiser was used as the interface for the two. To [over]simplify slightly, by replacing the U.S. carrier with the U.S. command center, the U.S. cruiser with the Headquarters Pacific Forces, and the "Kurama" and other Maritime Self-Defense Force warships with Japan, it gives the ultimate vision of Japanese-U.S. interoperability.

Another actual example on the tactical level was the Japanese-U.S. joint air exercise by U.S. Forces E-3A early warning and control aircraft and Self-Defense Force fighters which was carried out interfaced with the ground radar system. The E-3A is an airborne patrol post of the WWMCCS, and, while linking up with the ground warning and control system, spreads a search, detection, and identification net over a wide area of 400 kilometers (its simultaneous detection capability is 600 targets; its idenficiation capability is 200 targets). It can allot friendly fighter aircraft units most effectively against invading targets, and guide them to the most appropriate attack positions. It is thought that fighter units under E-3A control display fighting power 10 times that in cases in which they lack such control, so Japanese-U.S. joint air exercises using E-3A's are a typical example of combined, effective use of allied forces through interoperability.

These exercises are always being carried out by the NATO joint air defense system. E-3A's jointly owned by NATO (registered in Luxembourg) are usually in the air, and act as a pivot in combining the airpower of all the [NATO] countries and in linking [NATO] with North American Air Operations (NORAO) on the U.S. mainland. NATO also plans for ground combat based on interoperability, and is about to entrust its security to electronic monsters proposed and developed by America, deployment of which America is recommending: the Joint Tactical Intelligence Transmission System (JTIDS), the Joint Surveillance Target Arrest and (Response) System (JSTARS), and the Joint Tacticaly Missile System (JTACMS).

This is clearly connected to the concept of a (following force attack) (FOFA). The FOFA attempts to expand the doctrine of the "air-land battle" to deep inside the Soviet Union; it [calls for] an (attack in depth) against a Warsaw-Pact force which is invading at the frontline level, separating its first echelon at the frontline from the second echelon which is following, and repulsing [the invaders] by stopping or delaying the advance of the second echelon. The Stockholm (International Peace Institute) has warned that this brings a security dilemma and the danger of war to Europe from a different aspect than that of Euromissiles (1984-85 Annual Report).

To be sure, the interoperability orientation of the U.S. military and the Self-Defense Forces possesses military logic. It will probably cause the military forces of Japan and America to function efficiently as a comprehensive military force ranging from cooperation in peacetime to joint operations in times of crisis. It is inconceivable that this will develop in the same form as in Europe where large numbers of ground troops face each other and mutually increase semi-permanent tensions. But the basic direction will probably not change.

The fusion of the U.S. military and the Self-Defense Forces is certain to advance, and even the hedge separating the actions of the U.S. military from Japan's national standpoint will disappear.

The NATO countries are firmly joined militarily, but at the same time, the complicated interests of each of the countries also imposes restrictions on America. With the exception of the Korean Peninsula, in the Far East-Northwest Pacific region there are no tensions which take the form of those in Europe, nor are there continuous conflicts such as in the Middle East. Instead, there is the U.S.-Soviet military confrontation on the seas. The one taking the initiative is the United States, and out in front is the military itself. No one can restrict flexible operations utilizing the high seas. Behind it lies the strategy of "level escalation."

The current situation is that Japan's national standpoint is in the process of assimilating to this sort of offensive strategy and tactics. Effective and efficient interoperability of U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces will end up further advancing this. Moreover, [as published]

The admirals of the U.S. Navy and the Maritime Self-Defense Force even think that nuclear war at sea would result in less damage to humans and animals. Admirals in the Soviet Navy are probably not that much different, either.

(1) U.S. Forces in Japan as a Nuclear Force

The Thesis of "a Blockade of the Three Straits"

"Contamination Area"

What do you suppose the Self-Defense Forces think about nuclear warfare?

Officially Japan's defense policy does not envisage a nuclear war, and the Self-Defense Forces are not prepared to fight a nuclear war. This is because the "National Defense Program Outline" (devised in 1976) stipulates that [Japan] will rely upon America's nuclear deterrent against the threat of nuclear [attack], and [will maintain] appropriate defensive strength and form a Japan-U.S. security system, taking these two as its defensive force, that [Japan] will expel a limited, small-scale invasion by its own power, and if it is difficult to expel it with its own power it will continue resistance and wait for U.S. assistance in expelling it, and is further limited by the three nonnuclear principles and the public opinion of the Japanese people which demands strict adherance to those principles.

If nuclear war is considered, a plan for Japan's defense in the usual sense does not work out, and there is also the professional calculation that removing nuclear war from consideration is also convenient in maintaining the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces because it avoids exciting the public's atomic consciousness. And the general public has an unimaginable blind faith in America's nuclear deterrent.

Thus the Self-Defense Forces have carried out more and more Japan-U.S. joint exercises with nuclear-armed U.S. forces, regarding them as "nonnuclear forces," and have strengthened the Japan-U.S. joint tactical system.

The Japan-U.S. joint land maneuver "Kokuto 83," which was held in Hokkaido, assumed a battle under conditions in which chemical or nuclear weapons would be used.

An American photographer found this out from a photograph, taken inside the headquarters camp, that was published in a Japanese weekly magazine. A map of the battle situation was clearly shown in the photograph. The map indicated a situation in which Japanese and U.S. [forces] were working together to stop at the main position an enemy force which had broken through an outside sentry position; Japanese forces were counterattacking from the flank in front of the position with one unit, and American forces (a brigade) were moving a separate company by helicopter to land behind the enemy. [On the map,] a wide area to the left of the battle line as seen from the Japanese side was indicated as a contamination area. Furthermore, it was observed that this helicopter operation was carried out by a mixed unit of Japanese helicopters and U.S. infantry troops.

Aside from a very small group, there was almost no issue made of this photograph. The headquarters camp refused to allow the press corps in, so Japanese reports were not able to get even a glimpse of the inside, and the photograph was only used by one weekly magazine of a publishing company's system, and only in the pictorial section at that. But more than that, it was probably due to the fact that the U.S. military takes the view that in ground combat with Soviet forces there could be an early nuclear or chemical attack, especially a chemical attack, and the feeling that the establishment of contamination areas during exercises is so natural as to be obvious has spread, not only in the Self-Defense Forces, but also among those who have their own opinion on defense matters.

The Ground Self-Defense Force's exercise material. "Resistance Unit: A" is based upon "75 Z," which is similar type material for U.S. Forces. "75 Z" is a document analyzing the equipment, organization, and tactics of a Soviet combat division which appeared on the European front in 1975. "Resistance Unit: A" too, is based on a self-evident premise of chemical or nuclear warfare.

The New Naval Battle in the Sea of Japan

"Hokuto 83" is believed to represent one segment of a scenario in which the Ground Self-Defense Force, which is resisting a Soviet force which has invaded Hokkaido, receives assistance from U.S. forces and crushes [the Soviet invasion force].

As might be expected, the type of crude Soviet-threat thesis which held that Soviet forces might cross the sea and attack at any time has died down, but in its place, laterly there has been a lot of talk about the three-strait blockade thesis and the thesis of the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido in order to secure the Sea of Okhotsk as a sancturay for atomic powered submarines with strategic missiles.

A Tokyo-datelines article titled "U.S. and Soviet Strategy in the North Pacific" based on an interview with Commander (Holcomb) of the U.S. 7th Fleet, which appeared in the American newspaper The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR on 3 May 1983, introduced a statement by Commander (Holcomb) to the effect that even if it was impossible for Japan to gain 99 percent control of the three straits, the Soviet Union would be in a grave situation even if Japan had just 50 percent controlling power, that is, the capability to sink one Soviet warship out of every two that attempted to pass through the straits, and that if in time of war the Soviet Union recognized that there was little hope of passing through the Tsugaru or Tsushima Straits, it would probably attempt to break through the La Perouse Strait by force, whatever the risks involved.

It is probably almost a truism that a blockade of the three straits would result in a new "Naval Battle of the Sea of Japan" in the area of the La Perouse Strait which included a fierce struggle for air supremacy.

Attack and Defense in Northern Hokkaido

The January 1984 issue of NEW DEFENSE DIGEST, the magazine of the (Defense Association), contains an article, "The Self-Defense Forces in the 1990's" by U.S. Navy Commander (Lynton Wells) subtitled "The Personal View of One American Based on Analysis of Sea-Lane Defense." Commander (Wells) cites a mobile airborne operation (using helicopters and airplanes) in the Wakkanai area as the primary ground threat resulting from Soviet resistance against choke points, that is, the blockading of strategic narrow passages by Japan and America. He believes that in such a case, it would probably be difficult to recapture northern Hokkaido if a strategic place like the land choke point of Otoineppu [text gives Otoipu] and vicinity were to come under [enemy] control. (Commander (Wells) is one of the U.S. military's top experts on Japan who has even been a research student in the general studies course at the Defense Agency's National Defense College. He is a brilliant person, who also said, in the 1970's, that in the near future the Self-Defense Forces would have to move in the direction of being more conscious of naval strategy, thus predicting the current state of the Self-Defense Forces.)

Otoi[nep]pu is a strategic point at which the roads from Wakkanai and from Hamatonbetsu, which faces the Sea of Okhotsk, converge [in a place] surrounded by steep mountains. It has long been regarded as a position to be defended to the death by the 2d Division which is stationed in northern Hokkaido (headquarters at Asahikawa) and calls itself the "Border Division."

In fact, whenever the Ground Self-Defense Force obtains a new weapon it is deployed in Hokkaido before anywhere else, and within Hokkaido, the highest priority is given to the 2d Division and the 7th Division (an armored division). The artillery unit of Tokyo's 1st Division (a special regiment) is made up of one general mission battalion with 155 mm towed howitzers and (direct support) battlions (equal in number to the number of regular regiments in the division) with 105 mm howitzers. In contrast to this, the 2d Division is totally made up of 155 mm guns which, moreover, are self-propelled guns with gun turrets placed on top of tanks.

The probability of an Invasion of Sakhalin

The "thesis of an invasion of Hokkaido by Soviet forces," which revolves around a struggle over the La Perouse Strait, is the reverse side of the probability of an invasion of southern Sakhalin from the Japanese side.

That is, only Japan can gain air superiority, it is not impossible for the Maritime Defense Agency at any time to lay preparations to put the mine layer "Soya," the minesweeper (tender) "Hayase," which can be modified for use as a minelayer with comparative ease, submarines, P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft, Air Self-Defense Force C-130 cargo aircraft carrying cargo aircraft minelaying devices (CAML) and so on into the La Perouse Strait, lay intricate barriers of mines, and allot submarines to lie in wait at the exits.

But even if this were done, the barriers of mines would be destroyed one after the other unless the action of Soviet minesweepers were obstructed. It follows, therefore, that the Japanese side would like to have two or three coastal strongholds on Sakhalin.

If it is said that the Soviet Union is about to occupy and rule a limited part of Northern Hokkaido in order to guarantee passage of its submarines though the La Perouse Strait, by the same logic it becomes necessary for the allied forces of Japan and the United States to guarantee by occupation at least that part of Sakhalin up to the narrow portion in the middle of the peninsula in order to blockade the strait.

"The Decisive Main-Island Battle"

From 1 to 16 October 1984 the fiscal year 1984 (Ground Staff Mission) Antiarmor Exercise was held at the (Oji) exercise ground in Hokkaid. It was an exercise which became a topic of conversion due to the fact that Force Orange (enemy), in other words "Soviet force," broke completely through the forward scout positions and main position of Force Blue (friendly) 18 minutes after launching an all-out attack.

The defending side, outnumbered 2 to 1 in troops, 5 to 1 in tanks, and 4.5 to 1 in field artillery, was in a situation of having had control of the air wrested from it by the opposing side; furthermore, it tried to hold back the enemy's charge, which was spearheaded by a group of tanks, by constructing its positions on flat, open ground, so the result was obvious.

Moreover, the method of judging the effect of shelling and so on was also particularly unfair to the defending side, so some were inclined to evaluate it as a tricky performance put on by the Ground Self-Defense Force which is eager to acquire heavy equipment. However, it cleary displayed the standpoint of the Ground Self-Defense Force that "there will be" ground combat in Hokkaido, and from its point of view it was probably a realistic exercise of a decisive main-island battle.

With waving of the [imperial brocade] flag of defense of sealanes and blockading of straits, it is probable that requests for increased military expenditure and equipment buildup for the Ground Self-Defense Force will grow stronger.

U.S. Forces Pacific as a Nuclear Force

Special Units and "Nuclear Weapons"

Needless to say, U.S. Armed Forces, which are partners of the Self-Defense Forces, are nuclear armed forces. [Before proceeding further,] let us take a simple look at their nuclear capability in the Far East and Pacific Ocean.

The prominent American columnist, Jack Anderson revealed that 133 nuclear warheads for use in aircraft, 94 nuclear shells for use in howitzers, and 21

atomic explosive devices (nuclear land mines) were once stored in the Republic of Korea (WASHINGTON POST, 2 February 1983).

In regard to the last-mentioned nuclear land mines, William (Arkin), who visited Okinawa in the spring of 1984 in order to attend a civilian antinuclear conference, (a military analyst and a member of the ("Policy Research Group"), a research organ affiliated with the Democratic Party in America; an article of his appears in this issue of SEKAI) pointed out that 20 of the special atomic (demolition) mines (SADM), the W-54, are stored in the Republic of Korea, and a total of 50 are stored in Guam and Hawaii, that they contain atomic bombs, commonly called "suitcases" which are 32.5 centimeters in diameter and weigh 26 kilograms, and that they are operated chiefly by special operations forces (SOF) which are maintained by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

At that time, the redeployment of the Army SOF (Green Berets) was going on in Okinawa.

The present SOF are powerful units which exceed the concept of the Vietnam war era, units "which take the place of conventional forces in times of crisis when the use of conventional forces is inappropriate or impossible, irreplacable fighting strength which supplements that of conventional forces in larger-scale conflicts..., with a value which surpasses the amount of investment..., on the reactivization of which (America) places a high priority," (Fiscal Year 1985 Report on Defense).

Eighty Percent of U.S. Warships Carry Nuclear Weapons

Anderson's figures are in basic agreement with the figures of 192 [nuclear warheads] for aircraft use, 208 for use in howitzers (152 for 155 mm guns, and 56 for 203 mm guns), 5 to 50 nuclear land mines, 144 Nike antiaircraft missiles, 88 for use in Honest John surface-to-surface free rockets, and 12 for use in (Sargeant) surface-to-surface missiles which have been given by Admiral (La Roche) and others of the Defense Intelligence Center (February 1976 issue of DEFENSE MONITOR).

This is due to the partial withdrawal of artillery units, the retirement from service of the (Sargeants), and the turning over to the armed forces of the Republic of Korea of the Nike's and Honest John's.

The DEFENSE MONITOR went on to give 2,000 as the number of nuclear weapons stored at other locations in the Pacific. The other locations are the U.S. west coast, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and probably Japan. This figure probably includes the B-52 bombers on Guam, the strategic nuclear weapons on Polaris missile submarines (the latter were retired from service early in 1980), nuclear mines for use by land-based Navy antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and so on.

The DEFENSE MONITOR also gave a figure of 2,500 as the total number of naval tactical nuclear weapons carried on warships, such as bombs for the aircraft of aircraft carriers (including antisubmarine depth charges),

antisubmarine rockets launched by surface vessels and submarines, and antiaircraft missiles launched from surface vessels.

When this [figure] is divided by the number of aircraft carriers deployed, which are the nuclei, the Pacific Fleet comes out to have about 1,150 nuclear weapons.

Admiral (La Roche), too, who visited Japan in the spring of 1984 at the invitation of the (antinuclear autonomous body movement) of Kanagawa Prefecture, confirmed this figure as a rough yardstick, but he said that the figure will be increased by the deployment of nuclear Tomahawk [cruise missiles], and emphasized that when that happens the proportion of combat vessels equipped with nuclear weapons, currently estimated at 80 percent, will become 90 percent due to the [deployment].

Nuclear Weapons of Ground Units

The mainstays of the [U.S.] Army in the Pacific are the 2d Infantry Division stationed in the Republic of Korea, the 25th Infantry Division stationed in Hawaii, and the 9th Division, of which only the headquarters structure (is pushing forward) at Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture.

The nuclear firepower of U.S. ground forces (including marines) consists of 155 mm howitzers (with a range of 22 kilometers for ordinary shells and 30 kilometers for RAP i.e., rocket assist (projectiles)) for close-support use, 203 mm howitzers (a range of 30 kilometers for ordinary shells and 40 kilometers for RAP), Lance field missiles (a range of 120 kilometers) for long-range warfare, and nuclear land mines. The nuclear warheads launched by howitzers and Lance [missiles] are currently being modernized.

(2) The U.S. Army's Prepositioning System

The Reactivated Sagami Supply Depot

The U.S. Army Sagami General Supply Depot located at Yabe Shinden, Sagamihara-City, Kanagawa Prefecture, is a vast supply base with an area of 2.15 million square meters and as many as 760 factories, warehouses, and other structures. During the Korean war this base played an important role in the support of the U.S. Army fighting in Korea, and during the Vietnam war, as well, it undertook the repair of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and so on.

Due to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam in 1973 this supply base stopped repairing tanks after July of that year, and was in a dormant state with only a very small portion of the facilities being utilized. But the ASAHI SHIMBUN of 3 November 1984 reported that the U.S. Army was in the process of beginning, once again, to store combat equipment at this supply depot and planned, by the end of 1984, to employ (through an outisde agency) between 70 and 300 persons required for maintenance and repair, so the Sagami Supply Depot and the question of the prepositioning of weapons suddenly entered the spotlight.

Prepositioning in Europe and the Middle East

It is possible to have all sorts of conditions in the prepositioning of weapons, but the type which the U.S. Army is carrying on in West Germany and so on is called POMCUS (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets [given in transliteration, followed by English, followed by a Japanese translation]). This is something which seeks to place heavy equipment inside West German territory beforehand in more or less completely organized [sets] and send [U.S.] personnel by aircraft, because [otherwise] when reinforcements were rushed from America at a time of crisis it would end up taking more than a month to load the ships, cross the sea, and unload, if heavy equipment such as tanks, armored troop carriers, artillery, and trucks were sent by ship. A U.S. mechanized infantry division has approximately 17,000 troops, and 248 tanks, 498 armored personnel carriers, 75 cannons, and 3,500 trucks, so prepositioning of equipment at the division level becomes an extremely large-scale affair.

Thd U.S. Army is currently prepositioning equipment for 4 divisions and numerous support units in large, dehumidifyer-equipped warehouses in West Germany, and plans to add equipment for 1 division each in Belgium and the Netherlands; the warehouses and so on are expected to be completed in fiscal years 1984 or 85. In addition, the U.S. Marines are promoting a plan for storage in Norway of enough equipment for one brigade, and the U.S. Air Force is also carrying out prepositioning of ammunition, runway-repair materials, fuel, and the like in Western Europe.

Beginning in 1980, seven ships were at anchor on the island of Diego Garcia; six of them were loaded with enough equipment and supplies for one navy brigade, and one was loaded with fuel. But in 1981-82 there was a total of 18 ships. Ultimately, equipment and materials for three navy brigades and for ground and air units of the Central Command (reorganized in January 1983 out of the "rapid deployment force") [as published] which would be dispatched from the U.S. mainland in the event of a Middle East crisis will be prepositioned on 13 large transport ships. U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger's fiscal year 1985 defense report reveals that this maritime prepositioning fleet will be increased by one unit each in fiscal years 1984, 1985, and 1986, stating that "the 1984 and 1985 units will be positioned in regions other than Southeast Asia."

There seems likely to be a possibility of one of these being positioned in a Japanese port. The [defense] report went on to say: "We have reached formal agreement with a number of nations, and are also attempting to obtain the permission of various other nations for the use of local facilities in the event of a crisis."

Feelers on Positioning in Hokkaido Too

For the past several years, in the process of research on joint tactics for use during a crisis in Japan or the Far East, the U.S. Army has preached the importance of also prepositioning equipment in Japan. This is because one of the foundations of U.S. strategy against the Soviet Union in the Far East

lies in blockading the three straits on the periphery of Japan (La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) and preventing the dispatch of the Soviet submarine fleet to the Pacific Ocean in the event of a U.S.-Soviet crisis.

We have already discussed the possibility of a war centered on Hokkaido and Sakhalin. The U.S. Army is prepared, in such an event, to commit to Japan the 25th Division stationed in Hawaii, the 9th Division stationed in Washington State, and the 40th Mechanized Division of the California National Guard; all of these units have undergone joint training with the Self-Defense Forces.

But in regard to the point of heavy equipment for these units not arriving in time if sent by ship during an emergency, [the situation is worse than that of Europe, because] in terms of distance Japan is farther away than Europe. In the course of research on joint Japanese-U.S. tactics and so on, U.S. Army Japan has also sounded out the Ground Self-Defense Force on the possibility of prepositioning equipment in Hokkaido at places such as Chitose-City and the Shimamatsu Exercise Ground at Eniwa.

As long as the U.S. Army is planning to commit ground troops in Japan, the prepositioning of their heavy equipment in Japan becomes an unavoidable problem. Furthermore, the U.S. Army is in the process of organizing "light infantry divisions" which can be dispatched overseas by air transport. They will be compact compared with the regular infantry divisions stationed in places such as West Germany: consisting of 9 infantry battalions (540 men each), their main strength will be 54, 105 mm. light cannons and 33 attack helicopters; they will not have tanks, and will have approximately 10,200 men (the first unit will be the Ninth Division).

But, though they may be called "light infantry divisions," about 2,000 trucks and so on are needed to move and supply one division, and it is virtually impossible to carry this number on cargo aircraft. This means that it is desirable to place vehicles and artillery in Japan before they are needed.

Eyes Riveted on the Sea of Okhotsk

There was once a period during which U.S. defense authorities publicly stated that "a land invasion of Japan by the Soviet Union is almost inconceivable," pressing Japan for "expansion of sea and air defensive power," and the Ground Self-Defense Force was embarrassed because the value of its existence was half-denied by America.

But today, when the La Perouse Strait and the Sea of Okhotsk have become "strategic points" both for America and for the Soviet Union, it has become necessary for America to turn its eyes to the defense of Hokkaido, more because it has become a focal point of U.S.-Soviet nuclear strategy in terms of convenience for America's own strategy than for "protecting Japan."

It was at the end of 1974 that the Soviet Union deployed to [its] Pacific Fleet atomic submarines of the Model-D type which can aim directly at the

U.S. mainland. Following that, America suddenly showed interest in a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, and at the end of 1978 the "guidelines for Japanese-U.S. cooperation on defense" were agreed upon, and are also backed up by the progress of research on Japanese-U.S. joint tactics which began based on them. It naturally follows that the plan, born in this way, for joint tactics in the event of a crisis in Japan, the joint research on defense of sea lanes, on which research has progressed, and joint research on a Far East crisis, would advance in the direction of actual collective defense and prepositioning. Thinking about it now, it can probably be said that the point in time in November 1978 when the guidelines were determined was the turning point when Japan's defense policy departed from pure defense of one's own country and turned toward "NATOization."

Political Maneuvers To Preserve the System Are Also Entwined

Furthermore, it appears that behind the burning enthusiasm of U.S. Army Japan for prepositioning of equipment in Japan is entwined not only the purely military viewpoint noted above, but also bureaucratic political maneuvers [designed to] preserve the system. Lieutenant-General Alexander M. Weyand, commander, U.S. Army Japan, is also commanding officer of the "9th Army Corps," but in fact this "army corps" (rightfully, it should consist of 2 or 3 divisions, plus support units, a total of 40 or 50,000 men) is a paper unit [literally a unit without substance]. There are no more than about 2,500 U.S. Army troops in Japan, most of whom work on supply, supervision, intelligence and so on. The only combat unit is one Green Beret (Special Forces) battalion of about 300 men, which was deployed in Okinawa this year.

The 9th Army Corps is supposed to direct units which would come to Japan from Hawaii and the U.S. mainland in the event of a crisis in Japan, so only the persons needed for its headquarters exist. As might be expected, the existence of this army corps headquarters without troop strength became an issue at the U.S. Defense Department too. In 1983 the argument gathered strength that it was more rational to disband this army corps and place U.S. Army Japan under the U.S. 8th Army stationed in the Republic of Korea, in line with the fact that it is actually a support unit of the Eighth Army.

The commandant of U.S. Army Japan (and of the 9th Army Corps) became flustered and appealed to his own country and to the Japanese Government, saying: "If [they] do something like that, U.S. Army forces in Japan will end up being here just for the sake of the Republic of Korea, and that would become a political issue in Japan," and "It would also be an obstacle to joint training with the Self-Defense Force," meanwhile carrying out assiduous maneuvers to preserve the appearance of the 9th Army Corps as a "combat unit." The clincher was the prepositioning of equipment. That is, even if [the unit's] personnel are in America, if it has equipment in Japan in addition to a headquarters, to that extent there is increased reason for its existence.

But the attitude of the U.S. Congress was firm. Congress was strongly of the opinion that "Japan is getting a free ride on security. It is natural

for Japan to defend the Japanese main islands itself," so for the time being it was hardly a situation in which the Defense Department could propose prepositioning [of equipment] in Japan.

The Shimamatsu exercise ground is a purely Self-Defense Force facility, so a formal agreement by the governments of the two countries--following channels from the [U.S.] Defense Department to the State Department, from there to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and on to the Defense Agency--would be required in order for the U.S Army to use it along with the Self-Defense Forces. In a situation in which the U.S. Congress and the State Department were reluctant to go along, the possibility declined, for the time being, of carrying out prepositioning at Shimamatsu.

Therefore, U.S. Army Japan, having probably obtained the consent of (Headquarters Joint Pacific Forces) which showed understanding of its position, began to carry out prepositioning within the limits of its own authority. Fortunately for them, U.S. Army forces stationed in Korea were in the process of renewing their equipment; if put as "We will store our excess equipment at the Sagami Supply Depot," it would be difficult for the State Department or the U.S. Congress to complain about at which supply depot the Army stored its own equipment.

New 155 mm Artillery Will Also Be Introduced

But, in fact, it appears as though the over 1,000 small arms, the howitzers, and the field hospital equipment materials, and such which will be stored at the Sagami Supply Depot beginning about May of this year are not necessarily surplus from the Republic of Korea. In particular, the six M-109 self-propelled cannons (155 mm) are equipment which has never been in the Republic of Korea and strained the explanation of the State Department and U.S. Forces Japan that 'Surplus equipment from the Republic of Korea is being temporarily stored at the Sagami Supply Depot."

It is thought that U.S. Army Japan gave a very unclear explanation of this problem because it had to make it "ambiguous" since it was necessary to tell the U.S. Congress that "it is not prepositioning," and on the other hand, to say within the group that "the 9th Army Corps is an equipped combat unit."

The State Department and Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan explain that "The objective of using the Sagami Supply Depot has not changed. This is not 'POMCUS.'" To be sure, the Sagami Supply Depot was originally a facility for the amassing of munitions and goods, and it is a fact that this prepositioning is not as thorough as the "POMCUS" in Western Europe.

But it is said that even just the U.S. Army vehicles which will be brought into the Sagami Supply Depot beginning in the spring of 1985 will amount to between 1,000 and 2,000. Even if this is not "POMCUS" in the narrow sense as practiced in West Germany and the like, it is difficult to deny that it is "prepositioning" of equipment, and if the bringing in of a large volume of heavy equipment is carried out according to plan, there is no doubt that it

will become one focal point of the 1985 debate on the Japan-U.S. security relationship.

(3) The Nuclear War Capability of the Self-Defense Forces

What Constitutes Nuclear War Capability?

Nuclear Weapons and Political Will

Of course the Self-Defense Forces do not possess nuclear weapons. Nor, with the exception of England, which has developed its own nuclear weapons, do West Germany and the other NATO nations of Western Europe possess nuclear weapons of their own manufacture. But they have politically accepted U.S. nuclear weapons, allow them to be stored in their own countries, and stand ready to accept them and fight a nuclear war in the event of a crisis.

The decision by Norway to reject the introduction and storage of nuclear weapons of the U.S. military in Norway during peacetime was extremely important. But even Norway, [which has done this,] has not abandoned its former stand that in time of war it would accept nuclear weapons, equip its own armed forces with them, and consider using tactical nuclear weapons. It recognizes passage through its territory, that is, port calls, during peacetime by foreign warships and so on which are carrying nuclear weapons, and is readying its own defense facilities, including equipment, for wartime.

Norway's standpoint, which, when viewed militarily, hardly differs at all from the case of other NATO nations which do not possess nuclear weapons, is important because at least it draws a line [between itself and] NATO nuclear plans during peacetime.

Aside from very special strategic weapons such as intercontinental missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles, current nuclear weapons, particularly tactical nuclear weapons, are "nuclear/nonnuclear double weapons" which have a double capability also being conventional weapons. The nuclear capability of nations which do not possess nuclear weapons is firmly tied via the double weapons to the nation which does possess nuclear weapons and with which they are in an alliance relationship. Technological obstacles are of no consequence. The only obstacles which can exist are political; the problem is political will.

NATO's Nuclear Weapons

NATO's nuclear plans are administered by two permanent structures: the defense-minister-level "Nuclear Problem Committee," in which all members of the alliance participate, and the "Nuclear Planning Committee," also a defense-minister-level body, which gives further study to problems raised by the Nuclear Problem Committee, bringing them into more concrete form.

Among the permanent member nations of the Nuclear Planning Committee, America provided several thousand tactical nuclear warheads to NATO and has

also removed approximately 400 warheads of strategic nuclear missile submarines deployed in the Atlantic Ocean from America's Strategic Integraded Objective Plan (SIOP) and placed them under the planning and administration of the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe.

The post of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe is always held by the general of the U.S. military who is appointed commander of U.S. Forces in Europe (combined forces). England has offered NATO its entire nuclear force, including four strategic missile atomic submarines. The tactical and (war-theater) nuclear warheads located in the various NATO countries of Western Europe number about 7,000, and, aside from a small number belonging to England, they belong to America and are controlled by the U.S. military.

Nations which have accepted [nuclear weapons] participate in their control through the "double-key" system, under which neither (arming) nor use (including that by the nation's own military) is carried out without that nation's agreement. This "double key," which is basically political, may be reinforced by a small number of electronic and mechanical devices.

Return Cover For Nuclear Attack Aircraft

Due to a certain problem, the borderline dividing nuclear war power and conventional war power has become blurred.

Let us consider the F-16's which are deployed at Misawa. If F-16's carrying light nuclear warheads such as the B-57 and B-61 were dispatched from Misawa and from Kunsan in the Republic of Korea and carried out attacks against the Soviet Union, it is conceivable that the Air Self-Defense Force would be requested to scramble to intercept the Soviet aircraft that came in pursuit of these U.S. military aircraft, that is, to provide cover on their way home. In that case, is the Air Self-Defense Force, which supports a U.S. Air Force that depends upon fierce nuclear attack power for a decisive blow, a nuclear war power or a conventional war power?

The Air Self-Defense Force may not have nuclear capability but it should probably be said to have nuclear war capability.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force's P-3C is a more positive example. Suppose that a P-3C patrolling the open seas of the Sea of Okhotsk succeeds in marking [the position of] a Soviet Model-D ballistic missils nuclear submarine that is operating under water, and keeps pursuing it. This submarine's target is not Japan, but the U.S. mainland. The strategic missile submarine, the position of which has been pinpointed by the opponent's antisumbarine war power and which is being pursued, is the same as "dead."

In that case, is it really true that this P-3C does not have nuclear war capability?

Furthermore, particularly in the waters near Japan, the P-3C can protect U.S. atomic attack submarines loaded with Tomahawk cruise missiles by

hunting for and pursuing Soviet attack submarines that try to approach them. The U.S. atomic submarines that carry Tomahawks are a quasistrategic nuclear force. Force that restricts the activities of the ocean strategic nuclear power of enemies and supports that of allies is called "strategic" antisubmarine force. By nature this is one part of ocean strategic nuclear force, and the P-3C is the central force [of that part].

The Nuclear Capability of the Ground Self-Defense Force

Short-Range Nuclear-Firepower

The Ground Self-Defense Force began deployment of M-110A2 203mm. Self-propelled howitzers to units, a long-cherished desire, in fiscal year 1983. This cannon is a representative example of the nuclear/nonnuclear double use cannons of the U.S. Army and the armies of the NATO nations. Its older-type nuclear warhead is the 1-kiloton-class W-33, and production of the W-70 intensified radiation model (neutron bomb) is continuing as the new model which will replace this stock. This is "a marked improvement over the W-33 in terms of range, precise accuracy, and maintenance," (U.S. Defense Report for the current fiscal year).

The Self-Defense Force will acquire 91 of the M-110A2's when it achieves the goals of the 1981 mid-term program estimate; at present they are being deployed to an artillery brigade under the direct control of the Northern District Army, to the First Education and Guidance Corps, which doubles as a strategic mobile army corps under the direct control of the Director General of the Defense Agency, and to other education units. In time the Ground Self-Defense Force intends to deploy them to artillery (squads) [gun] (currently belonging to the Tohoku and Western Districts; artillery brigades are composed of a number of artillery (squads)) and also to artillery regiments belonging to divisions. Officially, the M-110A2 is produced in Japan, but America will not grant a license for manufacture of the gun barrel, so it is done within the framework of purchasing the main part of the cannon, including the breech mechanism and the (recoil control device) in the form of compensated assistance (FMS) [Foreign Military Sales].

The Japanese-manufactured Model-75 155 mm self-propelled howitzer (201 of which will be procured with the achievement of the 1981 mid-term program estimate. The firepower of the Hokkaido divisions) is almost an exact copy of the M-609A1, the main self-propelled cannon of U.S. and NATO forces.

The fact that its range when using conventional high-performance explosive shells is 18 kilometers, the same as that of the M-109A1, means that it can use the same kind of firing powder, and there is no way that there could be a big difference in the breech mechanisms, so it is safe to assume that it can also fire nuclear howitzer shells.

The Paradox of Nuclear Field Weapons

Generally speaking, the "double key" is canceled, and the political and military meaning of the nuclear howitzer shells which are under the control

of cannon's side is "fire." It is not possible to bestow on simple weapons such as artillery shells precise engineering security/release devices of the type used on missiles or bombs used by aircraft. Furthermore, the danger which hangs over all nuclear weapons brought to the bewildering, shifting scene of field operations is destruction or capture by the enemy.

Probably any commanding officer who is placed on a battlefield will try to fire [such weapons] before they are destroyed or captured. Moreover, even if an attack by a Soviet (Spetsnaz) special antinuclear unit has been successfully repulsed, if the battleline approaches, the commander of a nuclear weapons dump must either distribute the nuclear weapons under his control to units or evacuate them, before losing the chance to do so. Nuclear weapons located at or near the battle line exert strong pressure for early or pre-emptive use on commanding officers of every grade.

The 94 nuclear howitzer-warheads belonging to U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea (Jack Anderson's figure) symbolize the paradox of nuclear field weapons. If there were a push southward by a large group of tanks from the "North," this comparatively large volume of nuclear howitzer shells would have to be located near the frontline in order to be able to counter it. If it is possible to repulse the group of "Northern" tanks by conventional firepower, these nuclear howitzer shells can end up being white elephants; but should that fail, U.S. forces must abandon the chance of stopping [the tanks] with conventional weapons at a second line, and initiate the use of nuclear weapons against an opposing force that is not equipped with nuclear weapons.

The Self-Defense Forces began to replace its towed 155 mm howitzers in fiscal year 1984. The new cannon is the FH-70 jointly developed by 3 NATO countries (West Germany, England, and Italy), 120 of which will be procured when the "1981 mid-term program estimate" is achieved. For the time being they will be deployed to the general support mission battalions of divisions in Honshu [literally the main island] and Kyushu, but in future the [Self-Defense Force] would also like to deploy them to 105 mm artillery battalions whose mission, like that of U.S. marines, is (direct cooperation). There is a strong possibility that America's nuclear warheads for 155 mm cannons (the W-48 and W-82) can also be used in the FH-70. The W-82 is a neutron warhead.

Nuclear Protective Capability

One of the technical training manuals of the Ground Self-Defense Force is called "Protection Against Special Weapons." "Special weapons" refers to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The manual gives an outline of these weapons, and describes the basic patterns of attack, the basic actions of individual soldiers at the time of undergoing attack, response procedures of military units, applications of same, equipment for protection against special weapons, materials which can be used, and so on. Moreover, chemically protective clothing which is thought to make possible action under radioactive fallout (dust of death) resulting from nuclear attack has been issued to all units in the Ground Self-Defense Force.

In the parade of the Self-Defense Force's Second Division [which was held] in Asahikawa-City, Hokkaido in the autumn of 1982, approximately one company of a local regular regiment startled the local citizenry by parading in this chemically protective outfit. We have heard that it was boasted within the unit that this was effective in showing the force of spirit of the Northern Hokkaido "Border Division" It appears that the Self-Defense Force's education of the public is not at all limited to the smiling tactics of a "gathering of tiny tots and young people."

A Ground Self-Defense Force chemistry school and chemical protection company are located in Omiya in Saitama Prefecture. In 1 year the chemistry school trains about 300 persons of all ranks as personnel needed for protection against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and sends them out to units throughout the country. These personnel who have mastered the "Manual on Proection Against Special Weapons" train other unit members according to the manual, forming in corps and units at every level the nucleus for a war against special weapons. By special order of the prime minister a chemical protection company was placed on standby alert at the time of the uproar over the crash of the Soviet atomic powered military satellite in March 1982.

The chemical [protection] company has modern chemical protection vehicles equipped with tracks and armor, decontamination vehicles, which are modified trucks, and so on. Simple, portable decontamination devices which can decontaminate an area from [the size of] 1 tank to 100 square meters have been issued to all units. The equipment used for protection against chemicals is the same as that used for protection against nuclear (radiation). Persons connected with chemical protection units are eager to place a platoon-size protection unit at the district army level. It is said that a chemical protection vehicle was recently deployed to the Northern District Army, and this may be a forerunner [of such a move].

Internal irradiation by radioactive substances introduced into the body via drinking water or breathing is much more dangerous than irradiation from outside. Gas masks are widespread as required personal equipment for all members of the Self-Defense Forces, and if they can keep out gas they can more easily keep out radioactive substances in the form of minute particles. Moreover, the Ground Self-Defense Force has placed water supply vehicles with rank and file units for all sorts of objectives. It is an extremely common piece of equipment which also "lends a hand" to the public in times of fire or water shortages, but when one considers the fearsomeness of radioactive substances and toxic substances which enter through the mouth, this is truly the water of life for every unit in a situation of "defense against special weapons." A field laundry set also serves the purpose of reducing the labor of the average member of the Self-Defense Force, but it is useful in nuclear, chemical and biological decontamination as well. In the military all equipment, materials, and facilities are a part of fighting power.

Shelters Against Nuclear Explosions

Along with the capabilities of the cannon itself and the running capabilities of the vehicle frame, the U.S. military's M-109 155 mm self-propelled howitzer was developed with the objective of enhancing its survivability and action under conditions of nuclear combat. There is no reason to believe that the Self-Defense Force's Model 75 self-propelled cannon, which is "an exact copy" of the M-109A1 should differ from it in this one point alone. The switch to 155 mm [howitzers] and to self-propelled artillery by the division technical (artillery) force of the 4 divisions stationed in Hokkaidslsk Hokkaido (the 2d, 5th, 7th Armored, and 11th) has progressed.

A nuclear attack is an overlapping attack of thermic rays, blast, and radiation (initial radiation and lingering radiation such as fallout), but the armored frame which covers a tank can, to some extent, shelter and protection its crew. If completely enveloped in the fireball formed by a nuclear explosion, or if exposed to a shock-wave of from several tens to several hundreds of pounds per square inch (psi) at the edges [of the fireball), or if it received a direct hit, no matter how strong the armored frame of the vehicle it would be crushed or be destroyed by fire. In some cases the crew inside would be baked, and there would be cases in which, though the tank was not totally destroyed, it would become incapable of combat because cannons and other external equipment had been destroyed.

But the energy of a nuclear explosion is directly proportional to its power and inversely proportional to the square of the distance [from the explosion], so in field operations the decrease effect due to distance is a big advantage to the opposing side.

Generally, when civilians, who ordinarily live in flimsy houses, are exposed to nuclear attack, there are more casualties from secondary injuries: being trapped under destroyed buildings, or being struck by flying pieces of buildings, or being burned in fires which break our accompanying the attack, than from primary injuries. But secondary injuries can be limited by military forces which anticipate what will happen and disperse, dig shelters, and lay low in hiding places.

Moreover, armored war power has a very high coefficient of protection against the large volume of "fallout," exceeding by 3 or 4 decimal places that of aerial [nuclear] explosions, which is created by surface (1/3 or more of the diameter of the fireball is in contact with the ground) or underground [nuclear] explosions, of which many are expected in a land war. The mobile power of armored vehicles makes it possible to withdraw from heavily contaminated areas, judge the decrease in contamination, and charge [back in when it is felt that the contamination is no longer heavy]. Thus the proportion of a unit's shift to armor leads to enhancement of "protective capability against special weapons."

Tanks developed after World War II are sealed more tightly than earlier ones, so by equipping them with air filters it is possible to advance into areas which are fairly heavily contaminated.

The Nuclear Capability of the Maritime Self-Defense Force

The Harpoon Antiship Missile

The Maritime Self-Defense Force has now developed into one of the world's strongest and most modern antisubmarine units. Aside from America's huge aircraft carriers, the most powerful modern warship is the atomic submarine, and the greatest hope which America pins on the navies of allied nations is that they will blockade and destroy [literally force out] the Soviet Union's submarine force by means of a strong antisubmarine unit. The Maritime Self-Defense units already outshine, in both quantity and quality, the escort vessel force of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

The following warships are armed with harpoon cruise missiles having a range of 90 to 100 kilometers; 4 DE [destroyer escorts] (coastal guard escort vessels), Hatsuyuki class standard DD [destroyer] (all-purpose escort vessels), the newest antiaircraft missile escort vessel (DDG) [guided missile destroyer] (Sawakaze), that is, DDG from the 5th onward, DD after system modification, and submarines from the "Nadashio," commissioned this year, onward. The Harpoons of the "Sawakaze" are fired from an antiaircraft missile launcher. If the equipment on the launcher is changed, it will be possible to equip the three earlier DDG's with Harpoons, and the P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft also carry Harpoons. The Harpoon is already standard equipment for the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force currently has 16 submarines, over the past several years a policy has been maintained of building 1 submarine each year and decommissioning the oldest [existing] submarine. All but 1 or 2 are tear-drop shaped, single-shaft-propulsion submarines based on the same design concept as America's attack-type atomic submarines. The Self-Defense Force secretly desires to have atomic attack submarines, and the government's official view holds the possession of military vessels driven by atomic power does not contravene the provisions of the Basic Law on Atomic Energy which limit the utilization of atomic energy to peaceful purposes. The only things which prevent the acquisition of atomic submarines] are finances, and probably the restrictions [imposed by] public opinion.

The Self-Defense Force's submarines operate under the centralized command of the commander of the submarine fleet. Even today, in the age of atomic submarines, slow but quiet conventional-powered submarines are valued by major powers other than America. Conventional submarines are better suited than atomic submarines for missions such as antisubmarine patrol and forming antisubmarine barriers in the shallow waters of the continental shelf or at strategic defiles like the three straits. If the Self-Defense Force's submarine force were to join in a fierce battle between a force impeding passage through a strait and one trying to break through the strait, even if the submarines were completely expended, during the course of the battle the enemy would be forced to suffer a loss large enough to greatly reduce the U.S. Navy's burden.

Warships from the "Nadashio" onward will carry Harpoons, thereby gaining long-distance striking power against surface vessels. Submarine Harpoons are launched from conventional torpedo tubes. The [only] thing required is a system that calculates such things as the coordinates for the positions of the launching and target vessels, the distance [between them], and so on and programs the data into the missile. Not only future ships, but also the 4 existing ships of the "Nadashio" modes (2,200 ton model) can be outfitted [with Harpoons].

Asroc

Asroc, a required weapon for escort vessels, is a typical nuclear/nonnuclear double-use weapon used at sea. America installed a nuclear warhead on it and conducted full-range (flight) and detonation tests. The rocket, which is not guided, flies at the speed of sound to a maximum distance of approximately 10 kilometers and releases a torpedo to the surface of the sea in the general vicinity of the target. The torpedo lands in the water, its speed of descent having been slowed by a parachute, and once in the water it tracks the target by homing in on sound waves, approaches, and detonates. The nuclear warhead is a W-44 [1-]kiloton-class warhead. The Asroc launching platform is a very simple mechanism; there seems no possibility of having a very complicated operation here for nuclear security and release. There are two ways of loading the [missile] on the launcher, the direct type and the indirect type.

Could it be that preparations for a nuclear Asroc attack follow a system in which by order at an early stage a magazine or special storage space would be unlocked by fixed procedures and operations, and one or two missiles would be loaded into each of the 8 launchers with which a vessel is outfitted, and their circuits would be securely locked to prevent unauthorized launching?

The passageway leading toward the Asroc magazine on the [U.S.] fleet guided missile destroyer Towers which makes Yokosuka its home port bears a mark indicating the presence of radioactive matter. In other words, if the political problems are removed, is not the carrying of nuclear Asroc by warships of the Self-Defense Force a question of whether or not security and control are possible at the magazine?

Plans for Modernization of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

The U.S. Defense Report for the current fiscal year seeks "the submarine-launched antisubmarine Stand Off (to attack from a distant position) weapon, antisubmarine rockets for the vertical launch system (VLS) carried on surface warships, and new air-drop depth charges" as fairly long-term tasks of the "U.S. Navy Plan for Modernization of Nonstrategic Nuclear Capability" in fiscal years 1985-89 in order for warships of the U.S. military to counter much more effectively the threat posed by enemy submarines.

According to the Report, a shorter-term task of this plan is a nuclear warhead for use with the standard Model-II (long range) ship to air missile, and its deployment is expected to begin in the latter half of the 1980's.

[Boxed section on lower portion of pp 98,99]
From The Self-Defense Force Textbook on [Protection Against] Nuclear Warfare

What appears here are extracts from "Applied Textbook (Protection against CBR [chemical, biological, and radiation] Warfare") (Second Technical School Textbook Number 20, 18 February 1980) which is being used at the Second Technical School of the Maritime Self-Defense Force. It is being used at the Second Technical School of the Maritime Self-Defense Force. It is one example of the sort of training and education which the Self Defense Forces are doing to prepare for nuclear warfare.

Chapter 4: Shipboard Protection Against CBR Warfare

Section 2: Damage From Nuclear Weapons and Countermeasures

4201: Damage

The damage incurred by vessels due to nuclear attack is varied, differing according to type of explosion, output, and so on. Vessels in the vicinity of the detonation point will sink or incur heavy damage due to blast, heat rays, and underwater shock-waves, but the degree of damage lessens as the distance [from the detonation point] increases. Furthermore, even vessels outside the area in which [the aforementioned] damage is incurred may suffer the influence of contamination and EMP [expansion unknown] due to fallout and so on.

1. Damage anticipated from blast, underwater shock-waves, and so on (omitted).

2. Radiation Contamination: (1) All personnel on open decks will be contaminated by base (surge) [saji] fallout and by rain containing radioactive matter, and radioactive matter will adhere to the surface of exposed deck machinery and combat materiel. According to the Bikini tests the upper part of decks showed a higher level of contamination than lower parts. (2) Contamination inside a vessel, regardless of the height of the deck, differs according to the degree of air-tightness and water-tightness. When the base (surge) invades via the ventilation equipment it becomes an extremely dangerous situation and mist containing radioactive matter contaminates all surfaces. The same is true of fallout and rain containing radioactive

matter, but in both cases, there will be no contamination if [the vessel] is completely air and water tight (remainder omitted).

4202: Shipbuilding Countermeasures

1. Strength Countermeasures (omitted)

2. Contamination Countermeasures: (1) Ventilation equipment: the interiors of warships must be made capable of tightly sealed, cyclical ventilation by means of ventilation control, and the closure device must be a structure which can operate swiftly and surely. Furthermore, it is necessary to install air purification equipment and cooling equipment in important sections [of the vessel]. (2) Deck sprinkler equipment: As well as preventing the adherence of fallout and base surge, and reducing the effects of heat-rays, this provides equipment for washing away radioactive matter that adheres (to decks and material]. Bathing equipment: (Rooms and passageways with showers and rooms with bathtubs) will be provided in order to detect and remove contaminants which have adhered to the body. (4) Galley: If food is contaminated it enters the body and causes internal exposure, so the galley must be strictly protected. Contaminated sea water will not be used. Therefore consideration is necessary in regard to the storage of water for general use.

Section 3: Measures for Protection Against R [radiation] Warfare

4301: Summary of Measures

1: In the Event that a Nuclear Attack Has Been Suffered

"Atomic Protection Instructions" (Summary of instructions: following the sounding of the gas alarm for 10 seconds, the instructions "atomic protection," followed 60 seconds later by a 20 second blast of the alarm). Following that each (section) will carry out the work indicated in the (training guide for emergency post drills) (omission).

(1) [Ship's] Bridge: a) grasp the mode of attack; b) take evasive action; c) consider contamination; d) direct work to emergency command post; 3) confirm damage situation in each section. (2) Emergency Command Post: (a) direct personal protection of the emergency squad; b) direct detection of damage and grasp situation; c) direct investigation and measurement: (1) plotting of radiation strength and calculation of the (length of time it can be endured);

(2) establish contaminated areas; d) direct decontamination and grasp situation; e) direct regarding incidental damage; f) report on work executed. (3) Emergency Squad: a) personal protection (putting on protective masks and so on); b) damage detection; c) work of investigation, decontamination, and bathing; d) emergency work on incidental damage; e) starting and stopping the deck sprinkler equipment and the sealed cyclical ventilation equipment.

2: Personal Protection: Take action for personal protection until the alarm stops sounding.

(1) Personnel deployed in exposed parts will retreat to sealed quarters as established under regulations. (2) Cover exposed portions of the skin. (3) At the sound of the gas alarm close your eyes and lie down at that spot. Maintain that posture until the alarm stops. Personnel who have no chance to retreat inside the ship should quickly lie down on the spot, but enter the lee of structures and so on and wait until danger from shock waves has passed. (4) Put on a protective mask in preparation for the base surge and fallout. (5) If there is danger that your body has been contaminated, quickly decontaminate yourself at a bathing place. If you have been injured, carry out first aid measures after the shock wave has passed, and if necessary, receive emergency treatment at the combat sick bay. (remainder omitted)

4303: Decontamination:

1: Emergency Decontamination (omitted)

2: Bathing: Contaminated persons will decontaminate themselves by bathing in a shower room or bath[tub] room. Moreover, it is necessary to dispose of contaminated clothing so as not to spread contamination. (remainder omitted) (1) Shower rooms: a) when wearing protective clothing leave it on and rinse yourself off with fresh water (see water). b) remove protective clothing, protective mask, boots, and so on, and place them inside contamination treatment containers. c) remove the pocket radiation counter and turn it over to (bathing inspectors). d) Undergo a check for contamination. e) If body or work-clothes are contaminated, remove clothes (omission).

The VLS is a system which stores together as large as possible a number of nuclear-and conventional-warhead missiles, in bundles of a few each, for use against aircraft, submarines, and [surface] warships, managing they by means of a computerized automatic control mechanism, and taking them out, one after the other, as needed, and firing them from vertical launchers [located] on deck or buried within the ship. It will be installed on new

warships which America is in the process of building. The plan is certainly not a casual one.

At the time of his visit to Okinawa in the spring of 1984, W. (Arkin) emphasized that U.S. nuclear development authorities "are now eagerly pursuing a nuclear warhead for use with the Harpoon missile, and are already about to finish the developmental research stage (phase 1)."

We have seen above that for all practical purposes the P-3C can even be strategic nuclear force. The air-drop antisubmarine nuclear weapon currently in use, which the U.S. Navy prepared for aircraft such as the P-3C/B, the S-3 carrier-based antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and the ship-based SH-3E/H helicopter, is the B-57. B-57 nuclear warheads for use by attack aircraft are said to have a timer for underwater explosion, an attached fuse regulated by water pressure, to weight 130 kilograms, less than half as heavy as the (ruru), the previous generation aircraft-use nuclear depth charge, and to have explosive force in the [1] kiloton class.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force's H-SS2 antisubmarine helicopter which is carried on escort vessels and dispatched from land bases is modeled on the same frame as the U.S. Navy's SH-3 and carries antisubmarine equipment used by the Maritime Self Defense Force; it lacks nothing in payload [compared to the H-SS2]. The U.S. Navy has an armory in Misawa called an advanced underwater weapons (AUW) shop that stores and manages nuclear warheads and so on.

If only the problem of how to handle the final release of safety devices can be solved, it will be very simple to supply them to the Maritime Self-Defense Force. And the problem of the release is a problem which will be solved within the command sphere of C I interoperability.

Nuclear Protection Capability

The Maritime Self-Defense Force, too, is not neglecting nuclear protection. In the Second Technical School, as well, which trains personnel of all ranks [in fields] such as engineering, intelligence-related work, (construction) and installations, there is an "applications textbook" for protection against CBR (chemical, biological, and radiation) warfare. This [Textbook] lists the duties of the chief officer in each (field): the chief engineer, (chief duty officer), (chief supply officer), and (chief surgeon) when under nuclear attack, and the composition and equipment of the emergency squads which take charge of the fore, mid, and aft sections of the ship under the (emergency commander). Particularly in regard to nuclear weapons, it lists countermeasures on damage from such weapons, and methods of estimating it, and lists particularly the methods and standards for detection of contamination in each part of the ship and for decontamination of ship and personnel.

Large ships of the escort vessel class are equipped with basic radiation protection capability. Beginning with warships built under the First Defense Power Consolidation Plan (construction began in 1955), escort vessels have

equipped with devices for washing off radioactive dust which decontaminate by enveloping the entire ship in a shower, and warships in current service are equipped with compulsory cyclical ventilation equipment which works with hatches tightly sealed. There is fear that the sealing of the ship will loosen over the long term as ships are used, but keeping such places in a constant state of repair is the daily work of construction personnel.

The Nuclear Capability of the Air Self-Defense Force

Nuclear/Nonnuclear Double-Use Aircraft

The fiscal year 1985 U.S. White Paper on Defense lists seven types of fighter-bomber: the F-III, F-16, F-4, and F-104, and the European jointly developed Tornado, Buccaneer, and Jaguar as nuclear/nonnuclear double-use aircraft which form part of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear force (INF), and closes by saying: "As part of its plan, currently in progress, for modernization of its nonstrategic nuclear force, NATO is in the process of replacing obsolete double-use aircraft with more modern F-16's. ...in connection with this plan America is promoting the enhancement of the quality of stockpiles of tactical nuclear bombs through the deployment of new-model bombs which have been made safer and more secure.

Introduction of the Self-Defense Force's F-4EJ began in the early 1970's, and it has the same frame as the F-4E which was the U.S. Air Force's main force fighter bomber of that time. When it came to be manufactured in Japan the nuclear-attack equipment, bombing computation function, airborne refueling equipment and so on were removed. The repair and improvement of F-4FJ's [as published] for the purpose of extending their commissioned life-span will begin in fiscal year 1986, and at that time, along with the enhancement of the radar system, the addition of downward-facing surveillance and low-altitude target attack capability, the renewal of the combat and flight data display equipment and so on, the bombing computation function will be revived and Japanese-manufactured air to surface (ship) cruise missiles (ASM-1) will be added, so it will end up possessing ground attack capabilities which surpass those of the U.S. military's F-4E.

Apart from a very limited group of persons concerned, no one knows whether the nuclear attack equipment removed when the F-4EJ was manufactured was a special circuit, or a special interface, or some other system. Is it not likely that, if considered necessary, Japan's F-4EJ (and the F-15 as well) could become able to use atomic bomb by the addition of simple repairs or equipment?

(4) America's Scenario for Nuclear War

It is necessary to get a new grasp of the situation which we have described up to now regarding Japan and its periphery in the context of the entire nuclear strategy of the Reagan administration.

NSDD-32 [National Security (Decision) Directive]

In May of 1982, the year Reagan took office as president, William Clark, national security advisor at the time, gave a speech on "National Security Strategy" at Washington's Georgetown University. This is the only official announcement of the entirety of the Reagan administration's concept of world strategy.

The gist of the talk can be summarized in the following six points: The first is that it is a comprehensive strategy, that is, a strategy made up of the four [fields of] diplomacy, politics, economics, and intelligence, and based upon military power. The second is that it develops a cooperative joint strategy with allies. The third is that [the strategy] encompasses the entire world. For that reason, the fourth is the strengthening of nuclear force, putting particular efforts into C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence systems) and sea-launched cruise missiles (Tomahawk). The fifth is to increase flexible reaponse capability of conventional forces, particularly in Europe and the Western Pacific Ocean. The sixth is promoting consolidation of the response-system and carrying out of periodic maneuvers, particularly joint land, sea, and air exercises of U.S. forces and joint exercises with allied forces.

When one follows the subsequent string of moves by the U.S. Government and the U.S. military it is clear that they were a concrete manifestation of Clark's speech, and in that sense Clark's speech should be scrutinized afresh.

This can probably be said to be the source of the strengthening of C^3I facilities in Japan, the actual state and strengthening of which will be discussed in the next chapter.

At the beginning of his speech [Clark] revealed that in the period of 1 year and 4 months since taking office President Reagan had held 57 meetings (a rate of about 1 each week) of the National Security Council and had signed 35 "National Security Decision Directives" (NSDD). Among them the one which, in particular, became the basis for military strategy is called "NSDD-32." The "Guidelines for Defense in Fiscal Years 1984-88," part of which was leaked to the NEW YORK TIMES and so on following Clark's speech, is thought to be a 5-year defense budget plan formulated on the basis of this [directive].

Horizontal Escalation

NEW YORK TIMES reporter Richard Halloran explains the gist of "NSDD-32" by dividing it into the following three points (NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE of 15 January 1984):

The first point is conventional warfare. Up to then it had been considered necessary to prepare capability to deal with wars with the Soviet Union and China, and another small country, (2 and 1/2 wars) or wars with the Soviet Union, and another small country, or wars with the Soviet Union and 2

different small countries (1 and 1/2 wars)--for 30 days with conventional force, and after that with nuclear force--but that was changed as follows: The approach of 2 and 1/2 or 1 and 1/2 wars was abandoned in favor of a "horizontal escalation" strategy which prepared capability for waging war on a global scale.

In other words a war which occurs in one war zone can immediately lead to war in another war zone. One not only launches a counterattack in the zone in which one was attacked, but launches an attack in any war zone in which it is possible to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. An example would be to attack Vladivostok if the Soviet Union made a move in the Middle East.

Furthermore, argument was raised against this strategy of horizontal escalation (principally by Thomas (Reed), the former Air Force Chief of Staff who, at Reagan's request, participated in discussions on national security policy) to the effect that it had now changed to a policy under which first one responds to a Soviet attack, and, while keeping in mind that war will spread especially at sea, maintains forces in other war zones which are able to counterattack. Here particular notice should be taken of the fact that it is assumed that a U.S.-Soviet war would spread to the sea.

Moreover, the capability to sustain conventional warfare has come to be raised to more than 30 days.

The Development of Long-Term Nuclear War

The second point is the order of priority for defense zones. That is: (1) North and Central America, (2) Western Europe, (3) The Middle East (up till then the State Department's statements on this had been vague), (4) Japan and the Republic of Korea, and (5) South America and Africa.

The third point is nuclear war. This develops a long-term nuclear war spreading across multiple stages (protracted nuclear war). That is, it takes a strategy of firing nuclear weapons piecemeal, in response to an opponent's moves, rather than hurling a large volume all at once. This is not placing limits on nuclear warfare, but means considering all scales and processes, from limited nuclear war (with limitations on the area and the objective) to total nuclear war.

Incidentally, in an interview with the magazine AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Thomas (Reade) made the following remarks regarding Japan's role in U.S. global military strategy (issue of 19 July 1982):

It is necessary for Japan to increase greatly the proportion of its defense burden." "Japan must...recognize its new role, and must strengthen the thing which can contribute most--reconnaisance in the northwest Pacific Ocean." Japan will give the intelligence gained thereby to its ally, and can defend sea lanes. And Japan will probably be requested to increase its economic aid to neighboring countries and to the nations of southeast Asia, and to support U.S. forces stationed in Japan and existing [U.S. military] facilities.

We have already seen that recent moves of the Nakasone Cabinet are thought to [indicate] acceptance of this, and that Japan has been completely incorporated into U.S. global strategy and is dashing along the path of supporting one wing of that strategy.

On that point, there is partical concern over the moves, in the northwest Pacific Ocean, of the U.S. Navy and Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force which cooperates with it. "U.S. Navy Tactical Headquarters Report for Fiscal Year 1984" says the following regarding the assumption, found in "NSDD-32," that a U.S.-Soviet war would expand to the sea: "It is probably unwise to conclude that a sea-war with a global power like the Soviet Union would be geographically limited or that it is planned to occur only in a form like that. Soviet participation extends throughout the globe, so it is thought that in the event of a war [the Soviet Union] will seek to gain an advantage against targets outside of Europe and outside the borders of the Soviet Union. Similarly, should operations in another war zone be advantageous, or should it be impossible to defend the interests of an area which has been attacked, we shall not limit our actions. It is wise to recognize that war with the Soviet Union is, by its nature, global in scale, and that this is particularly true on the seas."

Recent moves of the U.S. Navy, which thinks this way, in particular deployment of the Tomahawk and so on, are discussed in detail in "Nuclear Front--the Dangerous Northwest Pacific Ocean" and "Nuclear War at Sea--the Danger Approaching the Far East" in the March 1984 issue of SEKAI.

"[The meaning of] 'Will not introduce [nuclear weapons into Japan]' [one of Japan's 'three nonnuclear principles'] must not be limited to rejection of the deployment of nuclear weapons inside Japan and of port calls or stopovers by vessels or aircraft loaded with nuclear weapons. In addition the government should certify to the people of the nation, in a manner which leaves no doubts, that it includes the meaning of 'will not introduce' command and communications facilities indispensible to the operation of U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons, especially atomic submarines, which are deployed in the waters surrounding Japan."

These are the words set forth as the first proposal of the "Proposal for Five Nonnuclear Principles" which 119 writers, scholars, and men of letters, including Jiro Akagawa, Hisashi Inoue, and Kenzaburo Oe, declared under their joint signature on 20 June 1984.

It can be said that the importance of the "command and communications facilities"--to change it to U.S. Defense Department terminology, "C^3I (C to the power of 3 I) systems" mentioned here is finally beginning to be recognized in Japan too. But the actual situation (even what is where) is cloaked in a heavy veil of military secrecy, so virtually nothing is known.

Based upon a few materials and on-the-spot investigations, we shall clarify to the extent possible the form of C^3I in Japan.

What is C^3I?

The person who first introduced Japan to C^3I is New Zealand peace activist O.R. (Wilks). At the international conference in preparation for the 1975 21st Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs he gave a special report titled "U.S. Nuclear War Systems in the Pacific Ocean: Dangers and Opportunities" in which he explained C^3 systems (command, control, and communications systems) and pointed out that they are facilities indispensible to nuclear war.

Almost 10 years have passed since that time. The rapid progress in electronics has made possible the establishment of highly developed C^3 systems led by satellite technology and rocket technology, and through the development of all sorts of radar and antennas intelligence (I) systems such as early warning, investigation, and gathering of information, have also been strengthened, so that today "C^3I" systems in which I is added to C^3, are acquiring great military influence.

It is already known by many people that nuclear weapons cannot be used without C^3I, and that, consequently, offensive and defensive battles will break out in connection with C^3I immediately before a nuclear war. In spite of this, the first-class C^3I bases which are deployed in great numbers in the Japanese island chain, and which will be top priority targets in a nuclear attack, have hardly been studied, and their actual situation is not well known.

We shall begin by giving a simple explanation of what "C^3I" is.

The Actual Situation Regarding Operation of C^3I

The following are selections from the radio communications of the Soviet interceptor Number 805 which are taken from the content of communications published by the Defense Agency in connection with the incident in which a Korean Airlines plane was shot down in September of last year [as published].

3:09:44 Course 240 degrees...roger.
3:13:05 Confirm. Am locked on target.
3:13:26 Does not respond to IFF [identification friend or foe].
3:13:35 Target's course is 240 degrees.
3:20:30 Turning off lock-on and approaching target.
3:23:27 Am pulling back. Am now testing missiles.
3:25:11 Am approaching target. Am locked on target. Distance to target is 8 kilometers.
3:26:20 Have fired.
3:26:53 Remaining fuel is 1600.
3:27:01 Will execute. What is distance to base?
3:27:05 Roger.
3:33:56 Altitude 5,000 meters.

Messages from the ground are not included in these communications, but clearly a number of commands have been issued such as the on and off of the

lock-on device for tracking the target, the operation of the IFF to distinguish between friend and foe, and the launching of the missile, and it can be inferred that the attack and the return to base is being controlled. Moreover, plane Number 805 is carrying on communications which repeat commands and controls or report on the situation.

Furthermore, ground radar (intelligence) is supporting command by confirming such things as the position, speed, and direction of friend and for. Meanwhile, plane Number 805 is confirming its own position by a Ground radiowave beacon TACAN (tactical air navigation equipment, a control system) as it flies. Probably the reason why he asked for the distance to the base (in the English-language report of the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] it is given as "point" rather than "base," perhaps meaning "way point.") was in order to make an emergency landing at a base which did not have TACAN. Incidentally, the fuel remaining in plane Number 805 was only 1/2 that of the other interceptors, planes Number 163 and 121.

It will probably be understood from the above that in actuality C^3I are operated as one body.

Well, as this stands, the Defense Agency's intelligence system was unable to catch the communications from the Soviet ground base, but, leaving aside the question of the truth or falsehood of that, a fighter aircraft's radio communications use the same UHF [ultra-high frequency] radio waves as television, so, just as television waves do not reach well in the shadow of buildings and do not reach long distance, there is a great decrease in radio waves at ground intelligence bases, making reception of communications difficult. But if it is a line-of-sight distance, it can reach as far as the moon. Therefore, if an aircraft [listening post] had been in flight at this time it should have been able to also monitor all the radio communications of ground stations. And that would be valuable data for finding out such things as the Soviet Union's air-defense system and intercept capability.

COMINT [communications intelligence]; SIGINT [signal intelligence]

In general radio waves can be easily monitored so code is used. The former Japanese Navy used a random-number chart called a "D code" to communicate with warships, and for aircraft used a two-digit code with an effective period of a few months. And if a codebook were dropped in the ocean, in the former case it would sink because the covers were made of lead, and in the latter case it was arranged that the ink would fade. If the codes were ever broken, friendly information and operations would become perfectly clear [to the enemy]. Consequently, the breaking of codes is one of the important missions of intelligence systems. Therefore work is carried on in which an opponent's communications are monitored and recorded 24 hours a day, and are analyzed by various techniques such as comparison with other information. Of course ordinary, uncoded communications are also all recorded. This is called COMINT (communications intelligence).

The Soviet Union's Bear reconnaissance aircraft often fly along the Japanese island chain, and this is for the purpose, along with studying the air-defense

system of the Self-Defense Force which scrambles [in response], of monitoring electronic intelligence such as the frequency, pulse-width, beam-width, power, and scan-turn of air-defense radar; this type of intelligence is called SIGNINT. Such information is useful in jamming an opponent's radar during a crisis, or, conversely, it is useful in developing techniques for rendering ineffective an opponent's jamming radio-signals [literally radio-waves].

Among other intelligency systems, there are the satellite system used for ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] early detection and warning, the (cobra den) radar (Aleutian [Islands]), the Pave Paws radar (U.S. mainland), and the surveillance systems of various kinds of spy satellite and so on; each of these is connected to C systems by real time.

Systems for Determining Position

Furthermore, control systems also include position-determing systems like the TACAN mentioned above. Warships can measure their position with an error [margin] of 40 meters by means of the NNSS (Navy Navigation Satellite System). Submarines cannot use NNSS while under water, so they utilize the Omega or Loran C system, the radio waves of which reach under water. But with Omega and Loran C the [margin of] error is 1,000 yards or more, so the accuracy of launched missiles decreases.

Therefore, [submarines] may employ the method of surfacing at night and measuring by NNSS, and revising by Omega and Loran C during the day. For instance, the survey ship "Takuyo" of the Maritime Safety Agency (2,600 tons) is carrying out measurements for the purpose of making maps and relief diagrams of the ocean floor, and us utilizing NNSS to determine its position. But NNSS takes 106 minutes to make one circuit of the globe, so [the "Takuyo"] uses a complex method of measuring its position by supplementing [NNSS] with systems such as Omega, Loran C, and Decca until [NNSS] next appears overhead.

Now a new satellite navigation system called the (Navstar) System has also been developed, and when this is perfected it will become possible for positions anywhere on the globe to be determined at any time with an error [margin] of 10 meters.

Nuclear War and C^3I

The role of C^3I at the tactical level, as seen in the incident of the shooting down of the Korean Airlines plane, is also important, but essentially C^3I systems possess strategic characteristics like the breaking of codes. Today C^3I systems are the central nervous systems of strategic nuclear systems, and without them it is impossible to use nuclear weapons. In particular, the question of whether or not [a nation] can retaliate against an opponent's first strike depends entirely on the existence of this C^3I.

Consequently, the question of how to improve the performance and reliability of [one's own] C^3I system, and of how to neutralize an opponent's C^3I system, in theory takes priority over the improvement of nuclear weapons systems.

At present in America there is a complicated problem in that a plan is being promoted for a BMD (ballistic missile defense) in which an opponent's missiles are ambushed by laser weapons before reaching the [U.S.] mainland, but besides costing a vast amount of money, there are too many technical problems, and, furthermore, it is said that probably the Soviet Union would also immediately match it (see the article by T.B. Tucker in the December 1984 issue of SEKAI).

In this case as well, it would be necessary to develop new C I for operating the BMD, and unless C^3I-related technology, such as how to deal with an opponent's attacks against the C^3I, were firmly established the BMD system would not operate effectively. No matter what kind of offensive or defensive system is developed, C^3I is always necessary and indispensible; if C^3I is weak, the system becomes meaningless.

The Weakness of C^3I

Generally radar is located on mountaintops with good unobstructed views, but at C^3I bases the antennas for sending and receiving radio waves must be exposed high in the air.

Moreover, a person with some knowledge can make a rough conjecture regarding the frequency in use, the communication method, the object of use, and so on, from the shape and direction of the antenna.



Figure 1. The (Isami) Transmission Site

KEY: (1) Antenna
(2) Iron towers
(3) Unit: meters

For instance, as shown in the preceeding photograph [not shown] and Figure 1, the U.S. military's antenna at (Isami) in Aichi Prefecture is all of 1,500 meters long, so it is clear that the frequency in use is VLF (very long frequency) and that it is used [in communicating with] submarines; and within the site are strung a number of 20-meter doubled antennas, so it is clear that it is probably a backup circuit for remote control by HF [high frequency] (short wave) from naval headquarters at Yokosuka via the Totsuka transmission site in Kanagawa Prefecture. (Usually Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation [NTT]'s coaxial cable is used.)

Therefore, the military importance of a C^3I base can be judged just by its outside appearance, so when it is a facility which, like (Isami), is incorporated into nuclear strategy, it would probably end up being made an enemy target of the highest priority at a time of crisis.

C^3I is very weak in the face of enemy attack.

Moreover, C^3I is weak in the face of high-altitude nuclear explosions. For instance, if a hydrogen bomb were detonated in the air 1,000 kilometers above Japan, all C^3I in the Japanese island chain would be neutralized. It is said that once when a nuclear explosion test was conducted in America, even the Radio Observatory of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications suffered the effects; it lost its ability to observe the ionosphere, relays stopped operating, and so on.

To begin with, a nuclear explosion causes an increase in the ion density of the ionophere (E layer) located about 100 kilometers above the Earth, absorbing HF radio waves, so for a few hours it becomes impossible to use HF communication, which communicates over long distances by using reflection off the ionosphere. VHF (very high frequency) and UHF (ultra-high frequency) waves that pierce through the ionosphere are greatly effected in the F layer [misprint gives "lower" layer] at about 300 kilometers above the Earth, and due to the phenomenon known as "scintillation," which occurs because the large volume of electrons that have been generated there move along the magnetic lines of force of the Earth's magnetism, all radio waves become impossible to use.

Furthermore, the semiconductor elements (transistors and IC [integrated circuits]) used in C^3I devices would be destroyed by the high-energy radiation produced by the explosion. And due to the explosion a strong, instantaneous discharge of electricity, called an EMP (electromagnetic pulse), would give rise to high voltage in conductors such as antennas and would destroy C^3I devices that were attached to them. The most serious problem currently facing experts on nuclear strategy is how to deal with this EMP damage.



Figure 2. [original text says "figure 1"] C^3I Bases Inside Japan

KEY: (1) Radar site; U.S. forces; Self-Defense Forces
(2) Kadena: ASWOS, P-3C

(3) Giant (talk) station?
(4) Haza: elephant cage
(5) Sobe: HF receiving site; HF monitoring station
(6) Futenma: ground station for satellite communications; two domes
(7) Kume
(8) Miyako
(9) Yoza
(10) Tengan: HF sending site
(11) Kesashi: Loran C
(12) Amami Oshima
(13) Okino-Erabu
(14) Kikaijima communications site
(15) Tsushima guard unit
(16) (Amagurishima) [海栗島] ?
(17) Tsushima: Omega
(18) Fukue
(19) Shimokoshikijima
(20) Okagaki: VLF sending site (scheduled)
(21) Mishima
(22) Tachiarai
(23) Sefuriyama
(24) Takahatayama
(25) Takao-Yama
(26) Yonaga communications site elephant cage; VHF
(27) Kyogasaki
(28) Kushimoto
(29) Sado
(30) Wajima
(31) (Isami) VLF sending site
(32) Kasatoriyama
(33) Omaezaki
(34) Okushiri
(35) Shiragami defense post
(36) Tappizaki
(37) Kashige
(38) (Ofunato-WAN) communications site
(39) Oi communications site
(40) Other Loran C bases [at] Iwojima and Minami Tori Shima)
(41) Wakkanai
(42) Tobetsu
(43) Higashichitose communications site: elephant cage
(44) Ominato
(45) Misawa: elephant cage (HF monitoring); 5 antennas for monitoring VHF, UHF; 6 communications domes; P-3C; ASWOC
(46) Yamada
(47) Otakineyama
(48) Mineno-Yama
(49) Higashichitose communications site; Wakkanai contingent
(50) Abashiri
(51) Erimo
(52) Tokachi Loran C

(53) Nemuro
(54) Higashinemuro
(55) Higashichitose communications site
(56) Nemuor contingent
(57) Microwave communications
(58) Tropospheric scattered wave communication
(59) Broad-band communications
(60) Unmanned site
(61) DCS [Defense Communication System] short-wave band communications
(62) Japanese civilian facility
(63) Upper-level facility reporting base
(64) Yokota: Giant (talk) station; Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan
(65) Yugi
(66) Sagami
(67) Hakone
(68) Sefuriyama [see number 23]
(69) Atsugi relay
(70) Iwakuni
(71) Tokorozawa: HF sending site
(72) Camp Zama: satellite ground station
(73) Fuchu
(74) Owada: HF receiving site
(75) Kokubunji
(76) Kamiseya communications site in Japan, headquarters Patrol Wing I
(77) Atsugi
(78) Hiratsuka: HF sending site
(79) Tokyo KDD [Telegraph and telephone Corp]
(80) Hardy Barracks: Air Force Special Investigation Office; (district) [industrial] Tokyo Office; Defense Agency Central Command Post
(81) North Pier
(82) Yokohama (Negishi)
(83) Yokosuka: [U.S.] Navy Headquarters in Japan
(84) Nagai
(85) Misawa

Countermeasures for Weakness

EMP only causes high voltage in conductors which conduct electricity, so glass-fiber optical communications systems, which do not use conductors, are completely unaffected. And technical countermeasures are possible for C^3I devices too, such as making electromagnetic shelters. In America 3 to 4 trillion yen have already been invested and the work of completely improving its C^3I systems is being pushed forward.

Furthermore, in regard to the weakness of being easily discovered by the enemy, attempts are being made to conquer this through reduplication, movability, and secrecy.

For instance, compared with civilian radar in 16 sites, Self-Defense Force radar is located in 28 sites, and is made to overlap so that it could function even if a few sites were destroyed; and [the Self-Defense

Forces] have begun to purchase large CH-47 helicopters so that when radar is destroyed it will be able to transport movable 3-dimensional radar of a (mobile warning unit) [ido keikaitai] in by air, and the new formation of air rescue/support units equipped with CH-47's is scheduled. Moreover, in the name of increasing the ability of radar bases to withstand attack, at Tobetsu in Hokkaido defensive countermeasures are being taken which use short-range antiaircraft missiles (short SAM's), Stinger portable SAM's, Vulcan gun systems, and so on.

But in Sweden and the Soviet Union they have conquered weakness through secrecy and reduplication by deploying large numbers of low output radar [devices] on low ground. The 9 nations of NATO have 84 radar bases, but the Soviet Union has deployed 7,000 small radar [devices].

Reduplication of C^3 Systems

Reduplication is also used in civilian C systems. NTT's coaxial cables are often broken due to construction work and so on, so multiple cables are laid along the same route, and it is arranged for [calls] to automatically switch to another route [as published] when [one cable] is broken.

U.S. Forces in Japan maintain a multiplex C^3 system by using varied communications methods such as satellite communications, undersea cable, microcircuits, and HF communications, and they also utilize NTT's multiplex coaxial cables and microcircuits throughout Japan (discussed later).

Furthermore, U.S. Forces in Japan are busily pushing forward the upgrading of satellite communications systems and the digitalization of area communications systems. They employ HF for communications such as the ultimate attack command to Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52 nuclear attack aircraft, and, in addition to the one at Kadena, have established a giant (talk) station at Yokota, and are constructing antennas for it at Owada and Tokorozawa. It is said that HF is being used like this not just to ensure multiplicity or just because HF communication is suitable for long distances, but because HF facilities are classic, so even if destroyed they are easy to repair.

The part of the strategic nuclear attack system with the highest degree of survivability is the missile on an atomic submarine at sea, but it is weakest in terms of C^3. This is because the ground VLF sending bases which transmit orders to nuclear submarines are too conspicuous, being huge, with zero possibility of surviving a crisis. Therefore multiplicity is obtained by means of an airborne communications system called TACAMO [Take Charge And Move Out [given in English]). This is a remodeled C-130 cargo aircraft which hangs a 1-to-5-kilometer-antenna down perpendicular from its tail and transmits VLF at an output of 200 kilowatts. But if the C-130 is always stationed at a specific airfield there is a possibility of it being destroyed on the ground, so it secretly moves from base to base, having even shown itself at Yokota.



Figure 3. [text gives figure 2] Diagram of Reciprocal Communication Links Between Areas

KEY:
(1) To (Ransuru)
(2) Indian Ocean: military satellite
(3) Diego Garcia
(4) Clark [Air Force Base]
(5) To Hawaii: communications satellite
(6) To (Holt) (Australia)
(7) Okinawa: Kadena; Naha; (Minatogawa)
(8) Philippines
(9) Korea
(10) Seoul; Kaisong; Pusan; Taegu; Ulsan; (Songun)
(11) Yaetake
(12) Fort Buckner
(13) Tsushima
(14) Sasebo
(15) Kume; Sefuriyama; (Shiraran)
(16) Military satellite
(17) Iwakuni; Sosai

(18) To Hawaii
(19) Satellite communications
(20) Microwave communications
(21) Tropospheric scatter waves
(22) Broad-band communications
(23) Cable
(24) Sea-bed cable
(25) Lease of commercial cable
(26) Rokko
(27) Hakone
(28) Camp Zama
(29) Fuchu
(30) Yokosuka DCS [Defense Communication System] short-wave receiving site
(31) Japan
(32) Ibaraki
(33) Tokyo KDD [telegraph and telephone corp]
(34) Misawa
(35) To Hawaii
(36) Satellite communications
(37) Guam
(38) To Hawaii
(39) Finagan

Source: "Base Data" in the August 1984 issue of SEKAI

C^3 Systems of U.S. Forces in Japan

A Total Picture of the Communications Network of U.S. Forces in Japan

"C^3 Systems in Japan: Adjustment and Modification" which Air Force Colonel Neal K. Weatherby, of Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan, published in the February 1984 issue of the SIGNAL (a complete translation by (Masayoshi) Nagao appeared in "Base Data" in the July and August 1984 issues of SEKAI) revealed for the first time a total picture of the communications systems of U.S. forces in Japan, and also touched upon matters such as tasks related to adjustment with the Self-Defense Forces in regard to C^3 systems and C^3 -system improvements which will be promoted now and in the future.

Considering the facts that Weatherby is the person with the greatest responsibility for the command, control, and communications systems of U.S. Forces in Japan, and that SIGNAL is the journal of the U.S. (Air Force Association of Communications and Electronics), it is probably safe to view [the article] as being highly reliable.

Figure 3 [literally figure 2] is a diagram of reciprocal communications links between areas shown in the article; all sorts of communications methods are used in a multiplex manner, with even civilian sea-bed cables and the Tokyo KDD network being incorporated.

But the first thing that causes one to entertain doubts concerning this diagram is the fact that it does not show the satellite communications ground

station located at Misawa. In the diagram in an article by Army Colone Terence D. (Sargeant) which appeared in the same journal, there is a defense-communications satellite ground station at Misawa which is in contact with Camp Robert on the U.S. east coast via a Western Pacific satellite. In actual fact, six communications domes are constructed at Misawa.

The second thing is the fact that although the tropospheric-scatter communications circuit which once existed north of Fuchu was abolished after 1970, [as published] [the diagram] shows only a broad-band communications circuit between Fuchu and Misawa.

Using NTT Circuits

The American military began work on the tropospheric-scatter communications system immediately after World War II, and it was a major communications network which tied together all the radar bases in Japan and so on. But the parabola antennas at Higashichitose, Misawa, and Kunimi were removed one after the other at the end of the 1970's, and the question of what circuits replaced them remained in doubt for a long time.

In regard to this question, it appears that the riddle has been solved, because recently it was ascertained that actually the broad-band communications between Fuchu and Misawa utilizes NTT's coaxial cables and microwave circuits (Figure 2 [3]. Sunday edition AKAHATA 18 November 1984).

Furthermore, it has been ascertained that in addition to the routes shown on the diagram, major bases such as Yokosuka, (Isami) and Kadena throughout [misprint on character] Japan are tied together like the eyes of a net, and, moreover are connected in a multiplex manner.

In other words, NTT's coaxial cables and microwave circuits were being used as a replacement for the tropospheric-scatter communications circuit. Such things as the fact that the facilities had stood over 20 years and had grown obsolete, and that the Sendai Kunimi unmanned relay site was dynamited by new-left guerrillas in November 1971 revealing the frailty [of the system] were probably primary factors in the switch.

Well now, the coaxial cables which connect Misawa and Fuchu are approximately 6 centimeters in diameter and contain 18 conductors. One going in each direction makes 1 circuit, so it comes to 9 circuits. They use a frequency of 13 Megahertz, and 1 communications circuit can handle 2,700 telephone circuits with 1 [coaxial] cable handling 24,300 [telephone] circuits.

The cables run from the relay sites of telephone exchanges into underground tunnels in cities, and outside the cities run under the shoulders of national highways. In other words, it means that civilian telephone communications and nuclear attack orders for F-16's pass along the very same cables.

The Defense Communications System

As to the content for which the network in Figure 2 [literally Figure 1] is being used, it has three uses: an automatic voice network (AUTOVON), an automatic digital network (AUTODIN), and an automatic secret voice communications network (AUTOSEVOCOM). The thing that ties these main communications networks to each other is called the Defense Communications System (DCS).

At one time the DCS stations were at Higashichitose, Zama, and Okinawa's Futenma, but in the 1970's Kuma Stationin Higashichitose was dismantled, and in 1984 domes believed to be a DCS station were newly constructed at Misawa.

And currently the three stations in Misawa, Zama, and Futenma are utilizing satellite communications. In satellite communications one communicates over a wide sphere, and at the same time, one can communicate with a larger number of partners, it is impervious to damage by earthquakes or typhoons, the cost is low, and it is also very reliable. The defense communications system using satellite communications is called DSCS. This year, in response to the DSCS satellites having been upgraded from model II to model III, the ground parabola antennas at Zama were also changed from the AN/MSC-46 to a new model (according to the previously mentioned SIGNAL, to the AN/GSC-39).

HF Transmitting Antennas

Something that major U.S. military bases such as Misawa, Zama, Yokota and Kadena are certain to have is a large HF logarithmic periodic antenna (LPA). Its form resembles that of a huge television antenna. This is used for long-distance HF communications linking bases with each other, and the "Shirase" which goes to the South Pole is also equipped with one. It is an efficient communications antenna which is broad band in nature and strongly directional, and there are some which rotate.

At Totsuka in Kanagawa Prefecture there are, in addition to a large LPA for use in HF communications, several dozen HF transmitting antennas such as an omni-directional, broad-band, inverted cone antenna. The fact that they are omni-directional signifies long-distance communication with roving warships and aircraft.

And at Kamiseya near Totsuka, in addition to an inverted cone HF receiving antenna and so on, there are 19 HF roving antennas for direction finding, loop antenna arrays (dismantled recently), and so on, but not as many as at Totsuka.

Kamiseya, Tengan, Sobe

Kamiseya is a communications site for U.S. Forces in Japan which is unified with the VLF communications site at (Isami) and the radio transmission site at Totsuka. It contains varied tenants such as the headquarters of the 1st

Air Patrol Group of the 7th Fleet (Patrol and Reconnaissance Force), Fleet Western Pacific Surveillance Intelligence facilities, the U.S. Navy's (Ocean Current Support Group), and the Kamiseya contingent of Pacific Airborne Surveillance; in connection with these it has antennas for receiving UHF fleet broadcasts (AN/SSR-1), antennas for receiving signals from the navy satellite FLTSAT (AN/WSC-3) and so on.

On Okinawa there is an HF receiving site at Sobe near Yomitan Mura and a transmitter site at Tengan on the east coast. These are being operated by a U.S. Army strategic signal corps, and a long-distance communications battalion of the Okinawa Signal Corps.

Twenty-three rhombic antennas are set up at Sobe, receiving HF messages from Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines, and so on; approximately 80 transmitting antennas are set up at Tengan including rhombic-, perpendicular-, and beam-type, and are transmitting at 5 to 20 megahertz.

Connection with WWMCCS

The communications systems of U.S. Forces in Japan which have just been described are one part of America's World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS, [pronunciation given as "wemex" in transliteration]). WWMCCS is a system which provides unified management of air defense, military communications, space communications systems and the like all over the world and is used by national leaders such as the president, secretary of state, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (NCA [National Command Authorities]) for giving orders to the military.

The NCA makes judgments based upon intelligence gathered from throughout the world, and gives orders to the Pentagon's National Military Command Center. The Center, [in turn,] issues orders to units such as the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the North American Air [and Space] Defense Command (NORAD) which handle strategic nuclear weapons, and to others.

The WWMCCS has large host computers in Hawaii and the Republic of Korea in which are stored data and programs, and a minicomputer at Yokota is connected to them.

Furthermore, terminals for this minicomputer are located at Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan, the 5th Air Force Headquarters Command Center, facilities with operational authority for the U.S. Navy submarine fleet in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, the 18th Tactical Fighter Group at Kadena, the 3rd Marine Amphibious (Corps) in Okinawa, and so on. Naturally, it is thought that a terminal will also be established for the 432d Tactical Fighter Group with the F-16's which will be newly deployed to Misawa. But to America's global strategy, the minicomputer at Yokoto, too, is nothing more than a terminal, and it will end up being isolated if there is a breakdown of the long-distance communications department of the C system which supports WWMCCS. According to Weatherby, there are plans to establish a second minicomputer [at Yokota] in order to be able to maintain Headquarters U.S. Forces Japan's own programs even in a time of crisis, and that this would provide some degree of independent capability.

NTT and the Modernization of DCS

In his article Weatherby states that U.S. Forces Japan is currently pushing forward a work-plan for the total digitalization of the Defense Communication System, and that it is scheduled for completion by 1987. He also states that for that reason "We are investigating just how much capability the various Japanese systems have, and to what extent we will be able to utilize them." In this connection, NTT is currently in the process of constructing optical communications circuits; the route through Japan from Asahikawa [in Hokkaido] to Kagoshima [in Southern Kyushu] will be completed very soon, and by 1987 all cities with prefectural offices will be linked [by optical communications circuits] and it will be completely digitalized.

In other words, there is no choice but to think that U.S. forces in Japan are trying to carry out the modernization of DCS by using NTT's optical communications circuits.

NTT's optical communications works by passing a laser beam through the center of a slender glass-fiber communications line and turning the light on and off as many as 400 million times per second; it encodes all voice and signals and uses a condensed digital system, so when made into a telephone circuit a single glass fiber can carry 5,760 circuits. In other words, 11,520 people can talk at the same time [on a single fiber]. It also has advantages such as being able to send characters, images, and so on at the same time, and being virtually unaffected by static.

The Central Command Post and U.S. Forces in Japan

After pointing out that a union between America's DCS and Japan's C system "includes matters which can be considered constitutional issues," Weatherby states that "it is necessary to conquer the political hypersensitivity which is apt to prohibit mutual connection [between the two]," and that "the challenge is to build a suitable two-nation C system which will not give rise among Japanese to the idea that it is a collective defense arrangement.

That is, he reveals that the establishment of a C system in Japan is such an important task to U.S. nuclear strategy that [America] does not hesitate to challange the [Japanese] Constitution.

Wheatherby goes on to say that "a new Command Post/Coordination Center is under construction for Hq USFJ, and is scheduled to achieve initial operational capability (disposition for actual combat) in November 1984." Meanwhile, in regard to the Central Command Post which is currently under construction on the Defense Agency grounds in Yoyogi, according to the Defense Agency's "Business Plan for Fiscal Year 1984 (proposal)" (August 1983), 36 staff members were supposed to be deployed there beginning in November 1984 to "commerce operations." The question of what sort of positional and functional relationship exists between the Central Command Post and the Command Post/Coordination Center mentioned by Weatherby can be said to be a big problem.



Figure 4. [figure 3 in text] Main Line Communications Network of U.S. Forces in Japan Utilizing NTT Circuits

Source: Sunday Edition AKAHATA 18 November 1984

KEY:

(1)	NTT relay station	(2)	NTT circuit
(3)	U.S. military microwave circuit	(4)	KDD circuit
(5)	U.S. military base or facility	(6)	Asahikawa
(7)	Sapporo	(8)	Chitose
(9)	Obihiro	(10)	Tokachi(ta)
(11)	Aomori	(12)	Akita
(13)	Sakata	(14)	Kamigoshi
(15)	Toyama	(16)	Kanazawa
(17)	Fukui	(18)	Iwakuni
(19)	Republic of Korea	(20)	Tsushima
(21)	Sasebo	(22)	Misawa
(23)	Towada	(24)	Misawa ⟷ Fuchu

(25) Kadena route II
(26) Yokota
(27) U.S. military microwave circuit
(28) Rokko
(29) Himeji
(30) Iwakuni ←→ Zama; Kadena route II
(31) Okayama
(32) Hiroshima
(33) Furiseyama ←→ Iwakuni
(34) Fukuoka
(35) Furiseyama
(36) Morioka
(37) Sendai
(38) Maebashi
(39) Owada
(40) Tokorozawa
(41) Sasebo ←→ Yokosuka
(42) Nagoya
(43) Osaka
(44) Takamatsu
(45) Matsuyama
(46) Oita
(47) Kurume
(48) Saga
(49) Kumamoto
(50) Hachinohe
(51) Misawa ←→ Fuchu, Zama
(52) KDD Ibaraki
(53) Communications satellite (to Hawaii, U.S. mainland, etc)
(54) Tokyo KDD
(55) Tokyo
(56) Kokubunji
(57) Fuchu
(58) Yokohama
(59) Kofu
(60) Zama
(61) [omitted]
(62) Route I
(63) Hakone
(64) Iida
(65) Sea-bed cable (to Guam, Hawaii, U.S. mainland)
(66) Oshima
(67) KDD Ninomiya
(68) (Isami) ←→ Yokosuka route II
(69) (Isami)
(70) Shizuoka
(71) Kariya
(72) Kadena route I
(73) Tsu
(74) Wakayama
(75) Fuchu ←→ Sefuriyama
(76) Tokushima
(77) Kadena route I
(78) Kadena route II
(79) Kagoshima
(80) Chiran
(81) Miyazaki
(82) Kadena
(83) Naha
(84) KDD (Minatogawa)
(85) Yaedake
(86) Kishi
(87) Guam, U.S. mainland
(88) Taiwan
(89) Phillipines

The Intelligence (I) System of U.S. Forces Japan

There are two [kinds of] intelligence systems: those which are bound to WWMCCS in real time, such as systems for monitoring of nuclear missile launchings, infringement of territory by aircraft, and passage of submarines through straits, and those which, like the gathering of intelligence, accumulate information for later analysis, organization, and study.

Surveillance of Straits

Formerly there was a real-time system with OTH [over the horizon] radar at Higashichitose, Tokorozawa, and (Awase) in Okinawa, for the purpose of

detecting ICBM launchings, but that has been dismantled, and the radar bases which were established around 1952 were also taken over by the Air Self-Defense Force around 1955 (in Okinawa they were taken over about 1975).

Furthermore, the bases at Shiragami on the Hokkaido side and at Tappi on the Aomori Prefecture side [of the Tsugaru Strait] which are bases for arranging underwater microphones for surveillance of submarines in the Tsugaru Strait have both been taken over by the Maritime Self-Defense Force and become (sentinel posts). But U.S. civilians are working at the Shiragami guard post, so actually it can be called a joint Japan-U.S. base. In the 1980's all the buildings in both bases were renovated, and the underwater microphones were also changed from LQO-3's to new model LQO-4's. It is unclear how far the arrangements of microphones stretch from the two bases, but judging from the fact that U.S. Force's arrangement of microphones (SOSUS [sound surveillance under sea]) is deployed for almost 1,000 kilometers in the Aleutians and off Kamchatka, there is a possibility that it might stretch as far as the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. Similarly, seven LQO-4's are deployed in the Korean and Tsushima Straits as well, and are being operated by the Maritime Self Defense Force's Tsushima (guard unit). It appears that U.S. military SOSUS is also deployed.

At Misawa there is a contingent of the First Patrol Wing which is headquartered at Kamiseya. Nine P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft are deployed there from Moffet Field in California on a 6-month rotating basis. There is an antisubmarine operation headquarters (ASWOC [antisubmarine warfare operations center]) at Misawa as there is at Kadena and Atsugi. Container-shaped boxes filled with computers and a large volume of magnetic tape are lined up outside the buildings.

Data obtained by P-3C's are sent directly to Kamiseya, but after the aircraft returns to base the recordings are analyzed by computer and then sent back to the United States by military aircraft along with the raw recording tape (if recorded material is sent by radio waves it picks up static, so it is not sent by satellite or the like). The entrance to the tightly shut [literally not opening] door of the Misawa operational headquarters bears a yellow sign saying EOA (emergency operations area) indicating that it is a type of nuclear shelter.

"Elephant Cage"

Furthermore, there is a so-called "elephant cage" in Misawa; this is a COMINT system, 440 meters in diameter with a height of all of 36 meters, and said to be the largest in the world. The cylindrical cage is a reflecting device, and is surrounded on the outside by 46 vertical antennas and 92 20-meter antennas. Inside the cage there is another round cage on which are installed 46 bow-tie-shaped antennas. The outer antennas receive vertically polarized waves and the inner [ones] receive horizontally polarized waves.

By means of these antennas it is possible to receive HF radio waves from 3 to 30 megahertz with high gain. Moreover, when the arranged antennas are

electronically combined it is possible to alter their directivity as in the diagram. For instance, if they are set at sector beam and operators are deployed who are skilled in the languages corresponding to each sector, real-time COMINT is possible. But an "elephant cage" is located in Misawa because it is also directed at the HF communications of moving COMINT and SIGINT targets such as warships and aircraft. If set at high gain beam it is possible to confirm the direction of the transmission source, and if linked up with other "elephant cages" the position and speed of the transmission source can also be learned.



Figure 5. Directivity of the "Elephant Cage" FLR-9

When set on high gain beam (high gain directivity) [the "elephant cage"] can use 24 receivers and catch 48 different frequencies simultaneously. This means that a fairly large staff is required for an "elephant cage" operated on a 24-hour basis.

It is operated by 900 men of the 6920th (Electronic Security Group) [hoan daitai] (ESG), 600 men of the Navy's Misawa Communications (Electronic Security Group), and so on.

"Elephant Cages" were developed by Germany during World War II. Its official name, "(uhrenweber) antenna" was a German military code name. Developmental research was done on it in America by the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and the private sector Sylvania Electronic Systems Corp. The one at Misawa is from Sylvania, and its U.S. military code is AN/FLR-9.

The "elephant cage" at Haza in Yomitan Mura in Okinawa is an NRL one about 200 meters in diameter operated by the 6990th ESG.

It is said that the mission of "elephant cages" is not only COMINT but also jamming of communications and countermeasures against jamming. But from the

fact that HF is one of the command systems for B-52 nuclear attack, there is probably a possibility [that it could be used for that]. As previously mentioned, HF is suitable for long distances and has good survivability, so U.S. Forces use it themselves, but opponent nations also regularly use it. Consequently it can probably be said that it is natural for them to do research on jamming of communications and jamming countermeasures.

There is great military significance in the fact that such bases exist in the vicinity of an [area] dotted with vital Soviet bases.

Communications Monitoring Facilities

At Sobe in Okinawa, in addition to the "elephant cage," there is a (tree) station of a U.S. Army security unit at which 50 sets of rhombic antennas, each with a direction 5 to 10 degrees different [from the next], are monitoring HF communications.

Beside the HF mentioned above, monitoring of VHF and UHF is also being conducted.

A few fixed VHF and UHF LP antennas are attached to the upper part of the Haza "elephant cage" and the Self-Defense Force ones at Higachichitose and at Yonago in Tottori Prefecture. But the Misawa FLR-9 is HF only; five UHF and VHF (cross dye poll)-type LP antennas, all revolving-type, are standing separately nearby for UHF and VHF. Moreover the length of each antenna is different, giving a broad-band character to the whole. Two of them are an unusual (double-cross) type.

The VHF and UHF antennas are all set up on high ground and face in a horizontal direction, so it is thought they monitor communications of distant aircraft and vessels.

The ones at Misawa are always pointed in a generally northerly direction.

Furthermore, three black SR-71 spy aircraft of the SAC's 15th Air Force are at Kadena on permanent assignment from a base in California. They often violate airspace on the Korean Peninsula and so on, carrying out spying activities, and the electronic surveillance equipment that they carry has the capacity to immediately send surveillance data to ground bases.

Position Determining Systems

Omega and Loran C

There are Omega bases at eight places in the world. The Omega base on Tsushima was constructed in 1970 and is administered and operated by the Ministry of Transport. The antenna is umbrella-shaped, rising 455 meters above the ground, and emits 3 types of VLF at 10.2, 11.3, and 13.6 kilohertz, dividing time into approximately 1 second for each. The antenna electric power is 150 kilowatts, the antenna services an area within a radius of 9,000 kilometers and its [margin of] error is 2 to 4 kilometers.

Loran C is located at five places as a chain in the northwest Pacific: Iwo Jima, Minami Tori Shima, Tokachi(ta) (Hokkaido), Kesashi (Okinawa), and Yap (Micronesia).

Its frequency is 100 kilohertz, antenna output is 700 kilowatts, it serves an area of approximately 5,000 kilometers [as published] and the [margin of] error for a point about 2,000 kilometers away is 500 meters or less. In 1980 [the Omega base at] Tokachi(ta) was operated directly by the U.S. Coast Guard, with personnel, on 1-week rotating shifts, and materials being brought into Kushiro Airport by C-130 transports. To some extent, 100 kilohertz LF radio waves penetrate under water like VLF, so it attaches (clarinet pilgrim) [kurarinetto pirugurimu] devices and contacts submarines, inserting submarine communications in the spaces between Loran C signals.

Modernization of Position Determining Systems

Now NNSS can determine position to within a [margin of] error of 40 meters, but it also has the defects of being unable to measure [position] continuously and of not being usable by high-speed aircraft. The Navstar system was developed with the object of correcting these defects and increasing precision, and will launch 24 satellites beginning in 1985 using the space shuttle.

Its official name is Navstar-GPS (global positioning system). Its satellites will [each] carry as many as 3 (vidium) atomic clocks which err only 1 second in 30,000 years. Using four of these satellites it will be possible to determine position with a 10-meter [margin of] error. Land-based units and ICBM's will also be able to use [the system], so it is probable that the greatest goal of the system is to raise the accuracy of ICBM's to [an error margin of] 10 meters. Control bases are needed in all areas for the operation of Navstar, controlling it by continuous monitoring of radio waves.

The Riddle of the Six Domes

Their connection with position determination is unclear, but there is no doubt that the six domes constructed beside the Misawa base's FLR-9 are a C^3I system. Four foundations are shown in a 1/25,000 scale aerial photograph taken on 6 June 1982 from an altitude of 3,500 meters.

They are arranged in a straight line and are connected by a fairly large pipe which leads to Building S1500. S1500 is the largest building on the base, containing the headquarters of the 6920th (Electronic Security Group), operating and security departments for the FLR-9, the AUTOSEVCOM department, and a special section representing the Department of Defense (DOD) at Misawa.

Building of the main structures began at the end of 1982 and the four were completed in September 1983. Then two more were built, being completed in the summer of 1984.

This was the first time that six domes had been built at one location in Japan, testifying to the strengthening of the Misawa base.

It is thought that each dome contains one large and one small parabolic antenna; Owen (Wilks) conjectures that "three domes are what are called (Classic Wizards), ground stations of the White Cloud satellite system which detects the location of warships by catching the radio waves of ship antiaircraft radar, and one is a DSC ground station," but did not give an explanation for the two domes built later.

But the following hypothesis is also possible. "Four are ground stations related to the Navstar plan to launch [satellites] beginning in 1985, and the remaining two are DSCS ground stations." Weatherby too stated: "The communications and electronic [facilities] necessary for their support have been completed in advance of the deployment of F-16's." The function of the six domes is uncertain, but there is no doubt that Misawa is in the process of becoming a major C^3I base.



Figure 6. [figure 4 in text] Position Determining Systems

KEY:
(1) Loran C Northwest Pacific chain
(2) Diego Garcia
(3) Mascarene Islands [literally Mauritius and Reunion Islands]
(4) Tsushima
(5) Kesashi
(6) Yap
(7) Northwest Cape
(8) Tokachi(ta)

(9) (Isami)
(10) Iwo Jima
(11) Minami Tori Shima
(12) Guam
(13) Omega
(14) Deniliquin
(15) Loran C Station
(16) VLF transmission station
(17) Omega station
(18) Pribilof [Islands]
(19) Attu
(20) Midway
(21) Johnston [Atoll]
(22) Hawaii
(23) (Sim Creek)
(24) Williams Lake
(25) (Shorecope)
(26) (Nilo Cape)
(27) George (Fallon)
(28) (Lamoure)
(29) Panama

Self-Defense Force C^3I Systems

Satellites and the Central Command Post

As mentioned before, a Central Command Post has been constructed at the second and third underground levels inside the Defense Agency at Yoyogi, and the work of connecting up telephones, facsimile, facsimile (broadcast) devices, command and support systems for Self-Defense Force warships, and (BADGE) systems is being carried on, as is the work of installing display devices and so on. But the operation of the center, which originally was to have begun in November 1984, has been postponed until the end of 1985.

As Weatherby said, the construction is also supposed to make contact with the C^3 system of U.S. Forces. Because of this it will become a setup under which information from the entire Self-Defense Forces which is needed for air defense control and warship control will be concentrated and displayed here, and orders will not be issued from here to the Air, Ground, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces until after the information is joined to America's WWMCCM and then returns [to the Defense Agency].

Furthermore, four main route microwave circuits for the exclusive use of the Self-Defense Forces are being constructed, of which the main route from Obihiro to Shikaya has been completed. In addition the automation of the telephones connecting bases with each other has also been completed, so progress is being made in strengthening the C^3 system.

There is also eager use of satellites. In spite of the fact that military use of satellites has been prohibited by the Diet, the fiscal year 1985 budget includes an expenditure for equipping five escort vessels with devices for receiving the U.S. Navy's satellite communications systems FLTSAT and LEASAT, taking as a foothold the fact that communication with Iwo Jima via "Sakura-2a" was approved in August 1983. This is designed to strengthen interoperability with the U.S. Navy.

What is "Coordination"?

The Self-Defense Forces were aware that Central Command Post just formed would be the "coordinating facility" [mentioned in the passage] "the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces will strive for close mutual coordination

through a coordinating facility in regard to tactics, intelligence, and rear support in order to jointly execute effective operations" appearing in the "guidelines for Japan-U.S. cooperation on defense" which were established by cabinet resolution in November 1978. And now they have probably been made to realize [to their regret] that "coordination" means totally incorporating the Self-Defense Forces into America's nuclear strategy.

In addition to the "elephant cages" at Higashichitose and Yonaga, there are independent Self-Defense Force intelligence systems at (Kobunewatari) in Niigata; Wakkanai, Nemuro, and Higashinemuro in Hokkaido; Oi in Saitama Prefecture; Tachiarai in Fukuoka Prefecture; and Kikaijima in the Amami group. At the (Kobunewatari) communications site there are 9 antennas including HF (doublet) antennas strung between 4 steel towers; 1 (cross dye pole)-type rotating LP antenna, 2 broad-band double-loop arrays like the ones at Kamiseya, 2 (Adcock) antennas for HF direction finding, 1 logarithmic period antenna for vertical polarization which is shaped like an OTH radar (it is pointed in the direction of Komsamolsk in the (Maritime Provinces), and so on, which for the most part carry out HF COMINT directed against the Soviet Union. There are also COMINT and SIGINT facilities at Wakkani, and the fact that their data is sent directly to U.S. Forces has been revealed by the incident of the Korean Airlines aircraft. This monitoring of radio waves is the responsibility of the Intelligence Office) of the Second Intelligence Section of the Ground Staff Office.

The Deployment of E-2C's

Four of the Air Self-Defense Force's E-2C early warning aircraft have already been deployed at Misawa and completed practical tests, a (provisional warning corps) [rinji keikai kokutai] has been organized, and has begun operational tests. By 1985 it will increase to eight aircraft and the corps will be officially inaugurated. The E-2C has detection capability within a radius of approximately 370 kilometers and can also discover low-altitude aircraft that cannot be caught on ground radar. Moreover it can guide friendly aircraft and so on, so it is indispensible in modern air combat.

Communications buffer equipment that allows data obtained by the E-2C in flight to be read on the ground has been established at Misawa and Kasuga. As in the case of ground radar data, this information is sent to the Central Command Post and linked with WWMCCS.

Whether F-16's, after being deployed to Misawa this spring, will operate jointly with the E-2C's or whether U.S. Forces E-3A's will be newly deployed to Misawa as they are at Kadena is a big question for the future.

As we have seen above, Japan's C^3I system is indispensible to the operation of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons including F-16's, B-52's, cruise missiles, and the missiles of atomic submarines. In other words, C^3I capability is nuclear capability. And because the system is weak, and because it is a nuclear target of the highest priority for adversary nations, without the people of the nation being aware of it even civilian

communications facilities throughout the nation are being incorporated [into the system] giving it multiplicity and increasing its multiplicity and efficiency.

Moreover, the fact that Japan's Self-Defense Forces have been totally incorporated into America's system of nuclear strategy has become much clearer through an examination of Japan's C^3I system. For instance, when the radar site at (Ojika) discovers an aircraft intruding on [Japanese] airspace it is connected directly to the Central command Post at Roppongi, then [the data] is judged and processed by the WWMCCS computer which is incorporated into America's global nuclear strategy, and goes back to the radar base in the form of orders. In other words, the radar base is merely a terminal.

If such is the case, it can probably also be said that in the same way the very Self-Defense Forces themselves fulfill a function resembling terminals for America's nuclear strategy.

It can also be said that an examination of Japan's C^3I has also made clearer the fact that without its people's knowledge Japan has been incorporated into a setup for automatic approval of war.

And Prime Minister Nakasone, speaking of "destined community," talks just as if Japan and the United States were equal and totally united as one, but the Japanese island chain is nothing more than America's frontline base, and the war can be carried on and America can survive even if the frontline is completely destroyed. Is not Japan's destiny in America's hands?

(1) The Self-Defense Forces Which Are Turning Into Real Combat Forces

Toward First Class "War Potential" in World Terms

"Supreme"

The Japanese government professes [Japan] to be a "minor military power," and has continued to say that [Japan's] military power, which has been built up year by year, does not exceed "the minimum required for self-defense," in other words, that it does not correspond to the "war potential" prohibited by the constitution. But with a vast military expenditure, eighth in the world, being poured into them, and supported by the most advanced technology in the world and by the diligence and organization of the Japanese people, the Self-Defense Forces are growing up as a first class "war potential" in world terms.

In the RIMPAC (5-nation joint naval exercise) of May and June 1984 in which 5 warships and 8 aircraft [of the Self-Defense Forces] participated, [Japanese forces] performed with style their mission of escorting the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise as part of the attacking force (unit blue), sinking at least 3 (hypothetical) submarines, were rated as "supreme" [transliterated] by Rear Admiral (Cohn), commander of the U.S. 3rd carrier

battle group, and earned praise from 3rd Fleet Commander Jones to the effect that "the Maritime Self-Defense Force is professional."

The remaining [participants in the exercise,] Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and some U.S. warships, were the defending force (unit orange) this was clearly an imaginary Soviet fleet, so here, too, can be seen the preferential treatment accorded to the Maritime Self-Defense Force by the U.S. military. This means that in terms of the level of equipment the U.S. side judged that [the Self-Defense Force] had acquired sufficient real strength [to deserve such treatment].

Let us look at one example of the "real strength" of the Self-Defense Forces.

The Real Strength of the "8.8 Fleet"

The Maritime Self-Defense Force commander (a rear admiral) was on board the "Kurama" (5,200 tons) the fourth DDH helicopter-carrying destroyer. If we analyze its capabilities by function, (1) for air defense purposes it has 2 and 3 dimensional radar, tactical data display devices, Sea Sparrow antiaircraft missiles, 127 mm rapid-fire cannon, and 20 mm Vulcan cannons. Along with the third DDH, "Shiranu," it has complete data processing equipment and Link 11, and has become a true system warship. Complete teamwork with the U.S. Navy has become possible through the Link 11. And the 20 mm Vulcan cannon is called a CIWS (close-in weapons system); it destroys, by means of a machine-cannon with a firing rate of 3,000 rounds per minute, enemy attack aircraft or antiship missiles which have broken through the defensive screen of all sorts of antiaircraft missiles and antiaircraft guns. It is fired by means of radar and computers, automatically selecting the most threatening target.

(2) For antisubmarine warfare [the "Kurama"] has three HSS-2B antisubmarine helicopters, active and passive sonar, ASROCK antisubmarine rockets, and short torpedoes. In passive sonar that catches the sound of an opponent without making any sound itself it is newly equipped with tow-type sonar (TASS) [Tow ARAY Sonar System] which the U.S. Navy has begun to employ. Not being effected by complicated distribution of water temperature or the sound of its own warship, it can detect enemy submarines at great distances without being noticed by them.

At present there are four DDG guided missile destroyers [in the Maritime Self-Defense Force], the third and fourth of which, "Asakaze" and "Sawakaze," (3,850 tons) were sent to RIMPAC. (1) For air defense warfare they have 2 and 3 dimensional radar, combat command equipment, long-range standard missiles (antiaircraft), 127 mm rapid-fire cannons, and 20 mm Vulcan cannons.

(2) For use against submarines it has sonar and Asrock and short torpedoes.

(3) For use against surface vessels it has 2 dimensional radar, Harpoon antiship missiles, and 127 mm rapid-fire cannons. It is worth noting, and

this is also true of the DD which is next, that it is equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles. There are two missile launchers, each equipped for launching four missiles in succession, able to attack enemy ships from beyond the horizon, and their accuracy and destructive power is said to exceed that of the (Eccocets) used in the Falkland war. Up to now the Maritime Self-Defense Force has relied on the U.S. 7th Fleet for offensive strength, itself concentrated on the purely defensive task of antisubmarine operations, but by being equipped with Harpoon missiles it has come to possess active offensive power. The expression "tactical offensive power within a strategic posture of defense" is quite painful.

The DD antisubmarine escort vessels "Hatsuyuki" and "Shirayuki" (2,950 tons) are newly built warships which possess powerful equipment while being compact.

(1) For air defense warfare they have a three-layered structure, with Sea Sparrow mid- and close-range missiles, 37 mm rapid-fire cannons, and 20 mm Vulcan cannons.

(2) As antisubmarine warfare vessels, though small, they carry one HSS-2B antisubmarine helicopter, and possess new, tow-type sonar (TASS) in addition to Asrock and short torpedoes.

(3) For warfare against surface ships, they are equipped with Harpoon antiship missiles in addition to 76 mm cannons. They can be said to be the most powerful escort vessels under 3,000 tons in all the navies of the world.

Under the "National Defense Program Outline" a Maritime Self-Defense Force was planned which was made up of a mobile operating fleet with 1 DDH, 2 DDG's, 5 DD's for a total of 8 ships, and carrying a total of 8 helicopters. Because of the 8 warships and 8 aircraft, it was called an "8.8 fleet" structure. One full set [of 8 ships and 8 aircraft] was completed by fiscal year 1984, and what participated in RIMPAC 84 were the 5 ships that form the nucleus of that "8.8 fleet." The aim of the "8.8 fleet" is not so much in the capability of individual warships as it is in operations in complex battles conducting system antiaircraft, antisubmarine, antisurface strike, and (electronic countermeasure warfare) as a fleet. Therefore, it can be said that the realization of the "8.8 fleet," whatever its numbers, represents a marked strengthening in qualitative terms, and that [the Maritime Self-Defense Force] has become a leading navy even in world terms.

Of course, in terms of equipment, it has been most strengthened among the Air, Ground, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces.

The Patriot Antiaircraft Missile

The switch to equipping with missiles has greatly progressed in land, air, and sea forces. The beginning was the Air Self-Defense Force's Patriot antiaircraft missile which was requested in the Defense Agency's budget request for fiscal year 1985.

The Patriot weighs 1 ton, has a maximum speed of over Mach 4, and a range of about 150 kilometers. But the Patriot's threat is not found in these figures. With the Nike J when one was fired it was impossible to guide the next missile until the first had struck its target, but it is possible to guide Patriots to several targets simultaneously. Guidance is done in advance by setting up a program with inertial navigation equipment and computers before firing. And it is also effective against low altitude targets, so it can deal with [targets] from high to low altitudes.

Currently there is a schedule for providing a total of 26 firing units: 4 each in 6 important defense areas where Nikes are deployed: central Hokkaido, the Hakodate-Aomori area, the Greater Tokyo area, Nagoya, the Osaka-Kobe area, Northern Kyushu [or the city Kitakyushu], and Okinawa, and 2 firing units for training and drill purposes. One firing unit, consisting of radar, five launchers, and so on, comes to about 20 billion yen. The Defense Agency explains that when accessory devices, materials, and so on, are included it comes to about 680 billion yen.

But this is the fiscal year 1985 price. It is obvious that if [Japan] goes on bringing in four firing units each year it will easily exceed 1 trillion yen.

The Strengthening of the Function of the Joint Staff Council

But in order to see the current actual strength of the Self-Defense Forces one must look beyond the strengthening of equipment.

A greater change is found in the fact that an attempt is being made to unify air, land, and sea forces and response-capability and actual combat capability have been raised. This manifests itself in a strengthening of the function of the Joint Staff Council and a strengthening of the authority of the chairman of the Joint Staff Council.

The unification of the three Self-Defense Forces and the strengthening of response capability are things which America has continuously requested and which were set forth in the second mid-term program estimate under the name of "increasing efficiency." This is because it is impossible to fight a war if the three Self-Defense Forces are disconnected.

"Combined exercises" of the Air, Ground, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces began in 1981, and command post (staff) exercises and maneuvers have been repeated every year since then. In the autumn of 1985 this "combined exercise" will be carried out jointly by Japan and the United States (command post exercise).

The leader of the Japanese side is the chairman of the Joint Staff Council; he will probably show himself there as the head of the combined uniformed forces, the leader of what is literally an "allied military force" of the U.S. military.

The Mechanism of Ballooning Military Expenditure

The Argument on Reconsidering the Ratio of 1 Percent of GNP

The "Institute for Study of Peace Problems" (chairman: Professor (Masataka Takasaka)), a private advisory body of Prime Minister Nakasone, submitted a report to the prime minister on 18 December 1984 which clearly set forth a review of the framework for defense expenditure of one percent of gross national product (GNP). [Defense expenditure] was barely held within 1 percent [of GNP] in the fiscal year 1985 budget, and it can be said that the abolition of the one percent framework has become a matter of time.

The Peace Institute issued the following conclusion regarding the 1 percent question.

"The 1 percent goal, that is, the principle decided upon by Cabinet and the National Defense Council in November 1976 that 'In implementing the provision of defensive power, for the present [we] shall make it [our] goal that the total defense-related expenditure for each year shall not exceed an amount equivalent to one-one hundredth of the gross national product for said year' is regarded as a concrete expression of the fact that a provisional goal standard existed in the provision of defensive power, it was, so to speak, determined in common-sense fashion. It was not worked out by international comparison, nor was it derived from the limit of burden on the economy."

"In other words it was determined by common sense from the defensive power provided for in the "[National Defense] Program Outline" and assumptions regarding the growth of the Japanese economy, and it was precisely for that reason that expressions such as "for the present" and "make it [our goal" were chosen." "At the time in 1976 there is some basis for saying a goal of one percent; we recognize that it fulfilled the role of a brake, but this kind of situation changed. Since the rate of economic growth fell below forecasts, the level [of defensive power] provided for in the "Program Outline" failed to be achieved during the period which one can understand in common sense terms by the words "for the present." Thus the one percent goal became something which is difficult to apply today."

"Of course when it comes to providing defensive power some limit is necessary. It is clear that the people of the nation consider such a brake necessary. But the brake should be something qualitative, such as civilian control being basically firmly established, military expenditure being determined from the viewpoint of an appropriate distribution of the national budget, and public opinion being healthy and exerting a restraining action [to prevent overspending on defense]."

Reexamine the "Program Outline" Too

After laying out this kind of argument the Peace Institute came to the conclusion that: (1) In the provision of defensive power, [Japan] should strictly observe the existing policy of devoting itself to an exclusively

defensive defense posture and holding firmly to civilian control and the three nonnuclear principles under the peace constitution, and should take care not to pose a threat to any neighboring under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. (2) For the present, the defense-related expenditure for each fiscal year shall be determined with the goal of early achievement of the level of defensive power provided for in the existing "Program Outline," while giving consideration to the stringent financial situation and attaching importance to harmony with all other national policies. (3) In addition, based upon the new viewpoint presented in this report, [Japan] should set about the work of prudently reexamining the "Program Outline." (4) The cabinet resolution of 5 November 1976, "On the Present Provision of Defensive Power," which established the so-called one percent goal [should] be reexamined.

It is reported that opinion was sharply divided within the Peace Institute and that there were heated debates, but in the end it reached the conclusion, which leaned toward Prime Minister Nakasone, to abolish the 1 percent framework and not set up a new numerical brake on defense expenditure.

At a conference with opposition party leaders prior to compilation of the budget for fiscal year 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone said to Chairman Sasaki of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party "We would like to stick to [the 1 percent framework] in compiling the fiscal year 1985 budget. But in the summer there will be a recommendation from the National Personnel Authority [among other things], so we cannot tell about the future. If it becomes necessary to seek some alteration we will take our case to the people." This truly gave a strong hint that the one percent framework would be adhered to at the beginning of 1985, but that there is a possibility that it will be broken in the course of the year.

The Scenario for Altering the Cabinet Resolution

When we examine the defense expenditure in the fiscal year 1984 budget, which was kept just within the 1-percent framework, the initial budget was 2.9346 trillion yen, leaving a gap of only 25.4 billion yen between it and the ceiling of 1 percent of GNP (estimated by the government to be 296 trillion yen). The increase in the wage base for fiscal year 1984 was 3.4 percent, so necessary expenditure for the Defense Agency became 31.6 billion yen, which by simple calculation breaks through the one-percent [limit], but expenses were trimmed at the supplementary budget stage in January, and it was managed, with difficulty, to preserve the 1 percent framework. In other words, it means that the 1-percent framework was "defended to the death" throughout fiscal year 1984.

As to whether the 1-percent framework can be preserved in fiscal year 1985 by making ends meet in the manner of a conjuring trick as in fiscal year 1984, the objective situation is much more stringent. Present expectation is that (1) the government will alter the 1-percent cabinet resolution at the July stage [of budget business], (2) that the cabinet resolution will be altered in the same way when the recommendation of the National Personnel Authority is issued in August, (3) and that the cabinet resolution

will be altered just before compilation of the 1986 budget in connection with the implementation of the increase in the wage base deriving from [the recommendation of] the National Personnel Authority.

In regard to (1), there are some who think that in July the rough estimate request ceilings for the fiscal year 1986 budget will be decided, and, furthermore, the 1984 mid-term program estimate (the mid-term program estimate for procurement of forward area equipment and so on from 1986 to 1990) will also be completed, so the timing will also be appropriate for alteration of the cabinet resolution. (2) and (3) are a matter of breaking through the one-percent framework because of personnel costs; it is a problem of raising the salary base of government workers, and the judgment is that there will be little resistance from opposition parties. In fact the JSP announced on 17 December that it would not oppose increasing the wage base for members of the Self-Defense Forces.

The Structure of Increasing Military Expenditure

The proposal of the Institute for Study of Peace Problems [advises the government] to remove the 1-percent framework and achieve the "National Defense Program Outline" while preserving the existing policy, that is, an exclusively defensive posture, civilian control, the three nonnuclear principles and so on, but it lacks analysis of the mechanism of the ballooning of military expenditure.

The highest point reached by "food and personnel costs," which used to account for most of the military budget, was 56.0 percent [of the military budget] in fiscal year 1976; [since then] the ratio has gradually declined, falling as far as 44.5 percent in fiscal year 1983 and 44.6 percent in fiscal year 1984, and the principal factor pushing down its ratio is the expenditure called "transformation into annual expenditure." "Transformation into annual expenditure" which had been 20.8 percent [of the military budget] in 1977 reached 33.5 percent in 1984.

To put it plainly, "transformation into annual expenditure" means "repayment of loans." In the manufacture of major equipment (fighter aircraft, escort vessels, and so on) anywhere from 2-3 years to 4-5 years are required between the placing of orders and delivery, so they cannot be procured in a single fiscal year, and it is arranged to make a small down payment and to continue payments beginning in the following fiscal year. This part carried forward (a loan, so to speak) is called the "burden for later fiscal years"; in 1984 it reached 2.1481 trillion yen (of which 1.1599 trillion yen was new). The military budget [for 1984] was 2.9346 trillion yen, so it works out that credit purchases of weapons makes up over two-thirds of the entire budget which includes personnel and maintenance costs, base countermeasure costs, and so on. It is the same as if a household with a monthly income of 300,000 yen were to spend over 100,000 yen each and every month on credit purchases of electrical appliances: it is probably natural that "payments" [for things purchased on credit] would go on mounting up in an accelerating fashion from the next month onward.

The repayments on this loan have become a mechanism which further pushs up total military expenses.

The problem is weapons and the "burden for later fiscal years."

And if one asks why [Japan] has to buy so many weapons, [the answer] involves America's military strategy and the demands on Japan examined above.

In fiscal year 1984 [Japan procured] 8 P-3C's at 90.338 billion yen (of which the burden for later fiscal years was 90.045 billion yen, the same below), 17 F-15's at 182.857 billion yen, (182.569 billion yen), 3 escort vessels at 118.439 (118.22 billion yen (118.22 billion yen)--what will this equipment be used for. It was probably already clear in Part I.

In such a situation it is impossible to have "an exclusively defensive posture." One is justified in saying that the Peace Institute's proposal was a trick on the people of the nation which brushed past the essence of the military expenditure problem and ratified the existing line of military expansion.

The Thesis on a New Brake

In regard to "a new brake," the proposal of the Peace Institute and the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] reached the conclusion of not establishing a new brake based on a figure such as a ratio of GNP. But even within the LDP the opinion that a new brake is needed is strongly rooted, and judging from all types of public opinion survey, public opinion, too, is very wary of increases in military expenditure (For instance, in the ASAHI poll of 18 June 14 percent agreed with an increase in the amount of the military budget, while 74 percent opposed it. In the MAINICHI poll of 18 December 72 percent were opposed to breaking the one-percent framework). During the ordinary session of the Diet in 1983, when Democratic Socialist Party Policy Board Chairman Ouchi who is soft on the 1-percent framework drew him out by saying: "How about working on a new brake together?" the prime minister answered: "If the opposition parties have any good ideas I would like to hear them." Judging from these circumstances, it will be fully foreseen that the LDP aims to involve the Japan Democratic Socialist Party [on its side] and "break the one-percent framework."

The reason why defense expenditure continues to increase and is about to break through the one-percent framework is not "because GNP growth has been less than forecast," or any thing like that. The main cause is the purchase of weapons on credit. It is to be expected that the "brake" is found not in the figure of one percent, but in the people's consensus on defense which tries to hold military expenditure within rational bounds.

First refrain from increasing the "burden for later fiscal years," then freeze the existing burden for future fiscal years--there is no other means to prevent defense expenditure from snowballing.

And the only way to do that is to rework the current type of defense concept which is involved with U.S. nuclear strategy, and to propose [defense policies] to the people of the nation, debate them, and obtain [the people's] approval. The present situation has become too extreme to deal with on the basis of "friendship" or "consideration" for America.

Overlapping Plans for Military Expansion

But, conversely, it is arranged that the mid-term program estimate which follows the current 5-year mid-term program estimate (the 1984 mid-term program estimate, that is, the one covering 1986 to 1991 on which study began in the spring of 1984) will accept U.S. requests and further promote military expansion.

In addition to promoting the procurement of escort vessels, F-15's, P-3c's, and submarines as has been done up to now, it is a plan for fully equipping an estimated 60 escort vessels with the antiship missiles and missile defense systems examined above. The highest priority is given to "defense of sea lanes," and the goal is the achievement of the "National Defense Program Outline."

But it is perfectly clear that if [the government] goes on with this policy the cost of procuring weapons will snowball, probably far exceeding the estimated total of 5.3 trillion yen for the 1981 mid-term program estimate.

On 24 June 1984 U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger sent to the U.S. Congress the annual report "Contributions by Allies to Joint Defense." The report touched upon Japan's 1984 mid-term program estimate, and placed enthusiastic hopes on it, saying: "If this plan has been fully worked out it will probably achieve the goal of defense of sea lanes for 1,000 nautical miles by 1990." For whose sake does this goal exist? America is not the only one which is openly dissatisfied with the "one-percent framework." The munitions industry which gains 30 percent of military expenditure is also a champion of breaking the framework. The Patriot has born fruit worth 1 trillion yen; if it comes to "defense of sea lanes" escort vessels, submarines, missiles, and naval air defense systems (AEGIS) [expansion unknown] will be needed.

It is said that "defense-related capital outlay," which was on an annual base of 300 billion yen under the fourth Defense Buildup Plan (1972-76) swell to an annual base of 500 billion yen for the next 5 years, and that the amount for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd, the top supplier to the Defense Agency, was 270 billion yen in 1982, almost 3 times that of 5 years earlier.

"Defense Production" (the sum of domestic defense procurement and special procurement) for 1982 was 1,051,626,000,000 yen. Beside being the first time that it had exceeded 1 trillion yen, the proportion occupied by industrial production also leaped up at one stroke from 0.36 in 1980 and 0.35 in 1981 to 0.46 (reported value, Defense Agency 1984 White Paper on Defense). The statement: "The problem of what equipment is necessary for defense

and the policy of keeping expenses within 1 percent [of GNP] do not mesh" (Gakuji Moriya, chairman of the Federation of Economic Organizations' [Keidanren's] Committee on Defense Production, and consultant to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) is not talking about defense. It must be listened to as the "whispering of Satan" of those who have once tasted the sweet "forbidden fruit" of military expenditure. Because an economy which is linked to military affairs seeks crisis for the sake of profits, turns that crisis into still greater crisis, and draws society into an endless vicious circle. It probably will not do to forget that the ultimate goals of munitions are death and destruction.

(2) Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and the Division of Roles

A Relative Importance Equal to That of NATO

The state of the current Japan-U.S. security relationship was well presented in a lecture given by Defense Agency Administrative Vice Minister Natsume at the (Institute for the Study of Security Problems) in May 1984.

"Since the beginning of the Reagan administration we have stopped debating figures such as the increase in the budget. And I think a major characteristic [of current defense policy] is the fact that we have become more concrete regarding the direction of our nation's defense effort. For instance, when Foreign Minister Ito visited America in March 1981 Secretary Weinberger told him that Japan and the United States should not carry on unproductive debates over the growth rate of defense expenditure. He said that he hoped for greater effort on Japan's part in regard to the defense of Japan itself and its periphery. This means he clearly set forth sea lane defense, so to speak."

"Secretary Weinberger testified before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that a more rational division of roles is indispensible. Under this division NATO and Japan will probably be asked to make greater contributions to joint defense along with America. This is the foundation of U.S. defense policy. I think its distinctive feature is probably the fact that the Reagan administration gives the same relative importance to Japan's defense as to NATO's, that it clearly set forth the fact that it anticipates a division of roles on the same sort of base as NATO's."

"In short, what America wants is an appropriate division of roles between Japan and America for the purpose of guaranteeing Japan's security and the peace and stability of the Far East. And it thinks that one division of roles is the enhancement of capability in sea-lane defense."

The 1984 edition of the U.S. Defense Report treated Japan for the first time as an allied military power "equal to NATO." And now it can probably be said that the things such as the government's response in the Diet to the effect that Japan-U.S. joint operations and escorting of U.S. warships in RIMPAC and other exercises fall within the sphere of the right of self-defense substantiate the NATOization of Japan.

Evaluated "Defense Efforts"

The two main Japan-U.S. defense conferences held in 1984 were the meeting of former [Defense Agency] Director General Kurihara and Weinberger and the 15th Japan-U.S. Business-Level Security Conference (Hawaii conference). The Hawaii Conference was held in Hawaii's Honolulu for 3 days from 25 to 27 June. No meeting was held in 1983 due to the schedule of the visit to America by former Defense Agency Director-General Tanikawa, so [the 1984 meeting] was the first meeting in 2 years.

Formerly not much attention was given to the Hawaii Conference, but ever since May of 1981 when then Prime Minister Suzuki "publicly pledged" at the Washington Press Club "defense of 1,000 nautical mile sea lanes" and proposed at a meeting with President Reagan that "concrete problems be discussed at a business-level conference," the Hawaii Conference has become a major focal point of defense consultation.

The conference this time was attended by Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Nakajima, Division Chief Kitamura of the North American Affairs Bureau, Japanese Ambassador to the United States Okawa, Defense Agency Administrative Vice Minister Natsume, Bureau of Defense Policy Chief Yazaki, Councilor Furukawa, (Chief Administrator) Inoyama of the Joint Staff Council, and Vice Minister Kotani of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency from the Japanese side, and by Assistant Secretary for Defense Armitage, his deputy Kelley, Director Thomson of J5 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sherman, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mansfield, Admiral Crowe of U.S. Pacific Forces, General Donnelly of U.S. Forces Japan, and Special Presidential Assistant Sigur (upper level staff of the National Security Council) titles are for the time of the conference.

The conference [discussed] "the international situation" on the first day, "our nation's defense efforts" on the second day, and "other problems in Japan-U.S. cooperation on defense" on the third day.

What attracted attention on the first day was the point that the U.S. side "evaluated" Japan's defense efforts. Ambassador Mansfield said "At present the United States is paying a great deal of attention to the Pacific region. Within this it is gratifying that Japan-U.S. cooperation on defense has progressed even in aspects such as joint training." Next Admiral Crowe evaluated the strengthening of the "Japan-U.S. alliance" very highly, using expressions like "I am pleased that Japan is coming to grips head-on with defense for Japan's sake" and "I am encouraged that joint Japan-U.S. training is being carried out smoothly." The Hawaii conference was the first time that such a high evaluation, centered on Japan-U.S. joint training, was given by the U.S. side.

Requests From the U.S. Side

But that does not mean that there were no requests from the U.S. side. The problem points that the American side anticipated from this time's Hawaii

Conference became clear in "our nation's defense efforts" on the second day. Saying "There also exists the argument that [Japan] should aim for defensive strength exceeding the level of the "National Defense Program Outline," but [Japan] should not idly display great objectives," and "It is necessary to consider the state of government finances and the defense consciousness of the people, which is not necessarily positive toward a buildup of defensive strength," Vice Minister Natsume restrained the U.S. side from making any concrete requests for defense efforts, but the U.S. side did not indicate its reaction. Then what Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kelley brought up were the problems of the enhancement of sustained-combat capability and the strengthening of interoperability mentioned earlier.

Deputy Kelley pointed out that "The appropriate division of roles between Japan and America which is mentioned in the Suzuki-Reagan joint statement of May 1981 should be constantly pursued," and particularly in regard to interoperability, went on to emphasize that "It is absolutely necessary in order to effectively carry out joint Japan-U.S. operations during a crisis. It must be studied in all aspects such as tactics, training, and equipment."

(A participant on the Japanese side said) "[Japan and America] have carried out a great deal of joint training, and America has begun to judge that the capability of the Self-Defense Forces has improved considerably. They are fully able to fight together. That is precisely why they repeated the importance of interoperability."

Summit Conferences on Japan-U.S. Defense Tactics

Former Director General Kurihara and Secretary Weinberger held two Japan-U.S. Defense summit meetings on 11 May (Tokyo) and 25 September (Washington) 1984.

At the meeting in Tokyo Secretary Weinberger made clear ideas such as (1) It is necessary to take measures which will make it possible to counter and sufficiently survive a Soviet first strike. It is important to increase deterrent power and this is impossible for one country by itself. (2) Japan has recognized the Soviet threat and is strengthening its force for self defense, and [America] hopes it will continue its efforts. And (3) the capability to sustain warfare is an important problem for America too, and it welcomes the fact that Japan is also gaining capability to sustain warfare.

In response to this, though former Director General Kurihara said "the perceptions of Japan and the United States regarding the Soviet Union are different," he [also] said "I can well understand Secretary Weinberger's explanation of the Soviet buildup military force," agreeing with him on his perception of an increased Soviet threat.

The Japan-U.S. defense summit conference held at Washington in September carried on from the debate at the June Hawaii conference and centered on (1) problems in defense efforts, (2) sea-lane defense, (3) interoperability,

(4) transfer of technology, (5) the problem of capability to sustain warfare, and NLP (problems in night takeoff and landing by aircraft carried on ships).

In regard to the problem of defense efforts, along with seeking a further buildup in defensive strength, Secretary Weinberger said: "Further effort is also needed in regard to the defense of sea lanes. And it is gratifying that mutual understanding is deepening concerning interoperability."

In response to this, former Director General Kurihara displayed a positive attitude, saying that he was still not completely familiar with the word "interoperability," but that "it is necessary to go on working rapidly" to raise the quality of exclusively defensive defense, and also boasted in regard to strengthening the capability for sustained warfare, that "[We] consider it one of the main points of the 1984 mid-term program estimate. In the fiscal year 1985 rough estimate budget requests, for instance, [we] are appropriating a 57 percent increase on a contract base."

What Is the Division of Roles

People often talk about the Japan-U.S. division of roles in "sea-lane defense," but the exact content of that phrase has never been made clear.

U.S. Navy Commander (Lynton Wells), who was mentioned above, presented in his same article a hypothesis on desirable changes for now and until around the middle of the 1990's. The reason this cannot be dismissed as a mere hypothesis, is not only because (Wells) is a [U.S.] Navy commander on active service who studied at the National Defense College and did research on Japan's defense system, but because it tallies with all sorts of facts, and tallies with concepts and terminology.

For geographical division of responsibility, after first designating the vast area of the entire Western Pacific Region (from the southern tip of Kamchatka to Australia), Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and up to the Middle East as "a region which is related to both [Japan and America]" and in which "the two nations should carry on overall coordination of diplomatic and economic policy," [(Wells)] especially pointed out the Northwest Pacific (west of 160 degrees east longitude and north of 20 degrees north latitude) within this region as "an area of major concern to Japan." It is important to note that this area coincides exactly with the area of the "sea lanes for the sake of face" (east of the Philippines and north of Guam) at the time of the argument over "sea lanes."

This map convinces us of actual progress: exercises and the transformation of areas into bases.

The Sea of Okhotsk, including Petropavlosk on the Pacific Ocean side, as well as northeastern Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands, is made into a "major area of U.S. antisubmarine patrol responsibility." We have already touched upon the fact that this sea has become an important area in U.S.-Soviet nuclear strategy. In August 1982 America held a landing assault exercise off Monbetsu on the east coast of Hokkaido, and U.S. naval exercises

such as FLETEX also started in the Aleutians grazed, the front doorstep of Petropavlosk, and then headed south along the Kuril Islands.



Figure 7. Possible Geographical Division of the Mutual National Interests of Japan and the United States Around 1990 (proposal by (Lynton Wells))

KEY:
(1) Vladivostok
(2) Sphere of Japan-U.S. two-nation responsibility
(3) Southwest route
(4) Southeast route
(5) 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo
(6) Petropavlosk
(7) Principally an area of U.S. responsibility for antisubmarine patrol
(8) Principally an area of Japanese responsibility for defense

The Sea of Japan is an area of responsibility for both Japan and America. It is widely known that since 1981 U.S. carrier battle groups have held repeated

exercises in the Sea of Japan. On the map the Tsugaru Strait is within Japan's area of responsibility, the Tsushima Strait is within the area of two-nation responsibility, and the Soya Strait is the point where the area of U.S. responsibility and the area of Japan-U.S. two-nation responsibility meet.

The Pacific Ocean side [of Japan] is made into an area of major Japanese responsibility, so it is clear why Japan is now hurriedly transforming Iwo Jima into a military stronghold. A 2,600 meter runway has been provided, P-2J antisubmarine patrol aircraft and F-4's are constantly flying in, and 250 men of the Maritime Air Self-Defense Force are already permanently stationed there. Three-dimensional radar has already been completely set up, and F-15's will be added to this beginning in 1985. It is possible that the construction of (Shiramori) airport on Ishigaki Island is also related to this sphere of responsibility.

The Division of Military Roles

The geographical areas of responsibility are the division of defense burden in time of war. What do the two forces do, and where do they do it? Interoperability is probably what unifies and controls their operations.

Under (Wells') plan (a state of total war) for the respective military roles [of Japan and America] the Tsushima Straits would be blockaded on the eastern side by Japan and on the western side by America. The Tsugaru Strait would be controlled by Japan and the Soya Strait would be controlled under the responsibility of both nations, sealing up the Soviet Union's submarines. It is probably a concept of integrated operation of Japan's air defense system (BADGE) system, a combination of control by E-2C early warning aircraft and F-15 and F-4 interceptors) and the naval air defense capability of U.S. Forces (AWACS and carriers) to prevent incursion of Soviet Backfires flying from the Maritime Provinces. It has also been touched upon in the discussion of POMCUS prepositioning examined earlier.

It works out that if the air-defense and strait-blockade tactics shown here are taken to be shields, the F-16's that will be deployed at Misawa are spears pointed at Sakhalin and Vladivostok, the aircraft carriers are spears attacking Petropavlosk, Sakhalin, and the Maritime Provinces, and the Tomahawks launched from submarines cruising under water off Japan's Pacific coast and the nuclear bombs and aerial-detonation type cruise missiles carried by B-52's flying from Guam are nuclear spears thrust deep to inland regions of the far eastern Soviet Union.

And it must not be forgotten that these war plans are tightly fitted into America's strategy of "horizontal escalation."

At the end of 1984 Joint Staff Council Chairman Keitaro Watanabe, and Commander (Teiche) of U.S. Forces Japan signed a "Plan for Joint Japan-U.S. Operations." The creation of the plan for joint Japan-U.S. operations is an important prop [of the Japan-U.S. security setup] 6 years after the "guidelines for Japan-U.S. cooperation on defense." Its content is secret.

It is said that if it leaks out to the Japanese press the cabinet will be blown away, not to mention the director-general of the Defense Agency. It is reported that the division of roles between Japan and America is spelled out here in detail, not to mention troop strength and condition. Is it not probable that the division of missions and the condition of joint operations regarding "sea lane defense" that are presented in this plan follow, for the most part, the "proposal" presented by (Wells)?

If such is the case, there has been a terrible deterioration in the Japan-U.S. security arrangement under which Japan provided bases and America defended Japan. It is none other than the conclusion of a "nuclear military alliance" which ignores the people, a defense system which unilaterally entrusts America with [Japan's] destiny.

Japan-Korea and Japan-Europe Connections

From 29 September to 2 October 1984 Joint Staff Council Chairman Keitaro Watanabe, with whom you are already familiar, visited the Republic of Korea in the midst of fierce student demonstrations and met with (Lee Ki-park) (Chairman of Joint Staff Headquarters), and Commander (Liebse) of U.S.-Korean Allied Forces. What in the world did they talk about? Their real objective has not been made clear, but the fact that no Republic of Korea newspaper reported anything whatsoever conversely shows the importance of the meeting.

Interchange between the uniformed forces of Japan and the Republic of Korea became active following the first visit by Defense Agency Director-General Yamashita in 1979 (in 1980 two Republic of Korea Forces officers of full-general class and 14 of major-general or Lieutenant general class visited Japan), but following the coup d'etat by Chon Tu-hwan and the Kwangju Incident in the same year the two drew apart for a time, reopening interchange 2 years later.

In 1982 top-ranking army, navy, and air force officers visited Japan one after the other such as Air Force Chief of Staff Yi Hwi-kun (May), Third Army Intelligence Staff Officer Kim Chin-yong (June), Chief of Headquarters of the Joint Staff Council (Kang Yong-sik (July), Navy Second Staff Vice Chairman Choe Ki-Wi (July), and Army Chief of Staff Hwong Yong-si (July). Army Chief of Staff Hwant was accompanied by the chief of the Intelligence Department of the Ground Staff Office who showed him Hokkaido's 7th Division and so on.

And once each year from around 1980, 81 onward heads of intelligence departments and other executives of the Air, Ground, and Maritime Staff Offices visited the Republic of Korea from Japan to survey the military situation, and approximately 20 uniformed members of the advanced course of the Ground Self-Defense Force (Leader's School) and between 10 and 20 research students from the National Defense Academy have been visiting military facilities [in the Republic of Korea] (NIKKEI SHIMBUN 23 November 1983). One may probably assume that a more substantial interchange is developing behind the scenes.

It is also said that the U.S. military has already finished substantive discussions with Japan (eastern waterway) and the Republic of Korea (western waterway) regarding a blockade of the Tsushima Straits.

Meanwhile, when Defense Agency Director-General Kurihara met with NATO Secretary General Carrington during his visit to various Western European nations in September 1984 the NATO secretary general demanded that "Japan too lend its political support in the event that America is forced to intervene (directly) in the Iran-Iraq war." An extremely reliable NATO source points out that this statement "was made based on numerous business-level discussions between NATO and Japan concerning this war." This means that it came to light that informal discussions between Japan and NATO had been continuing in preparation for a crisis in the Persian Gulf (MAINICHI SHIMBUN 6 October 1984), which means that Japan had crossed over the Japan-U.S. security framework and was in the process of setting sail into the global expansion of "Western collective security." You will probably be reminded that the Persian Gulf was also included in (Wells') "area related to both parties" discussed above. The meaning of "relative importance equal to that of NATO" can probably be discovered here too.

A world-level military system is being built with America as the nucleus, NATO in the Atlantic, Japan and the Republic of Korea in the Pacific, and the Middle East as an area related to both; this means that Japan will occupy an important position.

(3) The Current Stage of Japan-U.S. Technological Cooperation

Cooperation with America on Military Technology

What gives a nation political power and military power is the dynamism of its economy. What gives it that dynamism is technological power. The technological competition of modern capitalism operates on this theory, and the statesmen of every nation are convinced that the loss of superiority in advanced technology and the power to develop it signify the decline of the nation.

What appeared before our eyes in this typical form was the U.S. request that Japan provide it with weapon-technology.

In the name of "the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security system" Japan smashed one corner of what had, until then, been "three principles on [non]export of weapons" and took the plunge on providing military technology to America. It is probably already certain that behind America's strong requests to Japan there existed a strategy that by placing under the Pentagon's control advanced Japanese technology which had developed to where it was equal or superior to that of America it would prevent Japan before the fact from possessing independence in military technology, and at the same time would prevent a flow of Japanese technology to the Soviet Union and the weakening of the qualitative superiority of Western weapons.

Advanced technologies such as computers and microelectronics which are Japan's specialties were developed as general-purpose technologies, but are now about to be utilized as "military technologies" which will decide the quality of weapons, that is, the superiority of war capability. It has been 2 years since the "conversation with the chief cabinet secretary" 14 January 1983) which opened the path to provision of military technology to America, and over 1 year since the exchange of official documents; how, and how far, has Japan-U.S. interchange of military technology developed? We shall take a detailed look.

The (Cary) Fact-Finding Group

Before the signing on 8 November 1983 of the formal documents exchanged regarding the provision of weapons technology to America, a fact-finding group centered on executives of U.S. weapons manufacturers such as Lockheed and General Dynamics and led by Hughes Vice President Currie visited the aerospace manufacturers Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Ltd, and the electrical manufacturers Funitsu Ltd, Hitachi Ltd, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Nippon electric Co, Ltd [NEC], and Toshiba, in addition to the Japanese Government and the Federation of Economic Organizations, and sought the cooperation of each company regarding the technology seen in Table 1.

Furthermore, in regard to the AIM-9L air to air missile which Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is producing after having brought in technology from America's Raytheon Company, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries pointed out that some of its production technology surpassed that of Raytheon, so it was asked to cooperate on production technology (NIKKEI SHIMBUN 3 November 1983).

Within general-purpose technology, the second fact-finding group, made up of Dr McCallum and other staff members of the office of the deputy secretary of defense, concentrated particularly on the targets of photoelectron engineering, milliwaves and the like, and from 9 to 20 July 1984 visited 8 companies: Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi, Sharp, Matsushita Electric, Fujitsu, and Sumitomo Electric as well as the first and third laboratories of the Defense Agency's Technical Research and Development Institute.

Based upon these surveys, at the Sixth Periodic Conference on Japan-U.S. Equipment Technology in August 1984 the U.S. Defense Department indicated strong interest in five fields among Japanese advanced technology: (1) the gallium arsenide elements used in super computers, (2) photoelectron engineering such as optical fiber (optical communications), (3) compound materials such as carbon fiber, (4) ceramics (for use in engines and electronics), and (5) heat resistant materials (considered to be special heat-resistant alloys used for turbine blades).

Furthermore, on 23 August the U.S. Defense Department published the report of the Currie fact-finding group and revealed that the U.S. side was interested in the general-purpose technology shown in Table 2.

Table 1. Japanese Weapons Technology in Which America Showed an Interest

(1)〔技術〕 (6)〔メーカー〕 (10)〔用途〕
(2) 電波吸収フェライト (7) 日本電気 (11) ステルス・エアクラフト（忍者飛行機）
(3) 音声認識装置 〃 (12) 戦闘機の搭載武器制御システム
(4) IR—CCD (8) 三菱電機 ミサイルなどの追尾 (13)
(5) CUC（炭化銅繊維） (9) 日立製作所 戦闘機の構造体 (14)
（日本経済新聞 83・11・3） (15)

KEY:
(1) Technology
(2) Radio-wave absorbing ferrite
(3) Voice recognition devices
(4) IR-CCD [infrared charge-coupled device]
(5) CUC (carbonized copper fiber)
(6) Manufacturer
(7) NEC
(8) Mitsubishi Electric
(9) Hitachi
(10) Use
(11) Stealth aircraft
(12) Weapons control system for fighter aircraft
(13) (Tracking) missiles, etc.
(14) Fighter aircraft frames
(15) (NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN 3 Nov 83)

Table 2. Japanese General-Purpose Technology in Which America is Interested

1. ガリウム砒素素子（マイクロ波及び高速度論理回路）
2. マイクロ波集積回路
3. 光ファイバー通信
4. ミリ波
5. サブミクロンのリソグラフィ
6. 画像認識
7. 音声認識・翻訳
8. 人工知能（知識ベースのコンピューターアーキテクチュア）
9. 光電素子
10. フラットディスプレイ（平面表示装置）
11. セラミックス（エンジン及びエレクトロニクス用）
12. 複合材料
13. 耐熱材料
14. ロケット推進
15. CAD（コンピューター利用設計）
16. 生産技術（ロボット技術及びメカトロニクスを含む）

KEY:
(1) Gallium arsenide elements (microwave and high speed logic circuits)
(2) Microwave integrated circuits
(3) Optical fiber communications
(4) Milliwaves
(5) Submicron lithography
(6) Image recognition
(7) Voice recognition and translation
(8) Artificial intelligence (knowledge-base computer architecture)

(9) Photoelectron elements
(10) Flat display devices
(11) Ceramics (for use in engines and electronics)
(12) Compound materials
(13) Heat-resistant materials
(14) Rocket propulsion
(15) CAD (computer-aided design)
(16) Production technology (including robot technology and mechatronics)

Gallium Arsenide

The electron-mobility of gallium arsenide elements is over five times as high as that of silicon elements which are currently the main-stream IC [integrated circuit] element, so as elements in sending and receiving devices for UHF and higher frequency radio waves they have the advantages of low noise, high gain, high effect, low-voltage operation, and smallness and lightness. Moreover, they have the virtue of not being easily effected by (electric discharge lines). Therefore this element is ideal for electronic equipment used in satellite communications.

Japan is producing almost the entire world production [of these elements]; NEC, Mitsubishi Electric, and Fujitsu form the top group [of manufacturers], and Matsushita Electronics is next in line.

And if these are made into IC's they are not only made smaller, it is [also] possible to increase the number of functions, increase performance, and lower costs. What came into being in this way was the microwave integrated circuit; NEC and Sony managed to begin selling them in the summer of 1983.

The integration of electronic circuits for use with milliwaves, which are shorter than microwaves, and to that extent more resistant to electronic jamming is still in the future, and gallium arsenide elements are currently important elements for use with milliwaves.

In this field too, it can probably be said that Japan, which developed practical large-volume inter-building communications and milliwave communications satellites ahead of the rest of the world, is most advanced.

Next is surface elastic-wave elements of electronic-use ceramics. This is the most superior element for cutting radio jamming and its manufacture is almost monopolized by Japanese powers such as Toshiba, Sony, Taiyo Yuden Co, Ltd, and Murata Mfg Co, Ltd. This too is an indispensible element for military communications or internal electronic devices for missiles.

Super Computers

As stated in Part III, [among] America's military communications networks the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) which is used for global transmission of strategic orders uses microwave SHF, and the Air Force Satellite System and Fleet Satellite System which receive those orders each

use UHF. In the 1990's (Milstar) satellites using milliwaves which are resistant to radio jamming and resistant even to antisatellite attack, that is, have high survivability, will probably make an appearance as the nucleus of the present DSCS. All of the elements and integrated circuits mentioned above will be indispensible in making America's military communications network more durable and improving its performance.

And due to the high electron mobility of gallium arsenide elements they are attracting attention as elements for use in the super computer of the next era. The super computer was developed for use in the "headquarters" of the military communications network. The current highest computation speed is that of the super computer manufactured by Hitachi 630 million computations per second, but the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI]'s project to develop a "high speed computation system for use in scientific technology" is aiming at [a speed of] 10 billion computations per second, approximately 15 times that of Hitachi's super computer.

As elements for this project Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, and Toshiba are responsible for gallium arsenide elements, Funitsu and Oki Electric Industry Co, Ltd are responsible for HEMT [high electron mobility transistor] elements which use gallium arsenide and aluminum gallium arsenide, and Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC are responsible for the Josephson connection elements, development of which was abandoned by IBM. All are world leaders. In addition to these enterprises, MITI's (Comprehensive Research Institute) and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation's [NTT's] Atsugi Electro-communications Laboratory, which rejected the second fact-finding group, have both published good results.

Super computers are indispensible for headquarters use, but the architecture of artificial intelligence is very suitable for rapid setting up of operations by the headquarters of front-line units. When it comes to planning operations, in addition to being able to receive all needed data from data communications satellites, it is possible to utilize all sorts of software for knowledge, tactics, logic, and so on, so it means giving front line commanders the same capability as great generals.

In fiscal year 1982 Japan began its project to develop a fifth generation computer ahead of the rest of the world, and in September 1984 NEC developed for practical use a non-Neumann-type data-flow computer which provides a foothold to the fifth-generation artificial intelligence computer, also ahead of the world.

What must not be forgotten here is that the important thing in making IC's and elements other than Josephson connection elements is how to produce flawless gallium arsenide crystals. Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd which excels in this technology has an 80 percent share of the domestic market and a 50 percent share of the world market. Furthermore, submicron lithography technology is necessary for integration technology as memory for use in computers. The lithography technology whith NTT's Atsugi Electrocommunications Laboratory and other representative IC manufacturers use in making VLSI

[very large-scale integrated circuits] currently far outstrips that of U.S. enterprises.

Optical Fiber

In optical fiber communications America's AT&T gave a contract [literally awarded the number one marker] to Fujitsu in October 1981 for an optical fiber network between New York and Boston, but it was cancelled due to the application of defense regulations. Fujitsu's system has a transmission speed of 400 Megabits per second, but the one delivered by AT&T's subsidiary WE [Western Electric] had a speed of 180 Megabits per second. What determines this difference in performance is the performance of photoelectron elements (light emitting diodes and semiconductor lasers) and optical fiber.

Optical fiber communications is resistant not only to jamming, [but also] to the magnetic pulse at the time of a nuclear explosion, so it is an indispensible system for military communications. But ordinary quartz fiber has the defect that when it suffers intense radiation it becomes optically damaged and ceases to transmit light easily. Radiation-resistant fiber which solves this problem has also been developed by Sumitomo Electric and other manufacturers of electric wire.

Thus Japan is ahead of America both in the electric manufacturers of photoelectron elements and the electric line manufacturers of optical fibers. It is precisely because of this background that already in 1980 an NEC optical fiber communications system was constructed by the Department of Defense as an approximately 29 kilometer air defense communications system between North American Air Defense Headquarters (NORAD) in Colorado's Colorado Springs and neighboring Peterson Air Force Base.

As shown by the preceding, if software is excluded, it is clear that Japan possesses very excellent general-purpose technology in the hard technology which is indispensible to the military communications network that the U.S. Defense Department is trying to prepare in the future.

Voice and Image Recognition

Image recognition is the IR-CCD (infrared light-solid state camera element) of Table 1. CCD using visible light is used by civilian video cameras and so on; Sony was an early developer, and made a delivery to America's National aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1981. In October 1981 the Defense Agency entrusted Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, and Fujitsu with the development of IR-CCD with infrared detection function for use in missiles and the like. The Defense Agency and Mitsubishi Electric were scheduled to publish their results at the International Solid State Circuits Conference (ISSCC) which was held in New York in February 1983, but suddenly cancelled their presentation. In October 1984 Toshiba developed a portable anti-aircraft missile which, being equipped with IR-CCD that captures the enemy aircraft as an infra red image, is theoretically superior to the U.S. military's "Stinger" portable SAM [surface to air missile] which operates on a system of tracking the infrared light radiated from an engine.

In voice recognition NEC is superior and has applied it in fighter aircraft weapon control systems. [With these systems] it is possible to give commands by voice. In machine translation Hitachi and Fujitsu both began marketing [devices] in the autumn of 1984, ahead of the rest of the world. Present devices are imperfect, but in the future they will probably be deployed to assault units as order deciphering machines.

The flat display to which the U.S. Defense Department is paying most interest is the Sharp EL (electro luminance) display. This is in order to use it in antitank attack helicopters. The EL is thinner than a CRT (cathode ray tube), so even if the picture is made larger it does not take up space. Therefore, other devices can be loaded in the space thus opened up, adding new functions.

And if infrared laser radar is used it not only enhances performance in detection of enemies, but [also] makes it possible to freely evade transmission lines and large trees which are great dangers to helicopters, so that it is possible to fly with great agility. This is because EL is suited for display at such times.

Utilization of Ceramics

A strategic bomber is not just a huge metal object; because of poor combustion efficiency deriving from the heat-resistance limit of the engine material, it must emit that much more combustion gas from the engine. Therefore it has defects such as: (1) it is easily caught by ordinary radar networks, and (2) air currents disturbed by the heat and particles of the combustion gas are easily caught by OTH-B (over the horizon) radar which is watching from beyond the horizon, and are also caught by surveillance satellites with infrared detection devices.

Therefore, in regard to the radar in (1), it will be alright if one covers the surface of the aircraft body with a substance which will absorb broad-band range waves without reflecting them, that is, the ceramic called ferrite paint. NEC has developed an excellent product of this type.

In regard to (2) one can conceive of a ceramic engine which has good heat efficiency and good heat insulation, so there is little emission of infrared light from the aircraft body and little emission of combustion gas. A heat-resistant special alloy would probably also be necessary for the turbine blade used in that [ceramic engine].

Nine firms such as Toshiba, Asahi Glass Co, Ltd, Kyoto Ceramic Co, Ltd, Ishikawajima-Harima, and NGK Insulators, Ltd are in the process of developing ceramic engines with the backing of MITI. At present, they are not completely ceramic, but Isuzu Motors, Ltd and Nissan Motor Co, Ltd each developed a ceramic automobile engine in 1984. And in regard to the heat-resistant special allow as well, in May 1984 the Science and Technology Agency's National Research Institute for Metals developed the world's strongest super alloy.

By means of the above a "stealth aircraft" is formed which is difficult to capture by ordinary radar networks, by OTH-B radar networks, or by infrared detection surveillance satellites, but beyond this, a (composite body) is being employed as the (aircraft body) in place of metal in order to lighten the burden on the engine. Of course just by making the engine ceramic the weight of the engine is reduced by approximately 50 percent or more, so even just that is a major change, but if a composite body is also used the aircraft can be made still lighter. In the case of the horizontal tail blade of the B-737 [Boeing 737], the weight is reduced 29 percent by using carbon-fiber reinforced resin.

The (Grosvatter) law states that when the weight of an aircraft's body is reduced by 30 percent its speed increases by 20 percent or more, so these weight reductions not only lighten the burden of the engines and to that extent reduce gas emissions and raise (stressability), but also increase acceleration and speed.

The CUC (carbonized copper fiber) appearing in Table 1 was developed by Hitachi in joint research with Toray Industries, Inc in March 1982 as a buffer material between a semiconductor's substrate and its electrodes and elements, and is a superior composite material in terms of thermal conductivity and electric characteristics. The U.S. military probably noticed that it is more effective than other composite materials in guarding electronic equipment inside the body of the aircraft from jamming.

A report "Seeking Better Cooperation" which was submitted to Prime Minister Nakasone and President Reagan by the (Japan-U.S. Advisory Commission) on 17 September 1984 stated that "as the two major technological powers, Japan and the United States should go on actively promoting research and development following the order of priorities determined by those responsible for defense policy in both countries and responding to individual arrangements between private sector enterprises."

The report went on to say: "there is deep significance in combining the advanced electronics, telecommunications, maintenance, production technology and so on, which are Japan's strong points, with the system engineering and software technology of America."

But should we really permit the advanced technology which has been developed by civilian technicians to be utilized, not to increase the richness and stability of people's lives, but to increase the scale and efficiency of destruction and slaughter?

And is it absolutely impossible that while being flattered by talk of "two major technological powers" and the like, after a while Japan will [end up] as a technical subcontractor for America's military industry and incorporated under its control?

(4) Emergency Legislation and "Civil Defense"

The Second Report on Research on a System of Emergency Laws

On 16 October 1984 Defense Agency Director-General Kurihara presented the second interim report on "research on a system of emergency laws" to the lower house Special Committee on Security.

Put simply, "research on a system of emergency laws" is something which is trying to build a system which will give priority to military affairs across all fields, political, economic, and social, in order to make combat operations smooth and effective. It takes the form of an examination for defects in the legal system in order to make Self-Defense Force operational action more rapid, and is closely geared to the Self-Defense Force operations research "Defense Research" (top secret) which is currently being carried out in total secrecy.

The [study was begun in August 1977 and classified the laws with which it dealt into three categories ((1) laws administered by the Defense Agency, (2) laws administered by other ministries and agencies of government, and (3) laws relating to items for which the administering ministry or agency was unclear); in April 1981 an interim report was issued concerning the first category. This discussed article 103 of the Self-Defense Force Law which stipulates matters concerning such things as expropriation of goods and use of land in wartime, article 22 of the same law, which provides for the formation of special units (combined units with air, land, and sea forces mixed together), article 70 of the same law, concerning the recruitment of (reserve members of the Self-Defense Forces), and so on, and pointed out "defects" in 11 items, principally in the legal system related to military conduct of the Self-Defense Forces.

The latest interim report relates to the second category of laws administered by other ministries and agencies, and seeks revisions such as treatment as an exception in regard to 15 items in 11 laws such as (1) movement and transport of units (Highway Transportation Law, Maritime Transportation and Safety Law, Aviation Law), (2) use of land (Seashore Law, Rivers Law, Forests Law, National Parks Law), (3) construction of buildings (Architectural Standards Law), (4) electrocommunications, (5) handling of explosives (regulations on transport of dangerous materials by ship and storage of dangerous materials), (6) hygiene and medical treatment (Medical Treatment Law), (7) the handling of those killed in action (laws concerning cemeteries, funerals, and so on), and (8) accounting (Accounting Law).

The Defense Agency says that these research reports "are not preparation for legislation in the near future," but a draft outline of cabinet order revisions needed for category 1 Defense-Agency related laws has already been completed within the Defense Agency, and it is said that the stage has been reached in regard to the second category of the latest report as well where "if all the ministries put their minds to it a draft of the revised laws would be completed in a flash" (ASAHI SHIMBUN 16 October 1984).

Passage in 2 Weeks

From the very beginning it was research bound by the establishment of a framework which called for operating "within the boundaries of the present constitution," so things such as a military draft system or a system for control of speech and of the press were not studied ("On Research in the Defense Agency on an Emergency Legal System" 21 September 1978). But the present constitution has never had any provisions for emergency powers which tell how to deal with a national state of emergency, so it can be said that there is a great contradiction involved in the very act of high-lighting "imperfections" of laws based on this constitution for a time of crisis.

Legally speaking, it means that it can be said to be a movement of "constitutional revision through interpretation," so to speak, which, by the arrangement of laws, emasculates the spirit of the constitution which stands on a consistent pacifism, but, conversely, if the Defense Agency really assumed an emergency there would be consolidation of the law in order to establish a wartime system which, not to mention control of speech and the press, restricted all aspects of basic human rights and mobilized human and material resources; there is no way that it could stop at the level indicated in this interim report.

Actually it has reached the stage at which the "(Sanya) Research" (implemented in 19863) which should be called the prototype "emergency legal system," and which covered 77 to 87 bills for wartime including revision of article 103 of the Self-Defense Force Law examined above, defense administration of justice (special courts), and defense protection (Military Aircraft Protection Law) as well as a supplementary budget proposal was brought up before an extra session of the Diet and approved in about 2 weeks.

The Defense Agency considers that its own independent research ended with this second report. In regard to category 3 which remains to be studied, since there is a strong possibility that it will touch more broadly upon the rights of the people, the Defense Agency waited for a cabinet decision, and proposed that "it is necessary in the future to study it from a wider standpoint," merely listing four topics: (1) protection, evacuation, and guidance of residents, (2) guaranteeing the security of civilian ships and aircraft, (3) effective use of radio waves, (4) establishment of prisoner of war camps in accordance with international treaties. This already includes things which lead to "compulsory evacuation" and "regulation of the press."

In March 1984 Prime Minister Nakasone replied, in connection with the Upper House budget bill, that "the third category is a question for the entire cabinet, I would like to press them for action on this as soon as possible," and a Defense Agency source also reports that "it is probably conceivable that the Cabinet Councilors' Office will take charge of it" (MAINICHI SHIMBUN 16 October 1984).

Table 3. "Military Defense" and "Civil Defense" in NATO



KEY: (1) General defense
(2) Military defense
(3) Civil defense
(4) NATO-level military defense
(5) Military defense on the level of each nation
(6) NATO-level civil defense
(7) Civil defense on the level of each nation
(8) Exchange of experience and coordination of opinion on civil defense
(9) Cooperation concerning crisis management
(10) Establishment of a NATO civilian wartime organization and participation in NATO activities by each country
(11) Civil defense agreements between two or more countries
(12) Maintenance of national and government functions
(13) Protection of the people of the nation
(14) Supply and stockpiling
(15) Cooperation with the armed forces
(16) (Yutaka Goda) "Civil Defense in Allied Nations"

"Civil Defense"

"Civil defense" is considered one of the big items in category 3. It is predicted that this will gradually be made a focus of attention in the future as an object of debate.

"Civil defense" is taken to be a defense system [under which] in time of war "the [central] government, local autonomous bodies, and the people of the nation unite in one body" for "disaster prevention, rescue, and evacuation of the people" in order to "protect the lives and property of the people and hold damage to a minimum" (1959 White Paper on Defense), and matters such as the enactment of relevent laws, the formation of organizations, and the construction of shelters are cited.

For a definition of "civil defense" it is possible to cite the passage (article 61) "this refers to performing all or part of the humanitarian duties listed below designed to protect the general populace from the danger of hostile action or natural calamity, and assist the general populace to recover from the direct effects of hostile action or natural calamity, as well as to provide the conditions necessary for survival" found in "Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Concerning the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict," which took effect on 7 December 1978.

And the following are presented as "the humanitarian duties listed below": (1) warning [signal], (2) evacuation, (3) administration of shelters, (4) implementation of blackout measures, (5) rescue, (6) religious assistance and medical services including emergency treatment (7) firefighting, (8) detection and indication of dangerous areas, (9) disinfecting and similar protective measures, (10) provision of emergency housing and supplies, (11) emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in disaster areas, (12) emergency repair of indispensible public facilities, (13) emergency disposition of the dead, (14) assistance in the preservation of things indispensible to survival, (15) supplementary activities necessary in carrying out any of the above listed duties."

It has come about that the "civilian relief organizations" that participate in these tasks are respected in wartime too, and must be protected.

This means that "civil defense" is the activity of protecting the lives and property of citizens from war and natural disaster, and according to (Yutaka Roda), chief of the Third Research Section of the National Defense College's Research Division, these are "minkan boei" [the Japanese term usually translated as civil defense] in the narrow sense which should be called "civil protection" [here the transliteration for the English is given] or something like that; the broader concept of "civil defense" [here too the transliteration of the English is given] is used in all countries in order to make it more effective.

This [concept] includes: (1) the preservation of national and government functions in time of war (for example: a) granting of authority in time of emergency, b) clarification of order of succession of authority, c) guaranteeing the survival of important national and government functions, and d) guaranteeing of communications and information systems and the like),

(2) stability of the life of the people of the nation (on the economic side: a) guaranteeing food and water, b) guaranteeing of energy and the necessities of life, c) guaranteeing transportation and communications, d) maintenance of production. On the social side: a) maintenance of public order, b) protection of cultural properties, c) medical treatment, d) measures for public information, reporting of news, and so on),

(3) cooperation with the armed forces (a) machinery for military-civilian cooperation and the main points of cooperation, b) coordination of allotment of staff between military and civilians c) collection of information and

reports and bulletins, d) maintenance of munitions production and replenishing of important commodities, e) provision of land, facilities, and so on, f) assistance in medical treatment, g) evacuation control) ("Civil Defense in Allied Nations" SHIN BOEI RONSHU March 1984 issue).

This goes far beyond what we imagine when we hear "civil defense," and is closer to something called "a system for total mobilization of the nation's people." Furthermore, it is clear that it coincides with the topics of research on an emergency legal system.

May one not view it as [a case of] in fact trying to make citizens cooperate with military activity and involve them in it while championing "nonmilitary activity" for the sake of protecting the lives and property of the people? If one asks the reason, it is because they say "The armed forces cannot carry out its defense mission in the nation or on the nation's periphery unless the general populace cooperates in the display of operational functions and the maintenance of operational freedom" (ibid.).

Making a Hostage of the Safety of Life

On 20 October 1984 former minister without portfolio Ichiro Nakanishi put together a progress report of his personal study group "The Group for Informal Discussion on Crisis Control Problems" (chairman: Hidezo Inaba) and turned it over to Prime Minister Nakasone, and it contained a report of a (special deliberative commission on civil defense) in addition to reports on information, food, agriculture, energy, rare metals, (durability) and cities.

The report says that the question of "how to contribute [misprint] to the unified security of our nation within the bounds of the basic activities of the lives of its citizens" was studied because "today, almost 40 years after World War II, our nation still lacks a national concensus of the people's will in the conflict concerning the problem of security," and proposes concretely that a legal basis be given to civil defense, a civil defense system be established, and so on.

"In our nation at present I suppose there are people who think that if a great earthquake or some other important emergency arises they can hide or run away, but even if they flee blindly or hide blindly they do so in vain. Everyone must learn that they cannot go on living unless, under cooperation between government and people, the know-how of how to flee, how to hide, how to cope, in other words, how to live, is prepared during normal times and is known to all"--this is the keynote of the report.

Here too, cooperation with the government and the armed forces, and obedience to one dimensional control are sought, with life and safety made hostages.

"Civil Defense" for the Sake of an "Allied Nation"

What should be noted still more, is the relationship between "allied nation" and "civil defense."

In the article mentioned above (Goda), having first stipulated that civil defense is essentially national in nature, cites civil defense in NATO and the Republic of Korea as examples. But while doing that he states that "The guaranteeing of domestic productive capability, transport and communications capability and so on, and stability of the people's lives are necessary preconditions in order to be able to effectively carry out support such as supply, transport, equipping and so on of U.S. Forces which come to Japan's aid." In concrete terms he states that maintenance of national and government functions, stability of the lives of the people of the nation, warning and relief activities, and facilitation of the operations of the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces are necessary.

The thesis is that it is precisely civil defense which will remove unstable elements vis a vis military operation action of U.S. Forces in an emergency, that it will increase America's confidence in Japan, and by extension contribute to the security of the entire West.

One must not overlook the fact that civil defense is being considered as a means of enhancing deterrent force. This is because without protection for the people of the country their fighting spirit will not rise and it will be impossible to prosecute a war.

It is nothing much. "An emergency legal system," and one which does not adhere to the constitution at that, and the concept spoken of as "crisis management," and the concept of "deterrent" too; all are contained within the soothing words "civil defense."

In July 1978 Prime Minister Fukuda directed that a study be carried out concerning promotion of "civil defense"[3] along with "research on an emergency legal system." But the work was interrupted with a shakeup in that cabinet, and after that this problem did not see the light of day within the government. It is probably already clear why the question of "civil defense" emerged again at this time. While carrying on research on an emergency legal system," before the barriers of the constitutional framework and public opinion [the government] could not take the kind of effective measures it would like, so it is trying to gather in a consensus of the people on defense through this comfortable word and build a substantive "crisis set up."

Protest and Survive!

The provision of "shelters" naturally occupies a core position in civil defense.

The "Crisis Management Social Group" report which was examined above cites "radiation disaster" along with large-scale disasters and emergency disasters as things which should be dealt with, and lists "preparing basements, underground cities, subways, sewers, and shelters, and making survival manuals on stockpiling of food and the like, well digging, securing fuel, and keeping implements for taking shelter constantly on hand."

There are differences in the concept and structure of shelters, and it has been reported that Switzerland is most advanced, with shelters capable of holding 80 percent of its total population, Norway can hold approximately 45 percent of its population, and West Germany 3 percent (Yutaka Goda "Twelve Lectures on Civil Defense: KOKUBO [National Defense] September 1984); [Goda] preaches the necessity of all sorts of financial assistance for the sake of building shelters, and of public relations such as distribution of lists of what to do in a nuclear attack.

Of course it must be said that even if there are shelters it is extremely uncertain whether or not one will survive in a nuclear war. Because shelters are useless if they suffer a direct hit, and even if one were to survive, there is research which indicates that the Earth would be enveloped in a "nuclear winter" if just a portion of the nuclear arms which exist in the world were to be used. There is no doubt that if a nuclear war occurs conditions will appear in which "the living will envy the dead."

Rather it might be better to think that the raising of "civil defense" arguments is aimed at changing people's consciousness of defense by training and educating people in disaster prevention and evacutation. The construction of shelters, too, is probably one link in a "crisis set up" which controls the people of the nation through fear, while spreading around the illusion of survival.

In that sense one must give heed to the unified government-civilian "disaster drills" which are held every year in September (on 1 September 1984 14 million people took part throughout the country) in preparation for a large-scale earthquake. This is because it is said that "all the nations of the world include natural disasters within the mission of civil defense" (op. cit. Goda Civil Defense in Allied Nations), and because they can also be called large-scale "civil defense" drills which mobilize citizens. The Self-Defense Forces are also geared to these drills.

The fact is fresh in our minds that the British government's "civil defense" textbook, "Protect and Survive," incited the uneasiness and wrath of citizens as a concrete preparation for nuclear war, gave birth to "Protest and Survive," the bible of the antinuclear movement, and led to an explosion of the antinuclear movement. We probably should make good use of this lesson.

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